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## **To rehabilitate the road or how to make of a road project an urban project. Ambitions and contradictions. The case of Marseille.**

**Stéphanie LEHEIS**

Université Paris-Est

LATTS Laboratoire Techniques Territoires Sociétés

stephanie.leheis@enpc.fr

+33-0-1641-53588

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### **Introduction**

The theme of transport and town planning articulation is one of the most present in planning. It's one of the main challenges of urban planning. It can be treated according to two approaches, following if one is interested in the tools of planning or the actors. In the first case, it is question of thinking on the effectiveness and the relevance of tools for coordination between policies. In the second approach, this selected here, it is question of analyzing the way in which the actors meet, negotiate and work together to conclude a global project.

The planning policies are confronted today with several challenges: an evolution of practices, in particular related to the multiplication of actors in the decision-making process; an evolution of stakes, carried by the discourse on sustainable development which supposes a better articulation between environmental, social and economic stakes. Most of analyzes agree thus on the idea of a complexification of processes. In this context, the objective of public policies coordination is all the more strong given that it supposes the emergence of new forms of governance and project management.

The object of this paper is to look at concretely how is made the articulation between a road project and an urban project, and which are the obstacles met. This work is based on a case study: the L2 by-pass in Marseille. It comes within the framework of a research contract on mega urban transport projects, managed by the Omega Centre (University College London) and funded by Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF)<sup>1</sup>. This highway link (not completed) is supposed to pass through the North districts. The road project must be an opportunity for the renovation of the poorest districts of Marseille. Considering sustainability challenge, how to integrate an highway in a densely populated district?

Based on this study case, I make the hypothesis that the link between road project and renovation project is built by the actors, and is not enough to carry out the two projects jointly. The sociology of translation will enable us

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<sup>1</sup> Site du programme de recherche : <http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk>

to identify the translation process at work which resulted in associating the realization of the infrastructure project with that of urban renovation.

The recourse to the theories of political sciences will enable us to highlight the obstacles at the coordination of public policies. This approach supposes an analysis of the conflicts of stakeholders: the phases of coordination are interpreted like moments of convergence between the various strategies of the actors. Thus we will be able to identify arrangements which are created between the stakeholders. However, if this approach enables us to understand how follow one another of the phases of convergence then of divergences between the actors, it does not make it possible to explain why the project advances on the fringe in spite of the failure of the process of coordination. A data must be reintroduced here: time. We will show how in spite of a strong consensus between the actors, time plays against the project and results in projections with the margin.

The timeline profile of the project and the stakeholders analysis were made from planning documents and interviews with most of the actors involved in the project.

In this paper, we will initially reconsider the history of the link between urban and infrastructure project, in the case of L2: who builds this discourse? In which documents it is translated?

Then we will confront the quoted ambitions of coordination between the two projects with the reality of their implementation. Which are the devices and tools which allow the actors coordination? Which is the reality of project progressing? This analysis will enable us to identify some of the obstacles to the coordination of these two policies.

Finally we will show the limits of this approach, by introducing the question of temporalities of the project and the actors to understand the process at work.

## **The articulation between transport and town planning, a commonplace.**

### **An old set of themes but always topical.**

This old set of themes is related to the very definition of transport and networks. A transport infrastructure is a physical object first which must find its place and be integrated. It's undoubtedly the first level of articulation between transport and town planning. At the same time, the infrastructure-network creates link, connects and takes part in territorial construction (OFFNER & PUMAIN, 1996). Thus to go further in the articulation, it is necessary to take account of this capacity of infrastructures to create, to structure/destructure territory. The urban history<sup>2</sup> testifies to the old link between transport infrastructures and urban forms. The perennality of the road network<sup>3</sup> is an illustration. If we consider the recent history, progressive planning<sup>4</sup>, directed towards the ideology of progress, hygiene and the technique, has deeply modified the relationship between urban form and infrastructure. It developed at the beginning of the 20th century, at the moment when majority of the great urban networks (transport, electricity, cleansing...) that we know today develop most quickly. In particular with the Modern Movement, carried by Le CORBUSIER, symbolized by the Charter of Athens (1933), two great principles are essential: the functional division of urban space (zoning) and the separation of flows. The mass development of the car after the WWII will see the application of these principles. The effects on the city were important. The BUCHANAN report, *Traffic in towns* (1963) testifies to the way in which the city adapts gradually to the car. The street is changed in road. As of the years 1970 many criticisms protest against these infrastructures built on the model of the network-pipe which constitutes a heavy heritage today. The criticism of this progressive planning also resulted in a deep crisis of town planning. In 1991, G. DUPUY makes the diagnosis of a disconnection between infrastructure and territory. The functional division between territory (use of space) and system of mobility led a sectoral approach and a dysfunction of the planning system in France.

Practices evolve gradually today, partly thanks to the speech of sustainable development, which tends to be essential like a new reference frame of public policies. The challenge of town planning is from now on to make the road differently, to remake of street a public space (success of the concept of urban boulevard). These objectives are reinforced by the rhetoric of sustainable development, which supposes an articulation of economic, social and environmental issues. If we take again the definition suggested by KAUFMANN and JEMELIN (2003), the introduction of sustainable development in transport and its application on mobility precisely implies a better coordination of transport and planning policies. Today the success of the concept of urban project and the development of new methods of project management translate this same ambition. For example, the recent creation of ANRU (National agency for urban renovation) by the law also goes in the direction of a better articulation between the various levers of action for urban renovation. With this agency, urban renovation is thinking as a global project with only one budget for transport, equipments, housing, etc.

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<sup>2</sup> *Espaces et Sociétés*, n°95 and MERLIN, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> LEPETIT, 1994.

<sup>4</sup> Defined by CHOAY, 1965.

The evolution of the legally framework illustrates this will to create new tools to make infrastructures in a different way. The objective of articulation is clearly formulated in the French law. The first steps are established with the LOF (Law of Land Orientation) in 1967 which introduces this objective of coordination and creates the first tools (SDAU: Master development plans; POS: Plans of occupation). The most recent laws (1999-2000) confirm the tendency, with the laws Voynet, Chevènement and Solidarity-Urban-Renovation (SRU). By these three laws, sustainable development is presented as a new reference for planning policies; the cooperation between institutional scales is supported; and especially tools for coordination between transport and town planning are modernized (WACHTER, 2002). The creation of the SCOT (Territorial coherence schemes) in particular must allow a better coherence between transport schemes and urban plans.

### **To built the link between transport project and urban project.**

The construction of a link between transport and urban project answers current problems initially: congestion and continuous increase of automobile traffic which involve a saturation of networks; and an urban fragmentation. But this idea of coordination between infrastructure and urban projects does not go from oneself, it is built by the actors. It is based on the myth of the structuring effects of transport infrastructures (OFFNER, 1993) which introduces a simple and linear causality between transport infrastructure and socioeconomic development. Transport policies, and especially in case of public transport, are regarded as an integration factor for depressed areas. In a recent study, several authors<sup>5</sup> analyzed the various documents of planning (Master plans, Transport plans, contracts of city). In these documents we can see emerging the idea that transport infrastructures (like tramway or metro) make it possible to reinforce social cohesion, to requalify urban territories, to remedy to spatial divisions, and are also a tool for economic insertion. The speech on coordination between infrastructure and town planning is based largely on this myth of the structuring effects; it makes it possible in particular to the actors of an infrastructure project to develop the following speech: thanks to this infrastructure we will remake the city. It is what we can see in the case of public transport infrastructure (TCSP). The opening-up of districts by the means of new infrastructures (in particular projects of TCSP) is a priority for city policy. In the case of the road projects, the situation is more complex. The heritage of functional planning has given a bad image to the road. The actors of a road project must convince that they want and that they can make urban integration. It is the stake of the case of study presented here: we will see how the project evolved in the direction of a better urban integration and especially how the actors of the project built a link between the road project and the renovation of the crossed districts.

We will be based here on the theories of the sociology of innovation, and in particular on the sociology of translation. It is a question of understanding the implementation of a technical project, here a road project. This process supposes: a work of profit-sharing or interestment (it is necessary to convince and interest funders and institutions); a work of translation (the promoter of the project must persuade the allies that the realization of their objectives passes by the realization of its project, by establishing a chain of interest); and finally the designation of spokesperson. This analysis makes it possible to understand situations of controversies, in particular when a technical solution is called into question on the public stage. In our case it will enable us to understand the translation process at work which results in associating the project of the L2 by-pass with a more global project of renovation of the north districts. The recourse to the sociology of translation will enable us to identify the actors concerned and the devices used.

### **A challenge for the projects governance.**

This ambition of articulation between transport and urban projects must face today with a new context of local public action. The opening of decision-making process with public participation and the interaction between the various decisional levels, create a new requirement for the local public action (GAUTIER). Decentralization and Welfare state crisis called into question the system of cross regulation (CROZIER & THOENIG, 1976) which prevailed in the relationship between national and local authorities. In this model, the State directed the whole of public policies, thanks to the control of two essential resources, money allocation and emission of legal rules. This hegemony of the State governance did not prevent however negotiations at the local level, where forms of adjustment, exchanges and of coalition appeared. The opening of the collective play calls into question this model. It is analyzed as the mark of a new form of governance between State and local authorities (DURAN & THOENIG). In this new model, the construction of public policies passes by a local management of problems. That supposes a new definition of issues at a local level, and especially a mobilization of the local actors to adapt, build and set up jointly policies.

The challenge raised by the L2 by-pass project come within this analysis framework. The infrastructure is built by the State, via its regional services (DRE-DDE). Although the infrastructure crosses to a dense urban area, in

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<sup>5</sup> DUFLOS E., TRUCHETTI I., ROSALES-MONTANO S., BEAUCIRE F., 1999.

Marseille, the project control by the State is justified by its connecting function between two highways (A7 and A50). In this project, this is the capacity for the State to lead a policy towards the local authorities which is in question. Indeed the infrastructure implementation as its good coordination with the urban project (which is led at the local level) supposes an implication and a strong mobilization of local authorities. Transport policies like urban renovation are two means of action at local scale to impose itself as a metropolitan government (SALET, THORNLEY, KREUKELS, 2003). The main issue is thus to understand how the city seizes or not a project carried by the State within the framework of a metropolitan construction.

The recourse to the theories of political sciences makes it possible here to analyze coordination between urban and infrastructure planning according to the governance of the project. In the French context of persistence of the conflicts between State and local authorities, this analysis makes it possible to identify obstacles to the coordination of projects.

## **Presentation of the case study.**

The two projects studied relate to the North districts of Marseille. It is about a road infrastructure project: the by-pass L2 and a renovation project

### **Marseille and the North districts.**

This town, even so the third of France with 1.6 million inhabitants, is characterized by a lack in transport infrastructures. The site of the city centre, between sea and hills, limits the possibilities of urban extension and restrains the localization of infrastructures in corridors. We can added a fast urbanization, badly controlled in the years 1960-1980 which led to irreversible choices in planning, in particular by privileging the road infrastructures. The very important use of private cars also testifies to the weak investment in public transport. However the weakness of financial resources of the city, in comparison with other French equivalent cities, makes difficult the rebalancing between the different modes. On the metropolitan level, displacements are multiplied by the separation of employment, activities and housing poles, which amplifies saturation of existing infrastructures.

The L2 project crosses the districts East and North. The north districts in particular belong to poorest of the city. They correspond to the perimeter of ex-ZUP n°1 (Priority zone of urbanization), gathering more than 40.000 inhabitants, in housing estates built hurriedly in the Sixties and Seventies. These districts were built according the successive waves of immigration. The population of these districts today is very dense, younger than in the rest of the city, little or not qualified, and very touched by unemployment.

### **An urban project.**

Since the creation of a priority zone, this district was the object of many renovation projects, but much did not succeed. The concentration of housing estates and the plurality of social, urban and economic handicaps, encouraged with the creation of a great urban project, become GPV in 2000. The territory of the GPV today gathers 220 000 inhabitants, and 1/3 of the surface of Marseille. The GPV corresponds to a huge project of urban and social reintegration of these districts. This structure is organized in partnership with the State, the Region and the Town authorities. Operations of the ANRU are carried out within the framework of the GPV. Several operations are already signed with the ANRU: Plan d'Aou, Flamants, Crénaux, Saint Joseph, Saint Paul; and others are to be come. The GPV works on several means of action: displacements, economic development, employment and the urban reorganization. Within this framework, the modification of the Arnavon-Allende Boulevard which divides urban space is presented as a major opportunity for the district renovation.

### **A road project.**

Today the infrastructures network in Marseille counts 2 corridors (in North with A7 and A55, in the East with A50, connected by a by-pass in near periphery); the radial lines (S8 and S4); and a connection crossing the town center (Tunnel of Prado Careenage).

The L2 by-pass is conceived as a belted highway. This way will ensure the traffic continuity between the highways A7 north, A55 in the North-West and A50 in the east. Two great stakes are presented by the DDE, which is responsible for this project: a stake of improvement of the road network (the implementation of these new routes and the hierarchisation of the different roads will make it possible to offer better circulation conditions and safety on the whole of the network); a stake in the urban plan of displacements for Marseille (idea that L2 will offer opportunity of reducing car traffic in the center).

## **Construction of the link between road project and urban renovation.**

The issue of this third point is to make the history of the link between urban project and infrastructure project, and to see the way in which the actors of the road project built this link.

### **From the infrastructure cut to the integrated infrastructure.**

The decentralized services of the State carry the responsibility for the road project since 1979. The L2 project illustrates pretty well the practices evolution in planning evoked in the first point. Registered in master plan since 1930, the project has undergone several modifications in order to adapt to the stakes of urban integration. In spite of this early inscription and land acquisitions made throughout years, the road project emerges at the end of 1960's. To face with a strong population growth and a fast urbanization, the town of Marseille start the construction of Arnavon and Allende boulevards. Located in the north districts, these boulevards then seem like the first step of a loop line around downtown area. The logic was very different from today: *"The project at the beginning was conceived from a point of view of the Fifties - Sixties, the engineers who envisaged the project had never made urban development, they did not know what it was"*<sup>6</sup>. The infrastructure is built in the beginning of the 1970's, and forms a 2x2 ways which passes bottom of housing estates. The infrastructure is clearly a cut, which isolates blocks and doesn't supply the local traffic. The lack of means leads the city to stop here. The project is also transferred to the State, which built the penetrating highway at the same time and then raises the question of their connection. The highway form of the junction is decided in 1986. But the project really comes out of its box in the beginning of the year 1990. For the engineer who is in charge at the time, the situation is simple: *"Me I'm arrived at the DDE in 1992. When I'm arrived, the project was in the same state for twenty years. They asked me to arise it from the files"*. If the project comes back as a topical project, it is mainly thanks to the mobilization of required funds in the contract signed between State and Region (CPER). *"If you want we passed from 700 millions of Francs in the 1st CPER of 1984-1988 for roads to 2 billions and 800 millions in the contract of 1989-1993"*<sup>7</sup>. From there, the project which was conceived in the 1960's will know two important evolutions:

- The 1st turn corresponds to the early 1990's when the project is started again. The DDE team then engages the implementation of the East section. The choice which is made at that time is to start the public survey without preliminary modification of the project. For the people in charge it is clearly about a strategic choice. *"For us the project, it was necessary to make it evolve. For that, the best thing to do was to make people talk, (...) especially to make speak the inhabitants about what they are waiting for. We have launched the DUP immediately, while knowing of course that it was necessary to make evolve the project, the objective was to move on; and at the same time, we have started the participation process"*. Associations of inhabitants are mobilized very quickly and ask in priority for the covered by-pass. The project is negotiated on the building site, which leads to an important increase in costs. The by-pass becomes an infrastructure covered almost on the whole length, with many little projects on the roof designed by architects and planners. For the current team of DDE, *"there was a turn (...) which was to say: we stop the highways built without taking account about what there is around. We try to integrate the road. (...) It is something interesting that shows something of the great time when we realized that we had made too much concrete, too many aggressive highways, and when we realize that it was time to make highway with urban planning, with a better connection to the city"*.
- The 2nd turn corresponds to the 2000's (It is the period which interests us here). The realization of the east section according to highway characteristics gradually revealed the problem of inadequation of the northern section to cope with such important traffic. Consequently for the decentralized services of the State the question raised is what is the good method to start again the project in this part of the city. Taking into consideration protests during the construction of east section and the economic slide, the method evolved. The idea is then to work on the project in dialog with inhabitants, by integrating the infrastructure project in a huge urban project ("market of definition", competition of architects, etc). This evolution also corresponds to a change within the DDE, and to a staff reorganization: the infrastructure service is associated with the planning department, new professionals are recruited (a town planner, a communication manager, etc). For one of the members of this new team, the ambition is then not to remake what occurred for the east section: *"If we take again the stages of L2, we can say something like that. Stage 1: The 1970's with this part in north districts that I describe as an urban horror. Stage 2: it is the east section, in 1980-1990, it is the horror 2. The stage 3: years 1990-2000 it is what I call urban integration; it was a success for northern L2 but a failure for eastern L2. Stage 4: it is since 2000 the idea that we should not be satisfied with integration and that it is necessary to act on another scale"*. The dialog around the project proceeds according to several stages. In 2000 the layout

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<sup>6</sup> Former Engineer at DDE 13.

<sup>7</sup> Direction of Infrastructure department, Region.

by the north districts is retained; in 2001 the alternative by the Market of National interest (MIN) is decided; as from 2001 the dialog on the urban project is organized, following the launching of a "market of definition" entitled "a highway for an urban project" and for which three teams of architects answer.

The construction of this speech is also a way of developing the legitimacy of the project. While connecting the infrastructure project with the renovation project, the actors make essential the realization of this infrastructure for the wellbeing of these districts. For one of the former leader of the DDE at the time: *"It is true that on our side we saw the north districts, which were very poor districts in Marseille, and we said ourself: at least if we built the L2 here we will oblige the mayor to do something for these districts!"*.

Studies and documents produced by the DDE take part in the construction of this bond between infrastructure and renovation projects, and serve the technico-polical speech of the utility of the project.

### **Analysis of documents produced by the DDE.**

In the DVA (Prospective document on transports in Marseille area) produced by the DDE in 2000, the comment is made of a *"absence of control of the space accentuated by a disorganized highway network"* (p15) within the framework of a reasoning on the scale of the Marseille metropolitan area (AMM). The objectives of the ministry of Equipment policy in AMM are thus to organize a coherent transport system in order to avoid the transit by centers, to complete the infrastructure network, and to requalify the ways to move away the highway from city center. The production of statistical data confirms the importance of these stakes. For example, only 3% of the traffic on Marseille would concern the transit traffic, on the other hand 60% of the traffic relate to connections local-periphery, inside the metropolitan area. The data presented testify on the one hand to the importance of the local traffic and on the other hand of the saturation of existing roads. Objectives announced (to give again quality of life with the crossed districts; to allow the reconquest of the center; to remove the highways from the center) are all related to the completion of the by-pass. L2, which must reorganize flows on the scale of AMM, constitutes the main element of the DVA. The crucial idea being that the important traffic which crossed the city center could be transferred on this new infrastructure.

The urban expertise ordered by the DDE 13 with SCET PACA (2000) goes in the same direction. It confirms the creation of a link between infrastructure and renovation projects. *"The guiding idea is to consider that L2 North is not a simple project of infrastructure, but because of its complex environment, it is the support of an urban project. Contrary to the current situation, L2 North must give the opportunity to replan and revalorize a degraded sector touched by social segregation"* (p4). These elements are also reminded in the DTA. The territorial directive of planning (DTA), validated on December 18th, 2003 by the State, highlights the challenge of reorganization of the functions of the main roads, which must be based mainly on the completion of the by-pass. Thus in majority of the documents produced by the DDE during the period 2000-2004, a discourse is built on a necessary connection between infrastructure and urban renovation. The documents insist on the concept of opportunity: the passage of L2 must be an opportunity to renovate the north districts.

The produced documents of communication also develop very largely this idea: on the website of the project; and finally on information documents. The last booklet in date is entitled: "A formidable opportunity for urban requalification".

### **A process of translation at work.**

The infrastructure can be seen as an opportunity for urban renovation. This idea should be translated for all that, it is necessary to build the link to make see this potential by all the actors and influence the decision making process. If we take again the theory of translation defines by CALLON, four stages can be identified in this negotiation process.

- The problematization or how to make itself essential. It passes by the formulation of questions, the between-definition of the actors, the definition of obliged points of passage, and it leads to the installation of a system of alliances. In the case of the L2 by-pass, problematization passes by the production of data by the DDE on the saturation of the existing infrastructures and the complexity and the necessity of the project. For the period which interests us here (2000-2004), problematization is based on the choice which is made to build the by-pass in the north districts. This decision is adopted quickly, with the whole beginning of the dialog, so that associations of inhabitants are not organized yet in collective. So the persons in charge of the road project impose a point of required passage: to renovate the districts north and to solve the problems, the L2 by-pass should be made.
- Devices of profit-sharing or how to seal alliances. CALLON defines the profit-sharing as "the whole of actions by which an entity try to impose and to stabilize the identity of the other actors defined by its problematization. All these actions shape in devices" (p185). In the case of the by-pass, the process of profit-sharing or interestment consists for the DDE to involve the city and the GPV. That will pass by

the creation of a device: the follow-up committee. It actually corresponds at two committees, one technical and the other political, which gather the representatives of each institution implied in the road project to which the GPV is added. In the same way the creation of a conciliation procedure (exposures, public meetings...) will allow to integrate the inhabitants in the process. For the team of the DDE which manages the project, it is a question of implying the most possible people around this project to make it essential and necessary.

- Enrolement or how to define and coordinate the roles. This stage supposes negotiations between the actors to lead to a distribution of the roles.
- The mobilization of allies and the spokesperson nomination constitute the last stage.

We can thus clearly identify such a process in our case study, which consists in associating the project of infrastructure with the opportunity of renovation of the crossed districts.

However so that the potential of the infrastructure is perceived, it is also necessary to think about the quality of this translation (BAILLY, 2001). The analyzed documents are those produced by the DDE, but same work can be made concerning the documents produced by the local authorities or the GPV. In the PDU (1999) in particular, we find the elements announced by the DDE. The link between infrastructure and renovation is exposed; it is referred to the opportunity created by the passage of the by-pass. The translation of this idea seems to work. The DDE rhetoric is included in the main outlines: completion of the by-pass is regarded as an asset to relieve the downtown area of traffic congestion.

If we go up further in the various master plans, the by-pass is present on maps since 1933. The oldness of the project illustrates the permanence of this idea, all the more than the land acquisitions were reserved over a long period. In the same way for the GPV, the speech is taken again around the logic of an opportunity to seize. Even if the actors of the GPV are not concerned directly by the implementation of the road project, they also express their interest for the project. One of the fundamental stakes of the urban requalification program is precisely to create links between blocks, which currently are cut by the road infrastructures. It is the case in particular with Arnavon and Allende boulevards. In the territorial card, produced by the DIV in 2000, which presents the objectives of the GPV on Marseille, this idea of an opportunity created by the passage of the L2 by-pass is included: *"The disappearance of transit traffic on Allende Boulevard offers new possibilities of urban reorganization, reorganization of the roadway system, operations of rebuilding and demolition"*. Further in the same document: *"With the change of function of the Allende Boulevard, this reorganization constitutes a second interesting opportunity of urban requalification. Indeed the urban center of Merlan, in spite of its central position, is insufficiently open on the district, and its reorganization, as the relocalization of public services, will contribute to a new urban organization"*.

If the speech built by the DDE is well accepted by the local actors, it remains to be seen if the appointment between GPV and DDE will effectively take place?

## **Confrontation between the announced ambitions and the reality of their implementation.**

Concretely even if the appointment between DDE and GPV officially took place, we can notice a series of failures. If the process of coordination between road project and urban project supposes consensus and synchrony, in reality it is not always the case.

### **Coordinated procedures.**

Concerning the road project, the financing key and the impact of the project on the city imply a dialog between the different teams: DDE and the local authorities (city, department, region). This dialog passed by the creation of a follow-up committee (with elected officials, funders, DDE and GPV), a technical committee and of a technical commission (funders and GPV). What in theory should allow a good coordination between the actors. This evolution corresponds to the turn taken between 1999 and 2000, at the time of the launching of the L2 project. This moment also corresponds to a staff reorganization in the DDE.

The process of public participation, always for the road project, took place in the following way, between 2000 and 2002, 3 stages of dialog were organized:

Summer 2000: Northern or Southern layout? The Southern option is retained.

June 2001: Option MIN or Arnavon? Publication of the L2 newspaper, public exhibition, actions in schools.

February 2002: Dialog on the urban developments.

Concerning the urban project, under the DDE initiative, the following stages followed one another:

Production of the main study: by the SCET October 2000 - April 2001, which draws up the assessment of the crossed districts conditions, draft of the scénarii of development, and proposes an evaluation of the impact of the layouts.

The "market of definition": At the end of October 2001 - May 2002. 3 markets of definition are launched, the final choice goes on the Devillers team.

The mission of assistance to project: January 2003 - May 2004. Given by the DDE to the Devillers team, it results in the creation of a new plan (definition of main orientations and strategic choices); and the operational realization.

We can see in this calendar that the impulse is given by the DDE in charge of the road project, which takes the initiative to engage a consultation procedure and a market of definition to draw contours of a global project. During the same time (2000-2004), this team is reorganized: the team becomes multidisciplinary, planners are associated to road engineers.

### **Failures and obstacles.**

In spite of this voluntary approach, success is not really arrived. The project of APS which makes the synthesis of all this procedure, is blocked in the wheels of the procedure to the national office of Roads. This file of APS, published in 2004, is on standby of an approval by the procedure of Declaration of Public utility.

The year 2004 thus marks a stagnation point in the process of coordination of the two projects. The road project is blocked mainly for a problem of funding. The cost of the project cannot be assumed by the various financial partners any more. The recourse to a public-private partnership is gradually considered. Currently the procedure is on standby, and the launching of the consultation for a private partner should be carried out during 2008.

Concerning the urban project, the contract which connected the team of architect (Devillers) with the DDE ended with the finalization of the APS file. None the actions suggested are realized for the moment. For the GPV, the renovation projects continue independently. The action is concentrated on housing (rehabilitation of housing estates, destruction and construction of new residences) and on the economic activity. On the whole, we can conclude to a desynchronization of the projects.

### **Obstacles to the projects coordination.**

The analysis of this case can make it possible to identify several obstacles with coordination between road project and urban project.

- Contradictory logics of actors.

The various actors who take part in the project are characterized by different positions and sometimes contradictory strategies. The oppositions relate to several points:

Necessity of the project first of all. The project of L2 is put out of balance for each partners with other projects of infrastructures and other scales of action. For the State: the project is not really a priority, it is put out of balance with other great projects in the area in its charge, like the connection Sisteron-Grenoble or connection LEO in the South of Avignon, all the more than the true highway by-pass of Marseille already exists (A8). The priority is given to high speed lines, to make the connection between Italy and Spain. For the city/urban community: who had the control of project initially (until 1979), the infrastructure is necessary but not really essential (ex of the people interviewed: "*we circulate nevertheless in Marseille!* "). The project supposes the renovation of the crossed districts, in particular the north districts, which are not the priority local authorities (political opposition between a central town hall on the right and town halls of district on the left). Today the priorities are different: the tramway (and its ecological image), the metro (project of prolongation in progress), which is recalled in the PDU, is approved in 2006.

The divergences relate then to the uses of the infrastructure. It is difficult to identify positions according to the types of actors, because according to the teams which follow one another positioning can be different. The various uses are: the highway connection; the by-pass for Marseille; and the local service road.

From these three various uses of the infrastructure follow of course a debate on the form of the infrastructure.

Finally the main concerned the layout of L2 which also strongly depends on the uses that we intend to make play this infrastructure. For the partisans of the highway connection, the layout more in the North in the hills, which avoids the urban and dense districts, is the privileged option (it is the position of the DDE in the Nineties for example); on the other hand for the partisans of an infrastructure of local interest which must allow a better traffic circulation in metropolitan area and a local road, the layout in the middle of the districts is best the option (it is the position of the DDE in the years 2000). The choice of the layout is carried out after a intensive dialog with inhabitants, and the option by the north districts and along the MIN is adopted in 2001.

- A crystallization of the conflicts around funding issues.

The blocking of the project in 2004 emerges partly for problems of financing. Side DDE, the evolution of the road project in dialog with the local actors was very ambitious and exceeded its field of competence and its legitimacy. However once the project discussed, the distribution of roles and responsibilities posed problem: for

the representatives of the DDE, it was clear that the State was in charge only of the strictly road part of the project. The other developments suggested in the market of definition were to be assumed by the local government agencies.

The tramway example: in the project resulting from the "market of definition", plans produced by the team of architects reveal a tramway line on the L2 roof to lead off to the North districts. On a DDE request, the question of the funding of this tramway project is raised before the final drafting of the APS. financial agreement found, the tramway line is finally withdrawn from the plans. This example illustrates the oppositions around the financing of installations related to the by-pass. The majority of the actors present around the table of negotiations are enthusiastic by the approach of integrated design and coordination between the two projects; but when it is time to pass to the realization and thus to the financing issues, the oppositions are intensified. The desynchronization carries it again: in the case of the tramway for example, the city which has other projects of public transport in progress (metro, prolongation of the existing tramway) cannot integrate this new project in its agenda.

### **Call into question the local governance.**

If analyzes in political sciences show a new model of local public administration, we have got to admit in the case of Marseille we are either in the proof of a failure of this model, or in another model which has to be defined. The State impulse to set up the rehabilitation of the districts in the same time that the passage of the by-pass, is bared by the persistence of conflicts between the different institutional levels. For the State, the local authorities refusal of engagement testify to incapacity to seize problems, and carryforward of their responsibilities on a national level. For local authorities, the State action is considered as an interference in a local affair; it also makes it possible to put somebody in charge for the slowness of improvements in these districts.

### **Limits of the approach by conflicts and the introduction of a temporal approach.**

This approach by the conflicts of actors makes it possible to partly explain the difficulties of implementation of the project. For as much, this analysis shows several limits. The conflicts between stakeholders, in particular between State and local authorities, do not prevent the cooperation and the existence of a consensus around the necessity of the project. Even if the funders have a different vision from the project, none calls into question the need for this by-pass. Especially, the principal argument which testifies to the limits of this approach, is the persistence of the project. The project continues to advance with the margin: several of the elements which were proposed in the market of definition are today in development. The project of tramway on the cover of the by-pass is taken again by the city in the PDU. The train station in the north districts is preserved by RFF within the framework of the modernization of the line Marseille-Aix, and will be carried out. Generally, the document produced following the dialog remains a reference document for the sector town councils. Side of the urban renovation, the projects carried out by the GPV which are also funded follow the guiding lines posed by this document. It would thus seem that in spite of what appears in the analysis of political sciences like a failure of the project governance, actually results in a relative success in the realization of the project.

A way of interpreting these results is to introduce the question of the time and to return about the translation process at work. If we come back to the theory, CALLON reminds us that the translation process is a long, complex and iterative process. It consists of a stabilization of negotiated decisions and carried by a collective. However on long time, the instability of the actors or certain events can interfere in this process. It is actually what occurs in the case of the L2 by-pass. The project comes up like any project of infrastructure in a long time: feasibility studies; public debate; preliminary studies; studies of summary preliminary draft; public survey; declaration of public utility; studies of project; construction of the road; and finally opening. All these stages take time which plays against the project. In particular owing to the fact that it is about a project of infrastructure, several elements are to be taken into account:

- the very long time of the studies, which are to be made and remake with each modification made to the preliminary draft;
  - high costs of the project, which supposes the mobilization of important funds which is difficult to obtain (especially on behalf of the public power);
  - the implication of several actors. Each funder acts according to its own agenda (cf. impact of the election times).
- The instability of the actors in time also plays against the project: in the case of L2 the stopping point of the project in 2004 corresponds at the same time to a change within the DDE, but also to a reorganization of the State services within the framework of decentralization, and to a progressive evolution of the budgetary priorities of the State (lowers funds granted for the road).

## Conclusion

The construction of a link between road project and renovation project is obvious when we go up the history of this study case. The road project is presented like an opportunity for the North districts. However one of the issues is the good translation of this idea for all the actors involved, to adjust the decisions and act in a coherent way. It is perhaps what it misses in the case of L2 to create consensus around a great collective project. The speech of the articulation between projects seemed to work in planning documents, and yet it is not carried any more by the actors at the time of negotiations (in particular when it is question of financing). The introduction of a temporal analysis makes it possible to show how time plays against the project. The instability of actors, the instability of decisions, within the framework of a long and complex infrastructure project, call into question regularly the moments of consensus between the actors.

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