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► **To cite this version:**

Fabienne Martin. restrictive vs nonrestrictive modification and evaluative predicates. 2013. hal-00788131v3

**HAL Id: hal-00788131**

**<https://hal.science/hal-00788131v3>**

Preprint submitted on 17 Oct 2013 (v3), last revised 29 Apr 2014 (v4)

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# Restrictive vs. Nonrestrictive Modification and Evaluative Predicates

Submitted to *Lingua*, 17.10.2013 (2nd version)

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17 octobre 2013

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. The nonrestrictive bias of evaluative modifiers

This paper is devoted to a particular aspect of the interpretation of evaluative adjectives (*marvelous*, *horrible*), that is, adjectives that are compatible with subjective attitude verbs like *find* in the construction *find x adj* (e.g. *find marvelous*) and give rise to the so-called ‘faultless disagreement’ pattern.<sup>1</sup> Evaluative adjectives have often been claimed to manifest a strong, and even exclusive, preference for the nonrestrictive reading (henceforth the ‘nonrestrictive bias hypothesis’). For French for instance, Milner (1978) :301 claims that adjectives that he calls ‘affectifs’ (*abominable* ‘awful’, *horrible* ‘horrible’) cannot be used in a restrictive or anaphorical way. For Spanish, Demonte (2008) : 71 argues that what she calls ‘extreme degree adjectives’ (*horrible* ‘horrible’, *necio* ‘stupid’, *espantoso* ‘awful’) and ‘qualitative superlative adjectives’ (*maravilloso* ‘wonderful’, *magnífico* ‘magnificent’) are predicative nonrestrictive modifiers. For Catalan, Castroviejo-Miró and Schwager (2008) :184 assume that adjectives like *beautiful* are often understood as non-restrictive. For German, Umbach (2012b) claims that evaluative predicates often cannot be used restrictively. The claim has also been extended to adverbials derived from these adjectives. For instance, Castroviejo-Miró

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1. If A claims that the dessert is delicious, and B reacts by claiming that it is not, there is a sense in which both A and B are right, i.e. that their disagreement is ‘faultless’, cf. e.g. Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2007).

Evaluative predicates are not the only ones that display faultless disagreement effects ; vague scalar predicates (*rich*, *heavy*, *tall*) also do, cf. Richard (2004). However, as Kennedy (t. a.) :6 observes, the latter are not systematically acceptable under *find*.

(2008) :63 argues that her *extremely* adverbials are non-restrictive modifiers.

For Romance languages, where both the post- and pre-head positions can be regularly be used for a subset of their adjectives, a frequent observation reported in support of the ‘nonrestrictive bias hypothesis’ is that evaluative adjectives are often odd in post-nominal position, cf. e.g. (1) for French.

- (1) a. *J’ai vu l’affreux voisin ce matin.*  
I have seen the horrible neighbour this morning  
'I saw the horrible neighbour this morning.'
- b. *#J’ai vu le voisin affreux ce matin.*  
I have seen the neighbour horrible this morning  
'I saw the horrible neighbour this morning.'

The argument relies on what has been called the *complementarity hypothesis*, presented and discussed in more details in Section 1.2 below, namely the hypothesis that pre-head modifiers receive a nonrestrictive interpretation in Romance, while post-head modifiers receive a restrictive interpretation (see e.g. Alexiadou (2001) ; cf. also Wilmet (1980, 1981) for French, Vincent (1988) of Italian, Harris (1995) and Demonte (2005) for Spanish, Marchis and Alexiadou (2009) for Romanian). The idea is therefore that (1b) is odd because (i) the adjective being post-nominal, it must have the restrictive reading and (ii) *affreux* being evaluative, it doesn't easily get the restrictive reading.

An immediate problem for this argument is that evaluatives *do* appear in post-nominal positions in corpora, even in presence of a definite, a factor that had been argued to favour the anteposition by Forsgren (1978). A search in the literary database *Frantext* for any evaluative modifier studied here delivers many occurrences of the adjective in post-head position.<sup>2</sup>

One of the goals of this paper is to reconcile these data with the nonrestrictive bias and the complementarity hypotheses. The idea pursued is that a modifier can be restrictive or nonrestrictive in two different ways varying with the domain it operates on, and that being restrictive (resp. nonrestrictive) in one way only allows the modifier to appear in the post-head (resp. pre-head) position. In Section (2), we discuss in detail the two different uses of the notion of (non-) restrictivity in the literature. Section (3) shows what is common to these two uses. Section (4) identifies the contexts in which evaluative adjectives can appear in post-nominal position and explains why, on the basis of the definitions of (non)restrictivity built in Sections (2) and (3). The analysis proposed is compared with two previous accounts of the nonrestrictive bias of evaluative predicates.

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2. The quantitative corpus study on French newspapers of Thuilier (2012) also confirms that evaluative modifiers appear in both positions. For a total of 525 occurrences of evaluative adjectives (out of 59 different lemmas) in her corpus, 360 (68.6%) are anteposed and 165 (31.4%) are postposed.

The other properties by which pre- and post-head modifiers are traditionally distinguished (like the differences between idiomatic and literal readings, intersective and non-intersective readings, and ‘central property modification’ versus ‘referent modification’) are not addressed in this paper. That is, the discussion is restricted to cases where the reading(s) of the adjective remain(s) stable in pre- and post-nominal position.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2. The scope of the complementarity hypothesis

The position of the adjective in the DP is known to be relatively free in Romance languages. For French, a recent computational study based on large corpora has shown that the syntactical flexibility of adjectives is often underestimated in theoretical studies (Thuilier (2012)) : adjectives or adjectival readings supposed to appear in one position only are in fact often attested in the unexpected position in real corpora.<sup>4</sup>

Although almost any adjective in French can be used in the two positions, the degree of syntactic flexibility of the adjective nevertheless varies with its semantic class (among other factors).<sup>5</sup> For French, Italian and Spanish, color/shape adjectives and nationality adjectives strongly prefer the postnominal position ; I will call them ‘right-adjectives’. On the other hand, monosyllabic evaluative adjectives

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3. So for instance, I will ignore cases where the evaluative adjective is non-intersective only in prenominal position and intersective or non-intersective in the postnominal one (cf. Cinque (2003)’s contrasts between *un buon attaccante* ‘a forward good at playing forward’ and *un attaccante buono* ‘a forward good at playing forward/ a good-hearted forward’). I will also ignore the ‘objective’ (non-evaluative) reading evaluative adjectives can have in postnominal position only (cf. e.g. *un roman fantastique* ‘a fantastic novel/a fantasy novel’ vs. *un fantastique roman* ‘a fantastic novel’). As for adverbials, I only take their manner adverbial into account, since it is the only one which can easily appear in pre- and post-verbal position (what is called the agent-oriented reading is generally restricted to pre-verbal positions in French, cf. e.g. Molinier and Lévrier (2000) : 108-109 ; cf. also Geuder (2000) for discussion about English adverbials).

4. For instance, while non-predicative adjectives like *supposé* ‘alleged’ are said to be systematically prenominal, the postnominal position is also attested (Thuilier *ibid.* : 115) ; inversely, while certain adjectival participles like *interdit* ‘forbidden’ or *atténuant* ‘alleviating’ have been claimed to be necessarily postponed (Abeillé and Godard (1999)), they can be found before the noun in the right context (Thuilier *ibid.* :113).

5. Apart from the semantic class of the adjective, the other factors having an influence on the position of the adjective are (a) the length of the adjective (short items tend to appear before long ones), (b) its frequency (frequent adjectives tend to be anteposed and less frequent ones tend to be postponed, cf. Wilmet (1980)), (iii) its morphology (morphologically complex adjectives tend to prefer the post-nominal position, although some morphemes like the negative morpheme *in-* vote for anteposition, cf. Thuilier (2012)) and (iv) syntactical (among other facts, non-degree adverbials massively promote the post-nominal position ; the modification by degree adverbials makes the anteposition easier for I call below ‘right-adjectives’ and the postposition easier for ‘left-adjectives’, cf. Thuilier (2012) : 119).

tives like *bon* ‘good’ or simple non subsecutive adjectives like *futur* ‘future’ show a strong preference for prenominal position. These will be called ‘left-adjectives’. As for non-monosyllabic evaluative adjectives, they are among the classes of adjectives that equally accept both positions (Thuillier 2012). I will call these adjectives ‘neutral adjectives’.

The tenants of the complementarity hypothesis do not always make clear whether the hypothesis is supposed to hold for all adjectives or only a subset of them.<sup>6</sup> Generally, it is illustrated with neutral adjectives. I claim that it holds for neutral adjectives only ; for left- and right-adjectives, the preferred position of the adjective allows both the restrictive and the nonrestrictive readings (see below).

The following examples taken from the literature illustrates the complementarity hypothesis for neutral adjectives in different Romance languages ; the examples in (a) only have the restrictive (‘R’) reading, while the examples in (b) only have the nonrestrictive (‘NR’) one.

- (2) a. *Encontré las llaves viejas.*(Spanish, Demonte (2008))  
 find-PAST-1SG the keys old  
*R* : ‘I found the subset of keys which are old.’  
*# NR* : ‘I found all members of the set of keys and they are old.’
- b. *Encontré las viejas llaves.*  
 find-PAST-1SG the old keys  
*# R* : ‘I found the subset of keys which are old.’  
*NR* : ‘I found all members of the set of keys and they are old.’
- (3) a. *Legile importante n-au fost votate.*(Romanian, Marchis and Alexiadou (2009))  
 laws-the important be-PAST-3PL not  
 passed  
*R* : ‘The subset of laws which were important were not passed.’  
*# NR* : ‘The laws were not passed and they are important.’
- b. *Importantele legi n- fost votate.*  
 Important-the laws be-PAST-3PL not passed  
*# R* : ‘The subset of laws which were important were not passed.’  
*NR* : ‘The laws were not passed and they are important.’
- (4) a. *La police a relâché les étudiants innocents.*(French)  
 The police has released the students innocent

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6. The complementarity hypothesis is not endorsed by everyone. For instance, Cinque (2005, 2010) argues that post-nominal adjectives in Italian are systematically ambiguous between restrictive and nonrestrictive modification, while pre-nominal are unambiguously nonrestrictive (see Cinque (2010) :114 for references to authors arguing for the same point in other Romance languages). For French, I agree with Cinque for what I call right-adjectives (see below), but I am on the side of the complementarity hypothesis defenders for neutral adjectives.

- R* : ‘The police released the subset of students which are innocent.’  
*#NR* : ‘The police released all the students. They are innocent.’
- b. *La police a relâché les innocents étudiants.*  
 The police has released the innocent students  
*#R* : ‘The police released the subset of students which are innocent.’  
*NR* : ‘The police released all the students. They are innocent.’

An evidence for this difference in the interpretation of the adjective is that referring to the complementary set (to the other keys, laws, students) in the context in the following discourse is natural only when the modifier receives the restrictive reading. So for instance, (4a) could be followed unproblematically by the sentence *Les autres sont toujours retenus au commissariat* ‘The others are still detained at the police station’, while this is not the case of (4b).

The situation is different for adjectives that do not easily move (‘non-neutral’ adjectives). Right-adjectives like color adjectives can have both the restrictive and nonrestrictive interpretation in the postnominal position, cf. (5a).<sup>7</sup> However, in the marked prenominal position, they only have the nonrestrictive interpretation, cf. (5b).

- (5) a. *J’aime beaucoup les étagères blanches chez Marie.*(French)  
 I like a lot the shelves white at Marie  
*R* : ‘I like the subset of shelves at Mary’s place which are white.’  
*NR* : ‘I like the shelves at Mary’s place. They are white.’
- b. *Trouvez les vertes collines de Strangleronce.*(French, Internet)  
 Find the green hills of Strangleronce  
*R* : ‘Find the hills of Strangleronce. They are green.’  
*#NR* : ‘Find the subset of hills of Strangleronce which are green.’

Inversely, left-adjectives can have both a restrictive and a nonrestrictive reading in their natural prenominal position, cf. (6a), but only get a restrictive reading in the marked postnominal position, cf. (6b). The distribution of readings for each subclass of adjectives is summarized in Table 1 (‘A’ stands for adjective, ‘N’ for noun).

- (6) a. *J’aime bien les bons romans de Boris Vian.*(French)  
 I like well the good novels of Boris Vian  
*R* : ‘I like the subset of Boris Vian’s novels which are good.’  
*NR* : ‘I like the novels of Boris Vian. They are good.’
- b. *J’aime bien les romans vraiment bons de Boris Vian.*(French)  
 I like well the novels really good of Boris Vian

7. As the example (44a) in Section 2.3.3 will show, the nonrestrictive reading is however lost in the prenominal position when the right-adjective is focused.

*R* : ‘I like the subset of Boris Vian’s novels which are really good.’  
 # *NR* : ‘I like the novels of Boris Vian. They are really good.’

	AN	NA
neutral adjectives	NR	R
Left-adjectives	NR & R	R
Right-adjectives	NR	R & NR

TABLE 1 – Subkind of adjectives wrt the complementarity hypothesis

That the complementarity hypothesis holds for neutral adjectives only is rather expected. Indeed, if it held for all of them, this would mean that left- and right-adjectives would systematically have a *lexical* bias for the restrictive or the nonrestrictive interpretation. This claim is in fact endorsed by some authors ; for instance, Vincent (1988) justifies the fact that nationality adjectives are right-adjectives because ‘they are normally contrastive’. But the existence of a lexical bias for non-neutral adjectives is not supported by what we know from experimental studies on the interpretation adjectives receive by default. Firstly, Sedivy et al. (1999) and Sedivy (2003) show that when hearers have to choose between restrictive and non-restrictive uses of *scalar* adjectives like *tall*, of which many are left-adjectives in French (cf. *grand* ‘tall’, *petit* ‘small’),<sup>8</sup> they systematically prefer the restrictive interpretation. If the complementarity hypothesis held for these left-adjectives, they should on the contrary prefer the non-restrictive reading. Secondly, Sedivy and her colleagues show that this ‘restrictive bias’ does not show up with *colour* adjectives, which are right-adjectives in French. But again, if the complementarity hypothesis held for these adjectives, we would expect them to show precisely the (unobserved) restrictive bias.<sup>9</sup>

Observe however that the interpretation of all three types of adjectives (neutral, right- or left-ones) in pre- and post-head position is compatible with the following *weaker* version of the complementarity hypothesis :

- (7) *Complementarity hypothesis* (weak version) : in a pre-head position, modifiers in Romance get *at least* the non-restrictive reading, while in a post-head position, they get *at least* the restrictive one.

8. For instance, *J’habite dans un village petit/grand* ‘I live in a small/big village’ are rather odd in French (but would be fine if *très* ‘very’ modified the adjective, cf. fn 6).

9. Sedivy and colleagues suggest that this difference between scalar and colour adjectives is due to the fact that colour adjectives are frequently used in descriptions of objects even if they are the only objects of their type in context. On the contrary, scalar adjectives would be much more systematically used in order to identify a *N* among other *Ns*.

This is the version I will adopt in this paper for Romance languages, that I will mostly exemplify through French. Moreover, I assume that for Romance neutral modifiers, included the adverbial ones, the stronger version of the hypothesis applies :

- (8) *Complementarity hypothesis* (strong version) : in a pre-head position, neutral modifiers in Romance get the non-restrictive reading only, while in a post-head position, they get the restrictive one only.

## 2. Defining restrictivity

### 2.1. Restrictivity : set-based definition

(Non-)restrictivity is rarely explicitly defined in works devoted to (non-)restrictive modification, but the traditional intuition behind this notion is generally clear : a modifier *M* restrictively modifies the head *H* when the contextual set of objects denoted by the modified head *MH* is *properly* included in the contextual set of objects denoted by *H*. On the other hand, *M* nonrestrictively modifies *H* if the contextual set of objects denoted by *H* equals the contextual set of objects denoted by *MH*. As Cabredo-Hofherr (in prep.) emphasises, restrictive modifiers are under this traditional definition inherently *contrastive* : they presuppose the existence of entities of which the description given by the modifier is not true.<sup>10</sup>

Piñón (2005) provides formal definitions of restrictive and nonrestrictive modification that capture this conception of (non-)restrictivity. I repeat them in (10).  $\mathcal{M}$  is a model which consists of a nonempty set *O* of objects *o*, a non empty set *S* of possible situations *s*, and an interpretation function  $[[\cdot]]$ . *M* and *H* designate

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10. This is made very clear by Bach (1974) :271 (*apud* Cabredo-Hofherr *id.*) about restrictive relative clauses : ‘A restrictive relative clause presupposes the existences of entities of which the description given in the relative clause is not true’.

Note that this inference can be cancelled and is therefore better analysed as an implicature than as a presupposition (Katz (2008)). For instance, in French, one can continue the example (4a) so that the inference it triggers that some students are not innocent is cancelled, see e.g. (9) below :

- (9) La police a relâché les étudiants innocents, et donc, en fait, tous les étudiants...  
The police released all innocent students, and thus, in fact, all students...

In this example, *et donc, en fait* ‘and thus, in fact’ indicates that the inference is cancelled (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out). See Katz (2008) for Italian and Spanish examples where the restrictivity implicature is also cancelled.

Interestingly, the inference triggered by nonrestrictive modifiers seems much stronger, and, in fact, *not* cancellable. For instance, the example (4b) cannot be felicitously continued by a sentence that tries to defeat the inference that all students are innocent. I do not have an explanation for this asymmetry between the inferences respectively triggered by restrictive and nonrestrictive modifiers.

functions from situations and objects to truth values.<sup>11</sup>

- (10) a. M nonvacuously restrictively modifies H in  $s$  iff  

$$\llbracket \lambda o[M_s(o) \wedge H_s(o)] \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} \subset \llbracket H_s \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} \text{ and } \llbracket \lambda o[M_s(o) \wedge H_s(o)] \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} \neq \emptyset$$
  
 b. M nonvacuously nonrestrictively modifies H in  $s$  iff  

$$\llbracket \lambda o[M_s(o) \wedge H_s(o)] \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} = \llbracket H_s \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} \text{ and } \llbracket \lambda o[M_s(o) \wedge H_s(o)] \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M},g} \neq \emptyset$$

The advantage of the definitions in (10) is that they are neutral regarding what the set of objects  $O$  is. They may be physical, abstract objects, events, etc. Note that if the denotation of H in the situation  $s$  (i.e.  $H_s$ ) is a singleton set, then, according to (10), the modifier cannot non-vacuously restrictively modify  $H_s$ . As Piñón observes, this captures the old idea that a proper noun can be nonrestrictively but not restrictively modified.

Under the complementarity hypothesis, this definition captures well the difference between the examples (a) and (b) in (2)-(4) presented in the introduction. Given that under this definition, the modifier clearly restricts the denotation of its *head*, restrictivity so defined will be labelled ‘restrictivity<sub>*h*</sub>’. I claim that in *standard definites* (as those in the examples of Section 1), postnominal neutral modifiers have to be restrictive *at least* in this sense, i.e. restrictive<sub>*h*</sub>, while prenominal ones have to be nonrestrictive *at least* in this sense, that is nonrestrictive<sub>*h*</sub>. That is, although in principle, as we will see, (non)-restrictivity can be defined in another way, restrictivity as defined in (10) compulsorily applies to modifiers in standard definites.

## 2.2. Contrasts not captured yet

Although certainly useful, this definition of restrictivity (that is restrictivity<sub>*h*</sub>) cannot suffice to cover all uses made of this notion in the literature. In particular, as shown below, it cannot among others render the contrasts between restrictive and nonrestrictive modification that have been correlated with a post- vs pre-head position (i) with adverbials (section 2.2.1) and (ii) with indefinite NPs (section 2.2.2).

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11. The last conjunct in (10a) and (10b) ensures that the modification does not result in the empty set (is not vacuous). In (10a), the first conjunct ensures that the modification by M results in the elimination of at least one entity from H (i.e. that at least one entity in the denotation of H in  $s$  is not in the denotation of M in  $s$ ). In (10b), the first conjunct ensures that the modification by M leaves the denotation of H in  $s$  intact (i.e. that all entities in the denotation of H in  $s$  are also in the denotation of M in  $s$ ).

### 2.2.1. Adverbials

Peterson (1997) : 231-238 argued that the distinction between the restrictive and nonrestrictive readings of relative clauses and adjectives also applies to adverbs.<sup>12</sup> One of Peterson's examples (given on pp. 233 & 283) is repeated in (11).

- (11) The Titanic's sinking rapidly caused great loss of life. (Peterson 1997)
- a. *restrictive* : The Titanic's sinking being rapid caused great loss of life.
  - b. *nonrestrictive* : The Titanic's sinking, which [by the way] was rapid, caused great loss of life.

Peterson does not directly correlate this ambiguity with the syntactical position of the adverbial, but Morzycki (2008) agrees with Shaer (2000, 2003) that in English, the nonrestrictive reading is not available with postverbal manner adverbials. Shaer 2000 :284 illustrates Peterson's ambiguity in (12), where the adverb has a canonical adverbial position (which is not the case in (11), where the adverb can easily be replaced by an adjective). The idea is that each continuation selects a different reading of the adverbial ; Shaer claims that the continuation (b) selecting the nonrestrictive reading is not felicitous when the adverbial is in postverbal position.

- (12) The prisoner (loudly) proclaimed his innocence (loudly). (Shaer 2000)
- a. *Continuation on the restrictive reading* : He woke up all the other prisoners.
  - b. *Continuation on the nonrestrictive reading* : He really believed that he had been framed.

These examples illustrate a clear common point to the nonrestrictive *adverbial* modification and the nonrestrictive *adjectival* modification in definites, namely that in both cases, the modifier conveys an information which is superfluous, not central, parenthetical. On the other hand, both restrictive adverbial modification and restrictive adjectival modification in definites are central to the point made by the utterance.

Peterson emphasizes that the ambiguity 'is not, however, *exactly* what it was' with adjectives : with adverbials, the restrictive reading does not amount to the reference to a proper subset of events of a salient set (p. 235). Indeed, in each of the situations described in (11)-(12), there is a *single* event described (a singleton set), independent of the structural position of the adverb. Hence, the modification can only be nonrestrictive according to Piñón's definition. However, we agree with Peterson, Shaer and Morzycki's hypothesis that the ambiguity illustrated in (12)

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12. As Göbbel (2007) fn 14 observes, this view can be traced back to Heny (1973), who claims that 'adverbs placed before the verb rather than after the VP may turn out to have a sort of nonrestrictive force, being an interpolation or comment by the speaker'.

has something to do with the restrictive vs nonrestrictive ambiguity found with adjectives.

The idea I develop in Section (3) is that a restrictive modifier can restrict two types of domains, and that the two uses made of the term in the literature each target a different domain. In the classical case targeted by Piñón's definition, the modifier is restrictive<sub>*h*</sub>, i.e. restricts the denotation of its head. In the other cases, included the adverbial ones, the modifier restricts a set of propositions, namely the context set updated with the focus value of the sentence (see Section 3). These restrictive modifiers will be labelled restrictive<sub>*c*</sub>. Restrictive<sub>*c*</sub> modifiers also eliminate entities from a superset of entities, but this time, the relevant entities are propositions. Both kinds of restrictive modifiers perform the same kind of operation in that they throw something away from a certain domain. Before developing this view into detail, I turn now my attention to another context where the differences between neutral modifiers in pre- and post-head position cannot easily be captured by Piñón's definition.

### 2.2.2. Indefinites

According to Piñón's definition of restrictivity<sub>*h*</sub> given in (10), restrictive<sub>*h*</sub> modifiers are those where a least one member of H in the situation *s* does not pertain to M in *s*. In order to check whether this is the case or not, the interpreter must be able to build a representation of the set HM<sub>*s*</sub> independently of the representation of the set H<sub>*s*</sub>. When *s* is a contextual (minimal) situation, this is easy with definite DPs, because these standardly presuppose their domain of quantification. But with indefinites, things are more complicated. *Partitive* indefinites (as defined e.g. by Enç (1991)) notoriously resemble definites because (among others) they also presuppose a contextually restricted set of entities. Take for instance (13). In this sentence, *some blond girls* describe girls who are included in the set of girls established by the previous utterance.

(13) Several girls entered my room. I knew some blond girls.

With indefinites of this type, we can also build a representation of members of HM (blond girls, that is the ones I know) in the contextual situation *s* which is independent of the representation of the set of H (girls) in *s* (the set of girls that entered the room). But *non-partitive* indefinites do not presuppose a quantification domain. It is then not possible to distinguish the set of HM in the minimal situation *s* from the set of H in *s*. For instance, uttered out of the blue, the sentence *I was working. Several blond girls entered my room* describes a set of contextual blond girls undistinguishable from the set of contextual girls.

With non-partitive indefinites, modifiers will thus systematically be nonrestrictive<sub>*h*</sub> independently of their syntactical position according to (10) if *s* is a minimal

(contextual) situation. Symptomatically, indefinites are often left explicitly aside in works devoted to (non)-restrictivity. Katz (2008) :16 explicitly says that indefinite DPs are undefined for (non)-restrictivity. The same for Demonte (1999) :148 about Spanish. Cabredo-Hofherr (in prep.) also explicitly leaves aside indefinites NP in her work on the (non-)restrictive relative clauses in German.

The difficulty can be overcome if *s* is not a contextual, but rather the *maximal* situation (the entire world). Indeed, as shown below, the difference between pre- and post-nominal neutral adjectives can then be captured with indefinites, too. The modifier will be defined as *maximally nonrestrictive* if all members of the set H in the maximal situation are members of M; we deal then with what Fabricius-Hansen (2009) calls ‘conceptual nonrestrictivity’, i.e. cases where the modification does not restrict the extension of the noun, that is if  $[[MH]] = [[H]]$  in the maximal situation. The relation of identity can be semantic (*unmarried bachelor*), prototypical (*white snow*) or stereotypical (*innocent passengers*). The modifier will be *maximally restrictive* if  $[[MH]] \subset [[H]]$  in the maximal situation.

This way, we can capture the ambiguity illustrated in (14) : (14a) can be taken to imply that children are by definition innocent (*innocent* is maximally nonrestrictive), while (14b) suggests that children can in principle be either innocent or not (*innocent* is maximally restrictive). The same way, (15a) implies that horsemeat is indigestible by definition, which is not the case of (15b).

- (14) a. *Supposons qu’il y ait d’innocents*  
 Suppose-IMP.-1PL that there be-SUBJ.PRES INDEF innocent  
*enfants dans l’avion.*  
 children in the plane  
 ‘Let us assume that there are innocent children in the plane.’
- b. *Supposons qu’il y ait des enfants*  
 Suppose-IMP.-1PL that there be-SUBJ.PRES INDEF children  
*innocents dans l’avion.*  
 innocent in the plane  
 ‘Let us assume that there are innocent children in the plane.’
- (15) a. *Indigeste viande de cheval* (title, *Le Monde*, 16.02.13)  
 Indigestible horsemeat  
 ‘Indigestible horsemeat.’
- b. *Viande de cheval indigeste.*  
 horsemeat indigestible  
 ‘Indigestible horsemeat.’

But the differences between pre- and postnominal modifiers in indefinites cannot always be accounted for this way. Take for instance the following pair (16) ; let us

assume that the sentence is uttered out of the blue, so that the indefinite is clearly interpreted as non-partitive.

- (16) a. *Pierre m'a offert d'horribles fleurs.*  
Pierre me-has offered INDEF horrible flowers.  
'Pierre offered me horrible flowers.'
- b. *Pierre m'a offert des fleurs horribles.*  
Pierre me-has offered some flowers horrible  
'Pierre offered me horrible flowers.'

The 'maximally nonrestrictive' interpretation is blocked in (16a), because it enters into conflict with the by-default assumption that flowers are beautiful. So this time, we cannot capture the difference between (16a) and (16b) by saying that *horrible* is maximally nonrestrictive in (16a), and maximally restrictive in (16b). And if *s* is a minimal situation, *horrible* is nonrestrictive in both cases (the set of contextual horrible flowers is undistinguishable from the set of contextual flowers).

Do we have to conclude that in cases like (16), there is no semantic/pragmatic difference between pre- and post-nominal modifiers, or, if there is some, this difference has nothing to do with the ones we previously dealt with? I do not think so;<sup>13</sup> I claim that the contrast in (16a/b) can also be captured in terms of restrictive vs. nonrestrictive modification. However, as for adverbials, the modifier does not restrict the denotation of the head (we do not deal with what I called 'restrictivity<sub>h</sub>'), but rather a set of propositions (we deal with 'restrictivity<sub>c</sub>'). Before developing this idea, I now review the different definitions of restrictivity in terms of information structure.

### 2.3. Restrictivity : definition in terms of information structure

Many authors agree with the fact that the difference between the restrictive and nonrestrictive readings of attributive (non appositive) modifiers (also) has to do with information structure, cf. e.g. Ebert (1971, 1973), Peterson (1997), Jacob

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13. Note that several authors also assume for similar cases (where the indefinite is non-partitive and the nonrestrictive interpretation is not necessarily 'maximal/conceptual') that adjectives or relatives can in principle have a restrictive or nonrestrictive interpretation. For German for instance, Ebert (1971) (*apud* Cabredo-Hofherr (in prep.)) considers that relatives as the one in (17) can be either restrictive or nonrestrictive. However, under both readings, the set of contextual messy gardens is undistinguishable from the set of contextual gardens (the modifier is 'minimally' nonrestrictive in both cases according to our definition).

- (17) Er besass einen Garten, der sehr ungepflegt war.  
'He owned a very messy Garden/ a Garden, which was (by the way) very messy.'

(2005), Umbach (2006), Morzycki (2008), Riester (2012), Riester and Baumann (2013) and Cabredo-Hofherr (in prep.). However, there is much less agreement about the way restrictivity defined in terms of information structure (henceforth restrictivity<sub>c</sub>) should be characterized. I first give a state of the art in Sections 2.3.1-2.3.2) and conclude with the proposal adopted here in section 2.3.3.

### 2.3.1. Nonrestrictive attributive modifiers as conventional implicatures

Morzycki (2008)'s main point is that nonrestrictive modifiers convey conventional implicatures. His point of departure is Peterson (1997)'s view on the matter (from which he takes the idea that adverbials display the restrictive/nonrestrictive ambiguity as adjectives)<sup>14</sup>, which I will therefore present first.

The way Peterson (1997) characterizes restrictive and nonrestrictive adverbials has mainly to do with information structure. He distinguishes the two readings by the kind of answers the sentence containing them can provide (cf. his examples p. 237 reproduced below). In his illustration (18) of the nonrestrictive use of the adverbial, the whole answer including the adverbial constitutes its focused part, that is the information asked for by the question. In this case, the answer constitutes what Peterson calls a 'double assertion' : the Titanic sank and the sinking was rapid.<sup>15</sup> In his illustration (19) of the restrictive use, the focused part within the answer is the adverbial alone, i.e. the adverbial bears narrow focus. In this second case, according to Peterson, the sentence does not amount to a double-assertion ; (19) should not be paraphrased by 'The Titanic sank *and* it was rapid', but rather by 'The Titanic's sinking was rapid'.

- (18) a. What memorable events involving large ships in the North Atlantic can you mention ?  
b. [...] [The Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine in 1915. Also, the Titanic sank rapidly. It hit an iceberg]<sub>F</sub>. (nonrestrictive reading)
- (19) a. What caused such a great loss of life in the sinking of the Titanic ?  
b. The Titanic sank [rapidly]<sub>F</sub>. (restrictive reading)

Göbbel (2007) casts Peterson's intuition in a focus-theoretical framework and argues after him that the restrictive vs. nonrestrictive distinction is an informational one, both for adjectival and adverbial modifiers : the modifier is narrowly focused on the restrictive use, and integrated into a broader focus on the nonrestrictive use.

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14. Morzycki acknowledges the absence of an obvious definition of the terms 'restrictive/ non-restrictive' and essentially uses it as a label for the problem he addresses (see his fn 1).

15. Recall that some authors like Morzycki (2008) and Shaer (2000, 2003) does not follow Peterson in the idea that the nonrestrictive reading is available with postverbal manner adverbials (they would therefore disagree that it is available in (18b)).

Morzycki (2008) rejects Peterson's and Göbbel's characterisation of (non)-restrictivity in terms of different kinds of focus, but adopts Peterson's idea that nonrestrictive modifiers make part of double-assertions. Besides, Morzycki proposes to extend to the whole class of nonrestrictive modifiers, including the attributive (nonappositive) modifiers, the typical characterization of appositives as 'parenthetical', as additional extra-comments on the current utterance. He treats all nonrestrictive modifiers (including adjectives or adverbials in pre-head position) as a subspecies of expressive meaning as defined by Potts (2005), and identified with conventional implicatures. According to this approach, a sentence with a nonrestrictive modifier is a way of producing two assertions in one. The modifier is then conceived as predicated of an (implicit) contextually-restricted definite description. For instance, (20a) receives as a paraphrase (20b), and (21a) means something like (21b) (*C* is a contextually supplied domain variable).

- (20) a. Every unsuitable word was deleted. (nonrestrictive)  
 b. Every word was deleted. They were unsuitable.
- (21) a. If a ship slowly sinks<sub>*C*</sub>, it's always regrettable. (nonrestrictive)  
 b. Every ship-sinking<sub>*C*</sub> is regrettable. The sinkings<sub>*C*</sub> (i.e., the relevant sinkings) are slow.

Observe that the implication conveyed by the nonrestrictive modification is then analysed as having wide scope (e.g. it is interpreted outside the scope of the conditional in (21)). This is expected if indeed the implication they convey is a conventional implicature.

Although appealing for *appositive* nonrestrictive modifiers, such an analysis raises several problems when extended to *attributive* nonrestrictives. Firstly, as already noticed by Leffel (2012) :12, *attributive* and *appositive* nonrestrictive modifiers differ in their discourse properties. On one hand, appositives tend to convey new information, contrary to presuppositions (Potts (2005))). This explains Pott's contrast repeated in (22).

- (22) Lance Armstrong survived cancer..  
 a. # When reporters interview Lance, a cancer survivor, he often talks about the disease.  
 b. And most riders know that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor

On the other hand, attributive nonrestrictive modifiers regularly (but not always) present the predication as presupposed, as shown by the contrast (23) provided by Leffel (2012). The same contrast obtains for any neutral modifier in French, cf. (24a). As Waugh (1977) indeed already observed, modifiers in prenominal position can always present the description as already introduced in the previous context, cf. her ex. (24a). Appositives cannot, as shown by the oddity of (24b).

- (23) a. # Carcinogens are harmful, and you should use this product to rid your body of all carcinogens, which are harmful.  
 b. Carcinogens are harmful, and you should use this product to rid your body of all harmful carcinogens.
- (24) a. *J'ai vu un éléphant énorme. Cet énorme éléphant*  
 I have seen a elephant huge. This huge elephant  
*buvait de l'eau.*  
 drink-IMP. of the water  
 'I saw a huge elephant. This huge elephant was drinking water.'
- b. # *J'ai vu un éléphant énorme. Cet éléphant, énorme,*  
 I have seen a elephant huge. This elephant huge  
*buvait de l'eau.*  
 drink-IMP. of the water  
 'I saw a huge elephant. This elephant, huge, was drinking water.'

The second problem raised by Morzycki's approach is that conventional implicatures take maximally wide scope, even in contexts that are filters or plugs for presupposition projection (like *verba dicendi*), and are speaker-oriented – they convey the speaker's commentary of what is said. This is probably the case for expressives like *damn* or *jerk* (in *John told me that the jerk stopped drinking*, the implication conveyed by *jerk* is interpreted outside the scope of the verb of saying and reflects the speaker's opinion). But this is not the case of non expressive non-restrictive attributive modifiers, whose implication is even not projected<sup>16</sup> in presupposition holes, like negation, conditionals, questioning, etc, as we will see in the next section.

### 2.3.2. Nonrestrictive attributive modifiers as presupposition triggers

Nonrestrictive attributive modifiers have also often been said to be presupposed material. For instance, in several traditional descriptive French grammars, the predication conveyed by neutral adjectives in prenominal position is claimed to be 'notorious', 'common-knowledge', 'stereotypical', as 'mentions of social discourse', of the *vox populi* (Delente (2004), see also Roubaud (1785), Lafaye (1841), Berlan (1992)). On this respect, prenominal neutral modifiers are contrasted with postnominal ones, which are said, at least in indefinites, to convey a new description of the referent. For instance, Roubaud (1785) writes : "When you say *un*

16. An implication *projects* if and only if it survives as an utterance implication when the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the syntactic scope of an entailment-cancelling operator (Simons et al. (2010)). In other words, an implication projects when it tends to survive — that is, tends to be understood as a commitment of the speaker — even when the element that triggers this implication is embedded under operators like negation, conditionals, questions, etc.

*savant homme* [lit. a learned man], you *presuppose* that this man is learned ; and when you say *un homme savant* [lit. a man learned], you claim that he is. In the first case, you give the property by which he is distinguished ; in the second, the one by which you want to distinguish him. In the former case, science is beyond any doubt ; in the second, you want it to be known.’ (my translation, pp. 152-153). In the same vein, Waugh (1977) and Nolke (1996) assume that French nonrestrictive attributive adjectives are always part of an anaphoric NP, whose descriptive content is presupposed. For Italian, Vincent (1988) :299 similarly claims that the description conveyed by nonrestrictive attributive adjectives is taken for granted.

There are some parallels in the domain of the adverbials : manner adverbs in preverbal position have also been claimed to be backgrounded (Ernst (2002) :272), and postverbal ones focused (Bellert (1977), Ernst (2002), Abrusán (2012)).

I would like to point to three problems triggered by the view that the propositional content of nonrestrictive attributives is presupposed (see Fabricius-Hansen (2009) and Umbach (2006) for further criticisms of this idea).<sup>17</sup> The first concerns the case where the adjective is part of a definite description. In formal presupposition theories as those developed by Heim (1982, 1983) or van der Sandt (1992), a definite description is treated as generating a presupposition, that is an inference preserved under negation, in questions, under modal contexts, etc. In these theories, the description conveyed by adjectives that are part of definite DPs are analysed as a part of this presupposition, independently of the syntactical position of the adjective in the DP.<sup>18</sup> So for definites, the characterisation of nonrestrictive attributive modifiers as presupposed material fails to discriminate them from restrictive adjectives : in definites, adjectives are anyway presupposed material, independently of the fact that they are restrictive or nonrestrictive. For instance, both (25a) and (25b) presuppose according to Heim/van der Sandt that the fish under discussion is minuscule, whether the adjective prenominal or postnominal (that is, the propositional content the adjective conveys is in both cases interpreted outside the conditional) ; the same for (26a/b), which both presuppose that the fireman under discussion is brave.<sup>19</sup>

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17. Fabricius-Hansen (2009) : 100-101 and Umbach (2006) :153 both already observed that the implication conveyed by nonrestrictive modifiers can be new in the common ground.

18. Several works defend the idea that some subkinds of definites do not present the description they convey as familiar ; see e.g. Hawkins (1978) on the ‘unfamiliar’ use of the definite (addressed in Section 4.2). Baumann and Riestler (2012) (who discuss several examples of this kind) suggest that for at least some of these cases, formal presupposition theories would most likely treat the presupposition as *accommodated* by the addressee.

19. The only clear difference in terms of presupposition between restrictive or nonrestrictive adjectives in definites concerns the *nature* of the presupposition conveyed. Firstly, the presupposition conveyed by *restrictive* adjectives in definites is invariably that the referent *a* of the definite DP satisfies the adjectival predication (e.g. for (25b), the presupposition that the fish under discussion is minuscule). Secondly, *nonrestrictive* adjectives in definites can, apart from this first type of

- (25) a. *Si tu ne lui montres que le minuscule poisson, il sera déçu.*  
 If you NEG him show only the minuscule fish, he  
 be.FUT disappointed  
 ‘If you show him the minuscule fish only, he’ll be disappointed.’
- b. *Si tu ne lui montres que le poisson minuscule, il sera déçu.*  
 If you NEG him show only the fish minuscule, he  
 be.FUT disappointed  
 ‘If you show him the minuscule fish only, he’ll be disappointed.’
- (26) a. *Si le courageux pompier avait été là, il l’aurait sauvée.*  
 If the brave fireman had been there, he her-would.have  
 saved.  
 ‘If the brave fireman had been there, he would have saved her.’
- b. *Si le pompier courageux avait été là, il l’aurait sauvée.*  
 If the fireman brave had been there, he her-would.have  
 saved.  
 ‘If the brave fireman had been there, he would have saved her.’

This first problem can in principle be solved once we distinguish *referential* and *lexical* givenness, and admit that the referent of a definite DP can be given (known) in the current context while the description this DP provides is new/unfamiliar (see Baumann and Riestler (2012) and references therein). I will use this distinction between definites who provide new and old description of a given referent in Section 4. However, in order to show that the specificity of nonrestrictive attributives is that they are presuppositional material, one should additionally establish, for definites, that prenominal neutral modifiers provide a given/familiar description of the referent (e.g. in 25a)), while postnominal ones can also provide a new description (e.g. in 25b)). But as far as I know, this has never been empirically established, and I doubt it can.

The second problem concerns the case where the adjective is part of an indefinite description. If nonrestrictive attributive modifiers were presupposed material, their descriptive content should systematically be preserved under negation. But

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presupposition, convey the presupposition that all members (in the maximal situation) of the set denoted by the noun (included the referent of the definite) are members of the set denoted by the adjective. Such a generic presupposition is triggered when the adjective is what we called ‘maximally’ nonrestrictive (cf. Section (2.2.2)). For instance, only (26a) has an additional interpretation under which it presupposes that all firemen, included the one under discussion, are brave.

this is not the case ; for instance, if the definite determiner is replaced by an indefinite in (25a), the sentence does neither entail the existence of a fish, nor (a fortiori) a property of a fish under discussion.<sup>20</sup>

The third problem with the view that nonrestrictive modifiers are presupposed material concerns adverbials. If the presupposition conveyed is that the event described satisfies the adverbial description, this hypothesis is wrong ; for instance, (27), which contains a pre-verbal neutral adverbial (nonrestrictive) does not presuppose that the call was quick (since the call itself is not taken for granted). Another option is that the presupposition conveyed is that all events (in the relevant situation) generally satisfy the adverbial description (which seems to be close to what Morzycki 2008 suggests). But to my mind, a sentence like (27) does not trigger a presupposition of this type either.

(27) *Si le conducteur a rapidement appelé son chef, il n'y a pas*  
If the driver has quickly called his boss, there is no  
*de problème.*  
INDEF problem  
'If the driver quickly called his boss, there is no problem.'

In conclusion, the implication conveyed by nonrestrictive attributive modifiers does not systematically project when the modifier appears in presuppositional holes (negation, conditionals, etc.); it only does when other triggers (like a definite determiner for some theories) force it. I therefore conclude that the hypothesis according to which nonrestrictive modifiers differ from restrictive ones in that they presuppose the description they conveyed should be given up, if 'presupposition' is understood in the classical sense of Heim or van der Sandt.

### 2.3.3. (Non-) restrictivity and (non-) at-issueness

According to another understanding of presuppositions, these are propositions which are 'conveyed by a sentence but not part of the main point' (Horton and Hirst (2012) :255 via Simons et al. (2010)). Simons *et al.* redefine this notion of presuppositionality as 'non at-issueness' and fleshes it out in a focus-theoretic framework. What I argue in this section (after e.g. Peterson and Goebbel) is that the correct generalization behind the intuition that nonrestrictive attributive modifiers

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20. With an indefinite, only *maximally* nonrestrictive modifiers are presupposition triggers ; for instance, if *courageux* is maximally nonrestrictive in the indefinite version of (26a), the sentence conveys the inference that firemen are generally brave. But this interpretation is not systematically available with nonrestrictive modifiers (it is for instance not available in the indefinite version of (25a)), so the generalization proposed that nonrestrictive modifiers are presupposed material is not confirmed.

are ‘presuppositional’ is that they convey *non at issue* implications. On this point, nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers differ from restrictive<sub>c</sub> ones, which convey at issue implications.

In the previous section, we just saw that the implication conveyed by non-restrictive modifiers does not systematically project. We now claim that this implication is non-at-issue. This suggests that *not all non-at-issue implications of a sentence project*. In fact, there is nothing shocking about this : other cases of non-projecting non-at-issue components have already been documented. For instance, it has been observed that appositives, whose implication is also non-at-issue (Potts (2005)), sometimes does not project either. For instance, under the most salient interpretation of sentence (28), *a professor* receives a non-specific reading, and the nominal appositive receives a narrow scope interpretation wrt the conditional, cf. Wang et al. (2005), Nouwen (to appear) :

(28) If a professor, a famous one, publishes a book, he will make a lot of money.

In their study of projection behavior of some presuppositions, Smith and Hall (2013) also suggest that some not-at-issue meaning may not project.

In this section, I firstly establish empirically that the implication conveyed by nonrestrictive attributive modifiers is non-at-issue. Then I define more precisely what it means for a modifier to be (non-)at issue. Finally, I summarize the main differences between two kinds of non-at-issue nonrestrictive modifiers, namely attributives and appositives.

Three tests allow to establish whether a certain component is at issue or not. The first one is what Koev (2012) calls the ‘answerability test’ : since not-at-issue content is supposed not to address the main point of the sentence, one cannot use it felicitously to directly address a question. As (30) and (31) below show, French neutral adjectives and adverbials in a pre-head position (non restrictive<sub>c</sub>) are not really appropriate in this environment. This is expected if their content is indeed non at issue.<sup>21</sup>

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21. For English, since preverbal adverbials can be restrictive<sub>c</sub> according to Morzycki/Shaer, they should be felicitous when addressing a question, contrary to what happens in French. So the following two options should be available :

- (29) How did the accountant transfer the money to his own account ?  
a. He transferred the money to his own account [SECRETLY]<sub>F</sub>.  
b. He [SECRETLY]<sub>F</sub> transferred the money to his own account.

In fact, Göbbel (2007) (to which I owe these examples) claims that (29b) is ill-formed in the given context, and supports his claim that preverbal adverbials are always nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> in English. However, L. McNally (p.c.) and an anonymous reviewer accept (29b) in the same context, which suggests that Morzycki and Shaer’s view is the correct one. Interestingly, they also notice that *without* a focus on the adverbial, the answer (29a) would be strange. This suggests that when a modifier can have both the restrictive and nonrestrictive reading in a particular syntactic position, Focus disambiguates and discards the nonrestrictive reading. This is a point I will argue for later in

- (30) Comment est-ce que Pierre le lui a dit ?  
 ‘How did Pierre tell it to her?’
- a. *Il le lui a dit [VIOLEMMENT]<sub>F</sub>*  
 He it him has told violently  
 ‘He told it to her violently’
- b. # *Il le lui a [VIOLEMMENT]<sub>F</sub> dit.*  
 He it him has violently told  
 ‘He violently told it to her’
- (31) Comment sont les fleurs tu vas lui acheter ?  
 ‘How are the flowers you will buy her?’
- a. *Je vais lui acheter des fleurs [MAGNIFIQUES]<sub>F</sub>*  
 I will her buy some flowers magnificent  
 ‘I’ll buy her magnificent flowers.’
- b. # *Je vais lui acheter de [MAGNIFIQUES]<sub>F</sub> fleurs.*  
 I will her buy some magnificent flowers  
 ‘I’ll buy her magnificent flowers.’

The second test is what Koev calls the ‘direct reply test’. Given that non at issue content is not part of the main point of the sentence, it cannot be targeted directly by subsequent conversational moves like *yes*, *no*, *it’s not true*, etc. The following data show that French neutral adjectives in the prenominal position cannot be targeted that way, while they can in the postnominal position.

- (32) a. *Ils ont pu sauver d’innocents passagers.*  
 They have could save INDEF.innocent passengers  
 ‘They could save innocent passengers.’
- b. # *C’est faux. Ces passagers n’étaient pas innocents.*  
 ‘It’s false. These passengers were not innocent.’
- (33) a. *Ils ont pu sauver des passagers innocents.*  
 They have could save INDEF. passengers innocent  
 ‘They could save innocent passengers.’
- b. *C’est faux. Ces passagers n’étaient pas innocents.*  
 ‘It’s false. These passengers were not innocent.’
- (34) a. *Pierre vient de casser un magnifique vase en cristal!*  
 Pierre comes to break a wonderful vase in cristal  
 ‘Pierre just broke a wonderful cristal vase!’

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the last part of the section, though a comparison of German adjectives and French left-adjectives like *beau* ‘beautiful’ (cf. examples (44)), who behave like English adverbials and German adjectives in that they are compatible with new information focus on their most natural (prenominal) position. Sbelow.

- b. # Ce n'est pas vrai ! Ce vase en cristal est franchement vilain.  
 'That's not true ! This cristal vase is frankly ugly.'
- (35) a. *Pierre vient de casser un vase en cristal magnifique !*  
 Pierre comes to break a vase in cristal wonderful  
 'Pierre just broke a wonderful cristal vase !'
- b. Ce n'est pas vrai ! Ce vase en cristal est franchement vilain.  
 'That's not true ! This cristal vase is frankly ugly.'

Thirdly, at-issueness can also be tested through the Ducrot (1972)'s *loi d'enchaînement* (translated as 'linking law' by Jayez (2010)). In two words, the linking law forbids any attachment to a presupposition by the way of a conjunction or a subordination, except for *et* 'et' and *si* 'if'. Jayez and Tovenà (2008) and Jayez (2010) show that attachments are forbidden with another type of non at issue component, namely the content conveyed by conventional implicatures, too. The following data suggest that attachment is also difficult with neutral adjectives (like *sympathique* 'nice') in a prenominal position.<sup>22</sup>

- (36) a. *J'ai privilégié un candidat japonais sympathique, car*  
 I have privileged a candidate japanese nice, because  
*le côté personnel est vraiment important dans la*  
 the side personal is really important in the  
*collaboration.*  
 collaboration  
 'I gave priority to a nice japanese applicant, because the personal side is really important in the collaboration.'
- b. *J'ai privilégié un sympathique candidat japonais, # car*  
 I have privileged a nice candidate japanese, because  
*le côté personnel est vraiment important dans la*  
 the side personal is really important in the  
*collaboration.*  
 collaboration  
 'I gave priority to a nice japanese applicant, because the personal side is really important in the collaboration.'

22. The examples (36) contain an additional nationality adjective (*japonais* 'Japanese'), but the attachment is only tested with *sympathique* through our examples. As mentioned in the introduction, nationality modifiers are right-adjectives in French and contrary to what happens with neutral adjectives, their interpretation is not constrained in the post-nominal position (the attachment to their propositional content is therefore predicted to be optional in this position).

Note that I don't test the potential alternative sentence where the evaluative modifier is in postnominal position but precedes the nationality adjective (*un candidat sympathique japonais*), because sequences of this type are generally disallowed, cf. e.g. Laenzlinger (2005) :62-65.

The informants who judge (36b) to be acceptable interpret it as suggesting that the hiring person finds it easier to work with Japanese. This confirms the idea that one disprefers the attachment with the content conveyed by the neutral adjective in prenominal position.

On the other hand, the same test suggests that attachment is forced with neutral adjectives in postnominal position, corroborating the idea that restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers are understood as addressing the main point of the sentence :

- (37) a. *Il a engagé une délicieuse femme allemande, car on a besoin de temps en temps de traduction français-allemand.*  
 He has hired a delicious woman german, because one has need of time to time of translation french-german  
 ‘He hired a delicious German woman, because we sometimes need French-German translations.’
- b. *#Il a engagé une femme allemande délicieuse, car on a besoin de temps en temps de traduction français-allemand.*  
 He has hired a woman german delicious, because one has need of time to time of translation french-german  
 ‘He hired a delicious German woman, because we sometimes need French-German translations.’

In conclusion, the three tests just presented point to the conclusion that the implication conveyed by nonrestrictive modifiers is not at issue, while the one conveyed by restrictive modifiers is. What we do next is to define better what it means for a modifier to be (non-)at issue.

**(Non)at-issueness as relevance to the QUD.** Under Roberts (1996)’s definition, the question under discussion (QUD) is the question that determines the discourse topic. Simons et al. (2010)’s definition of at-issueness is built on the notion of relevance to the QUD. Their idea is that a proposition *p* is at issue relative to a QUD if *p* is relevant to Q, that is if it contextually entails an answer to Q.<sup>23</sup>

Focus indicates what is the QUD : it determines which part of the sentence corresponds to what is the information asked for by the question (Roberts (1996)). As we saw in the previous section, the implication *p* conveyed by restrictive modifiers is at issue. Therefore, according to this definition, the proposition *p* should be relevant to QUD, i.e. should answer it. This is what happens when the restrictive modifier is narrow focused, as under Peterson/Göbbel’s view of restrictive modification. On the other hand, if the implication *p* conveyed by nonrestrictive

23. For technical reasons not relevant here, Simons et al. (2010) do not define at-issueness directly for a proposition *p* as above, but via the yes/no question associated with a proposition. I ignore this aspect of their implementation here (as well as the refinements of their definition of at-issueness they defend in Section 6 of their paper).

modifiers is non at-issue, the proposition *p* should this time *not* be usable to answer the QUD. That is, nonrestrictive modifiers should be part of a broader focus. The proposed generalization from Göbbel (2007) is schematized in (38).

- (38) a. ... head [MOD]<sub>F</sub> (restrictive<sub>c</sub> reading)  
 b. [... [mod HEAD]<sub>F</sub>]<sub>F</sub> (nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> reading)

Although correct, the structures proposed in (38) raise two minor problems.

Firstly, French adjectives and adverbials in post-head position can *prima facie* be part of a broader focus, too. This is what is suggested by the data (39)-(40). In these examples, both answers A1 and A2 are felicitous ways to address the QUD. This raises a problem on the view that post-head neutral modifiers are restrictive<sub>c</sub> as defined in (38b).

- (39) Qu'est-ce que tu as acheté ?  
 'What did you buy ?'  
 A1 *J'ai acheté [de magnifiques fleurs]<sub>F</sub>*  
 I have bought INDEF wonderful flowers  
 'I bought wonderful flowers'  
 A2 *J'ai acheté [des fleurs magnifiques]<sub>F</sub>*  
 I have bought INDEF flowers wonderful  
 'I bought wonderful flowers'
- (40) Qu'est-ce que tu as fait ?  
 'What did you do ?'  
 A1 *J'ai [tranquillement lu mon roman]<sub>F</sub>*  
 I have quietly read my novel  
 'I (quietly) read my novel (quietly).'  
 A2 *J'ai [lu mon roman tranquillement]<sub>F</sub>*  
 I have read my novel quietly  
 'I (quietly) read my novel (quietly).'

It is not clear however that we really deal with the same focus in both cases, contrary to what these data suggest at first sight. An indication that the two answers A1 and A2 probably differ in their information structure is that a contrastive adverbial like *cette fois-ci* 'this time' triggers a different interpretation with a pre- or a post-head modifier :

- (41) A. Qu'est-ce que tu as acheté ?  
 'What did you buy ?'  
 A1 *Cette fois-ci j'ai acheté de magnifiques fleurs.*  
 This time I have bought INDEF wonderful flowers  
 'This time I bought wonderful flowers.'

A2 *Cette fois-ci j'ai acheté des fleurs magnifiques.*

This time I have bought INDEF wonderful flowers

'This time I bought wonderful flowers.'

Intuitively, the answer A2 is interpreted as contrasting the reported event with events where non-wonderful flowers were bought. The alternatives we have in A1, where something else than flowers is bought, seem somehow to be discarded. In other words, the alternative set triggered by Focus in A2 is very similar to the one we obtain when the modifier is narrow focused. The same contrast obtains in the presence of *ne...que* 'only'.

If correct, the intuition can be captured as follows. Contrary to what first appearance suggests, the modifier is not part of a broader focus in the answers A2 (39) and (40). The answers of A1 and A2 differ in that while A1 *directly* addresses the question, A2 does it only indirectly. The answers A2 in fact address a subquestion the speaker anticipates and accommodates, e.g. *how are the flowers you bought ?* or *how did you read your novel ?* Since these answers do not directly answer the question, their focused part is not determined by it. On this account, the generalization according to which neutral modifiers in post-head position are always narrow focused is not really endangered by the data (39)-(40).

The second problem raised by the structures (38) is a bit more tricky. In French, evaluative prenominal adjectives very often require prosodic prominence, independently of their syntactical position. This is especially true of elative adjectives like *magnifique* 'magnificent', *énorme* 'enormous', that I will consequently write in capitals from now on in the examples. This is in principle not incompatible with the idea that these adjectives are part of a larger focused constituent. But if prosodical prominence amounts to focus, we should explicitly mark the difference between the focus characterizing restrictive modifiers and the one that nonrestrictive modifiers can bear.

Following suggestions of Riester and Baumann (2013) (and authors cited therein, as Beaver and Velleman (2011)), I propose to distinguish the 'standard' focus marking the information asked for by the QUD (marked here *F*-focus), from any other focus that *does not* fulfill this role, but mark e.g. new information not asked by the QUD or not directly addressing it, emphasis, etc (marked here *f*-focus).<sup>24</sup> *F*-focused modification is therefore always restrictive<sub>c</sub>, but nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modification can be *f*-focused, as schematized in (42).

- (42) a. ... head [MOD]<sub>F</sub> (restrictive reading)  
 b. ... [[mod](<sub>f</sub>) HEAD]<sub>F</sub> (nonrestrictive reading)

Coming back to our previous example, we'll have e.g. the following structures :

24. The idea that accent placement can not only be determined by standard focushood, but also by other factors like emotiveness dates back to Bolinger (1965).

- (43) a. Je vais lui acheter des fleurs [MAGNIFIQUES]<sub>F</sub>  
           ‘I’ll buy her magnificent flowers.’  
       b. Je vais lui acheter [de [MAGNIFIQUES]<sub>f</sub> fleurs]<sub>F</sub>

Importantly, it seems that the possibility for a nonrestrictive marker to be *f*-focused is not available in a language like German. It has been indeed observed by Umbach (2006) and Riester (2012) that in general, (evaluative and factual) adjectives on a nonrestrictive interpretation resist focus.<sup>25</sup> What is then at the source of the difference between French and German here ?

We can account for this difference as follows. Syntax is in charge of disambiguating neutral adjectives wrt restrictivity in French. Therefore, in French, Focus is in principle free of fulfilling other roles, like e.g. marking emphasis. On the other hand, in German, Focus is the main disambiguating marker wrt restrictivity, since syntax does not play any role on this respect. This is arguably why Focus cannot be used for other purposes as freely as in French.

It is interesting to note that French adjectives that do not easily move (i.e. non-neutral adjectives, that is right- and left-adjectives) behave like German adjectives wrt Focus. Let us come back to examples (5a) (with a right-adjective in postnominal position) and (6a) (with a left-adjective in prenominal position) ; in both cases, the adjective can have both interpretations in its most natural position *if unaccented*. But if it receives Focus, the nonrestrictive reading disappears in both cases, as the following examples (44) show. This confirms again that Focus can be used for other purposes than disambiguating the modifier wrt restrictivity *only if* syntax plays this role.

- (44) a. *J’aime bien les étagères BLANCHES chez Marie.* (cp. (5a))  
           I like well the shelves white at Marie  
           *R* : ‘I like the subset of shelves at Mary’s place which are white.’  
           # *NR* : ‘I like the shelves at Mary’s place. They are white.’  
       b. *J’aime bien les BONS romans de Boris Vian.* (cp. (6a))  
           I like well the good novels of Boris Vian  
           *R* : ‘I like the subset of Vian’s novels which are good.’  
           # *NR* : ‘I like the novels of Boris Vian. They are good.’

**Nonrestrictive appositives vs nonrestrictive attributives.** Observe that in stating that F-focused modification is always restrictive<sub>c</sub>, we capture the idea that restrictive modification is central to the point made by the utterance, regardless of whether it provides a new or an old description of the referent. In encoding that nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> pre-head modifiers cannot provide the information asked for by the QUD, we render the intuition that they are additional, unnecessary comments,

25. So Focus triggers the restrictive interpretation. However, a non-focused modifier can receive both interpretations (see Umbach (2006) and Riester (2012) for details).

and this even if they provide new information on the referent. On this point, non-restrictive attributes resemble appositives. But these two kinds of nonrestrictive modifiers nevertheless differ from each other in several respects.

Firstly, as already mentioned below, while appositives convey new information, nonrestrictive attributive modifiers can convey new or old information. Secondly, while nonrestrictive attributive modifiers are systematically presented as conveying a non at issue content, the content expressed by appositives, although typically not-at-issue, have been reported to be sometimes at issue when they are *clause final*, as shown by Koev (2012) and Syrett et al. (t. a.); cf. also Schlenker (2012) on French. Thirdly, while appositives regularly project their content (although not always, cf. (28), neutral modifiers in pre-nominal position never project their content by themselves; it is the case only if independent triggers force it, as we saw in Section 2.3.1. The differences are summarized in Table 2.

	Description	At-issue content	Projected content
Restrictive <sub>c</sub> attributives	new/old	yes	no
Nonrestrictive <sub>c</sub> attributives	new/old	no	no
Nonrestrictive <sub>c</sub> appositives	new	yes/no	yes/no

TABLE 2 – Differences between (non)restrictive<sub>c</sub> attributives and appositives

### 3. How restrictive are restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers

As far as I know, no work tries to link the two notions of restrictivity discussed above. Intuitively, the two kinds of restrictive modifiers do the same kind of job though. In both cases, the restrictive modifier is contrastive and ‘throws something away’. Restrictive<sub>h</sub> modifiers are contrastive in that they presuppose the existence of at least one entity satisfying the description provided by the head, but not the one provided by the modifier, and they eliminate it from the denotation. Restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers eliminate something from a set of propositions. So more concretely and still informally, the same way the restrictive<sub>h</sub> modifier *Catalan* in (45a) contrasts the linguist in question  $x$  with at least another linguist  $y$  and eliminates  $y$  from the denotation, the restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifier in (45b) contrasts the proposition  $p^{restr.}$  that the linguist in question  $x$  is Catalan with at least one proposition that the linguist  $x$  is not Catalan, and eliminates it from a set of propositions. In both cases, the restrictive modifier discards something from a contextual set.

- (45) a. They hired the [Catalan]<sub>F</sub> linguist. (restrictive<sub>h</sub>)  
 b. They hired a [Catalan]<sub>F</sub> linguist. (restrictive<sub>c</sub>)

But on which set of propositions act restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers, in a way that distinguishes them from nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers? As a first try, we could say that the specificity of restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers is that they eliminate a proposition from the *common ground/ context set* (CG/CS), that is the initial set of possibilities taken to be accessible in the context (Stalnaker (1978)). More concretely, we would say that the restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifier puts forth a proposal,  $p^{restr.}$ , to update the CG by restricting the future contexts to those that have a non-empty intersection with  $p^{restr.}$ , in such a way that at least one potential context in the old CG is eliminated through the update. But so formulated, this property still does not clearly distinguish restrictive<sub>c</sub> attributives from nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> ones. Compare e.g. (45b) with (46):

(46) They hired [a Catalan LINGUIST]<sub>F</sub>. (nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub>)

The modifier *Catalan* contributes as much new information in (46) as in (45b), and in both cases, it updates the CG by restricting possible future contexts to those where the hired linguist is Catalan.

I suggest that in order to explicitly capture the difference between restrictive<sub>c</sub> and nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> attributives, we have to look at their respective way to act on the CG *that includes the information provided by the focus value of the sentence*. Before developing this, let me recall some basic definitions.

Given a sentence S,  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  gives the *focus value* of S, that is the set of propositions we get collecting the alternatives for the focus (Rooth (1992)). For instance, in (45b), where the modifier is narrowly focused, the focus value of S, or  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ , is given in (47):

(47) they hired a Catalan linguist, they hired a Japanese linguist, they hired a Dutch linguist...

As discussed in Rooth (1992),  $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^F$  should not give us the full set of alternatives (the whole range of propositions). Rather, we want to restrict our attention to a contextually relevant set of salient and plausible alternatives. Rooth achieves this through the mediating variable *C*, which is restricted to a subset of  $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^F$ . With Buring (1997) :38, I assume that  $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^F$  comes with a built-in contextual restriction of this type, so that  $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^F$  is the set of contextually plausible alternatives.<sup>26</sup> Crucially for us, this set contains at least two members. Furthermore, we can transform  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  into a proposition by conjoining each of the propositions by *or*. The meaning of this disjunction is the union of all propositions denoted by  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ , that is,  $\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ .<sup>27</sup>

26. Thus given a model, a world, an assignment function and a CG,  $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^F$  maps each expression to the set of contextually relevant alternatives. For instance, in (45b),  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  is not the whole set of potential alternative propositions, but a function which assigns to every context the set of *contextually salient* alternative propositions.

27. Note that while the Focus of S must be new, the disjunction of the contextually plausible alternatives that constitutes the focus value of S is according to Buring (1997) uninformative gi-

Let us see now how this applies to the difference between restrictive<sub>c</sub> and non-restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers. I give the definitions in (49); S is the sentence, and *p* is the propositional content conveyed by the modifier M, e.g. *x is Catalan* in our previous examples.

- (49) a. M restrictively modifies the CG updated with  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  iff  
 $(\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG}) \cap p \subset (\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG})$   
 b. M nonrestrictively modifies the CG updated with  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  iff  
 $(\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG}) \cap p = (\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG})$

For restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers, the idea is that they systematically eliminate at least one plausible alternative from the CG updated with  $\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ . The reason for this is simple. Remember that the contextually salient set of alternatives  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  contains at least two members. Since restrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers are narrow-focused,  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  has to contain at least one alternative which is eliminated by the update of *p*. For instance, in our previous example (45b),  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  must contain at least one alternative proposition eliminated from the CG by the update with *p* (*x is Catalan*), for instance *they hired a Japanese linguist*.

For nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers, the idea is that the focus value  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  can always be such that *p* does not eliminate any proposition from the CG updated with  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ . For instance, in (46),  $\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  might contain only the two propositions *they hired a Catalan linguist* and *they hired a Japanese anthropologist*. In that case, no alternative is eliminated by the update with *p*, namely *x is Catalan*.

Of course, a more forceful claim would be that with nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers, the focus value  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  has to be such that *p* does not eliminate any proposition from  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG}$ . Some data like (50) suggest that nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers are indeed unacceptable in a context where  $\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  explicitly contains an alternative eliminated by the update with *p*.

- (50) a. They hired a [Catalan LINGUIST]<sub>F</sub> (# not a Japanese linguist).  
 b. *Il a rapporté de [minuscules POISSONS]<sub>F</sub> (# pas*  
*He brought INDEF tiny fish (no*  
*d'huîtres ni d'énormes poissons).*  
*INDEF oysters nor INDEF huge fish)*  
 'He brought tiny fish (no oysters nor huge fish).'

ven the current CG. For instance, let us suppose that the focus value of (45b) contains the three propositions in (47) only. Then, for Büring, the disjunction of these three propositions does not bring any new information in the current CG. Büring (1997) :39 therefore adopts the following statement :

- (48) S can be uttered given CG iff  
 $\cup \llbracket S \rrbracket^F \cap \text{CG} = \text{CG}$

But more investigation is required to support this stronger claim ; I therefore only commit myself to the weaker hypothesis that with nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub>, the focus value  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$  can always be such that  $p$  does not eliminate any proposition from the CG updated with  $\llbracket S \rrbracket^F$ .

The ‘noneliminative’ character of nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> modifiers can easily be related to the fact that they are often said to convey side-comments/secondary information : the implication they convey is felt as peripheral because the focus value of the sentence never has to contain a salient alternative eliminated with the update of  $p$ .

## 4. The nonrestrictive bias of evaluative predicates

### 4.1. Previous accounts

Now that the concept of restrictivity has been clarified, I come back to what I called the hypothesis of the ‘nonrestrictive bias’ of evaluative predicates, that is the idea that evaluative predicates typically cannot be used restrictively. Recall that a standard observation supporting this claim is that in Romance languages, evaluative adjectives are often odd in postnominal position, at least in definites, cf. (1b).

To my knowledge, two accounts of this property have been proposed. The first is the one of Milner (1978), who already observes that the nonrestrictive bias is particularly with a subset of evaluative predicates only, e.g. *abominable* ‘horrible’, *horrible*, *affreux* ‘dreadful’, *divin* ‘divine’, *extraordinaire* ‘extraordinary’ (his ‘adjectifs affectifs’, henceforth *wonderful* predicates). He distinguishes them from what he calls ‘mixed’ evaluative predicates, e.g. *beau*, *inopportun*, *fort* (henceforth *beautiful* predicates).<sup>28</sup>

Milner claims that the nonrestrictive bias is due to the fact that *wonderful* adjectives are pseudo-predicates. In line with the emotivist and expressivist tradition in moral philosophy, he assumes that they are devoided from any true semantic content and that copulative sentences that have a *wonderful* adjective as ma-

28. Milner does not illustrate through explicit contrasts *wonderful* with *beautiful* predicates wrt restrictivity, but here are some examples of mine :

- |      |   |                               |
|------|---|-------------------------------|
| (51) | a. J’ai croisé la voisine sexy ce matin.<br>I bumped into the sexy neighbour this morning.                | ( <i>beautiful</i> predicate) |
|      | b. # J’ai croisé la voisine époustouflante ce matin.<br>I bumped into the amazing neighbour this morning. | ( <i>wonderful</i> predicate) |
| (52) | a. J’ai déposé l’article intéressant sur ton bureau.<br>I left the interesting paper on your desk         | ( <i>beautiful</i> predicate) |
|      | b. # J’ai déposé l’article passionnant sur ton bureau.<br>I left the fascinating paper on your desk.      | ( <i>wonderful</i> predicate) |

trix predicate are neither true nor false but only ‘express’ the speaker’s attitude. Since *wonderful* adjectives do not denote sets, they cannot be used restrictively. This purely expressive character is supposed to independently show up through other properties Milner attributes to *wonderful* predicates. A first property is that they cannot appear in true (non rhetorical) questions, cf. (53a), for Milner a direct consequence of the fact that words devoided of any true semantic content cannot be questioned. This should also explain why a *wonderful* predicate appearing in a *which*-phrase is interpreted outside it. For instance, Milner assumes that in (53b)-(53c), the implication conveyed by the adjective is interpreted as a comment of the speaker outside the scope of the question (*which houses did they build ? Whatever they are, I take for granted that they are fastuous ; which novels did you write ? I know by advance that they are passionating*). Thirdly, Milner claims that *wonderful* predicates are always speaker-oriented, as the contradiction of (53d) is supposed to show.

- (53) a. # Habite-t-il une maison fastueuse ? (Milner (1978) :289)  
 ‘Does he live in a sumptuous house ?’  
 b. Quelles maisons fastueuses ont-ils construites ? (*id.* :290)  
 ‘Which sumptuous houses did they build ?’  
 c. Quels romans passionnants avez-vous écrits ? (*ibid.*)  
 ‘Which fascinating novels did you write ?’  
 d. # Bien que ce film superbe passe depuis longtemps, Jean m’a dit qu’il n’avait pas vu l’abominable Amarcord. (*id.* :300)  
 ‘Although this superb film is onscreen for a long time, Jean told me that he didn’t watch the horrible Amarcord.’

I do not agree with Milner’s description of facts. Firstly, even if the adjective’s content in (53b) and (53c) can be attributed to the speaker, it does not have to. For instance, it is attributed to the hearer under the most accessible interpretation of (55a).<sup>29</sup> Secondly, the implication conveyed by *wonderful* predicates is not necessarily interpreted outside the scope of *verba dicendi*. The contradiction of (53d) is due to the fact that *abominable* appears in a definite DP and would also arise if the evaluative predicate were replaced with a factual one.<sup>30</sup> If the *wonderful* predicate

29. The idea that in questions, evaluative predicates invite the hearer’s opinion is found in various works dedicated to these predicates in the literature on relativism, cf. a.o. Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2007) (I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point).

30. Milner claims the contrary, but I am not convinced by his data since they are not built with a definite. For instance, the following example (built with a factual predicate) is indeed not contradictory but contains an indefinite in its first part :

- (54) Jean m’a dit qu’un roman inachevé d’Hervé Bazin *Vipère au poing* lui avait beaucoup plu ; pourtant ce roman est généralement considéré comme terminé. (p. 301)  
 ‘Jean told me that an unfinished novel from Hervé Bazin *Vipère au poing* pleased him a

appears in an indefinite, the contradiction vanishes, and this independently of the syntactical position of the adjective, cf. (55b).

- (55) a. Quels romans PASSIONNANTS as-tu eu l'occasion de lire ces derniers mois ?  
'Which fascinating novels did you have the opportunity to read these last months ?'  
b. Pierre m'a dit qu'il avait lu un roman ÉPOUVANTABLE/ un ÉPOUVANTABLE roman de Thomas Bernhard. Moi je les trouve tous excellents.  
'Pierre told me that he read a horrible novel from Thomas Bernhard. I found them all excellent.'

Thirdly, even if I agree with Milner's observation that *wonderful* predicates are often strange in true questions, I do not think that this is due to the fact that their content being expressive, it has to be interpreted outside the scope of the illocutory operator. In the spirit of the account proposed in Martin (2006), I would claim that the problem is due to the mirative flavour of *wonderful* predicates.<sup>31</sup> The claim that *wonderful* adjectives are mirative-like is supported by the fact that they require an exclamative prosody and all indicate that an extreme or at least unexpectedly high degree is achieved. The problem they raise in true questions can be accounted for as follows : it is pragmatically odd to ask whether an extreme degree is obtained and expectations consequently exceeded in a context where it is not even assumed that a high or very high degree is obtained. An evidence for this is that the problem vanishes in a context where the obtention of a very high degree is taken for granted, cf. (57).<sup>32</sup>

- (57) a. On est bien d'accord que sa maison est très belle. Mais est-ce qu'elle est FASTUEUSE ?  
'We agree that his house is very beautiful. But is it sumptuous ?'

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lot ; however, this novel is generally considered as finished.'

31. Mirative constructions express an emotion of the speaker caused by the fact that her expectations are exceeded in front of an unanticipated/novel information (see Rett (2012) for a review of miratives across constructions and languages). Exclamatives are typical mirative constructions (see e.g. Castroviejo-Miró (2006), Merin and Nikolaeva (2008)).

32. That *wonderful* predicates are also odd under negation (as noted by Milner too) can be accounted for the same way :

- (56) a. # Je n'ai pas acheté une voiture MAGNIFIQUE.  
'I didn't buy a wonderful car.'  
b. J'ai acheté une belle voiture, on est bien d'accord. Mais je n'ai pas acheté une voiture MAGNIFIQUE.  
'I bought a nice car, we agree on that matter. But I didn't buy a wonderful car.'

b. On est bien d'accord que son discours était très mauvais. Mais est-ce qu'il était ABOMINABLE ?

'We agree that his speech was very bad. But was it horrible?'

The second account of the nonrestrictive bias of evaluative predicates I am aware of is the one of Umbach (2006, 2012a,b) for German. Interestingly, Umbach also distinguishes between the same two classes of evaluative predicates as Milner, the *schön* predicates and the *wunderbar* ones. She makes a similar observation for German as Milner for French, namely that the former get the restrictive reading much more easily.

Umbach distinguishes evaluative predicates from factual ones by the type of propositions they denote : the former convey ethical/esthetical propositions that are not empirically testable, ascribed by the speaker. But she differentiates *wonderful* from *beautiful* predicates by the type of esthetical/ethical judgments they convey. Building on the Kantian distinction between *universal* and *subjective* esthetical/ethical judgements, Umbach proposes that while *beautiful* predicates may be used to convey *universal* judgements, *wonderful* ones can only convey *subjective* ones. When used to convey a universal judgment, *beautiful* predicates do not project an experiencer argument, while *wonderful* ones always do. Universal evaluative judgments partly 'mimick' empirical judgments in that they are *normative* : they rely on shared norms providing a standard that allow to define 'objectively' what counts as beautiful.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, universal evaluative judgments are truly 'debatable' (that is, the question whether *x* is beautiful can give rise to a genuine, non faultless disagreement) and are intended to enter the common ground. On the other hand, subjective evaluative judgments are purely private : they are only intended to reflect the subject's attitude, and therefore do not target the common ground. Rather, they are stored in what Farkas and Bruce (2010) call individual discourse commitments (sets of propositions to which a participant publicly commits, but which are not in the common ground). Judgments of this type give rise to 'faultless disagreement'.

Umbach further assumes that in order to be restrictive, a modifier should trigger alternatives and define a 'commonly accepted cut-off point' : the denotation of a restrictive modifier and of its complement has to be commonly agreed upon so that it can be used to narrow down the denotation/reference of the modified noun phrase. The idea, then, is that since *wonderful* predicates systematically convey subjective judgments, they cannot be used this way because they are by definition

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33. Note that under Umbach's account, universal evaluative judgments, although 'objectivable' through the set of norms they rely on, still remain subjective in that the norms are not *presupposed* in the context but *proposed* by the speaker. This is how I understand Umbach's proposal that subjective propositions conveyed by evaluative predicates are always interpreted metalinguistically, in the sense of Barker (2002) : the speaker who asserts the universal judgment *The flowers are beautiful* is also *making a proposal* about the standard of beauty in the context.

used to denote privately defined sets. The participants are not supposed to know how the speaker defines the set of wonderful things. Therefore, using *wonderful* predicates restrictively is odd because uncooperative.

## 4.2. Refining the empirical picture

I agree with Umbach's characterization of the two classes of evaluative adjectives. But a general problem raised by the two accounts just presented is that the nonrestrictive bias is not *always* at play. In some contexts indeed, *wonderful* adjectives *can* have a restrictive reading. This explains why they so often appear in post-head position in languages like French. This section describes in detail the contexts in which evaluative predicates can appear in post-head position in French and the associated readings. The collected data are summarized in Table 3 at the end of this section. They will be accounted for in Section 4.3.

Firstly, under a certain condition described below, *wonderful* predicates can be restrictive<sub>h</sub> when they are restrictive<sub>c</sub>, that is convey an at-issue content directly addressing a QUD. For instance, in (58)-(60), the implication conveyed by the adjective under narrow focus answers an (explicit or implicit) *which*-question, and is thus restrictive<sub>c</sub> (example (60) is taken from the Internet).

- (58) a. *Quels vêtements a-t-il jetés ?*  
Which clothes has he thrown away ?  
'Which clothes did he throw away ?'
- b. *Il a jeté les vêtements HORRIBLES, et gardé les autres*  
He threw away the clothes horrible, and kept the others  
'He threw the horrible clothes away, and kept the others.'
- (59) a. *Quel genre de femmes tu aimes ?*  
Which kind of women you like  
'Which kind of women do you like ?'
- b. *Ah, moi, je n'aime que les femmes MAGNIFIQUES !*  
Ah, me, I NEG like only the women gorgeous  
'Ah, me, I only like gorgeous women !'
- (60) *Quand je commence à lire un roman intéress[a]nt, je ne*  
When I begin to read a novel interesting, I NEG  
*lui consacre que les moments DÉLICIEUX de la vie.*  
it-DAT devote only the moments delicious of the life  
'When I begin to read an interesting novel, I only devote the delicious moments of life to it.'

In these examples, *wonderful* adjectives also clearly contrast a set of entities out of a larger set, which can be contextual (cf. (58)) or maximal (cf. (59) and (60)).

There are therefore also restrictive<sub>h</sub>. Note that in (59)-(60), the *wonderful* predicates are in the focus of *que* ‘only’, which confirms that they can induce alternatives.

There is a restriction on this use though. Indeed, *wonderful* predicates can be restrictive<sub>c</sub> and restrictive<sub>h</sub> only if they have an additional discursive role, typically an *explanatory function*. This is the case if the implication *p* conveyed by the modifier explains the proposition *q* denoted by the rest of the sentence. This is true in (58)-(60) : (58b) suggests that the subject’s referent got rid of these clothes *because* they were horrible, etc. If the context makes the explanatory function unlikely, *wonderful* predicates are again deviant with standard definites in post-nominal position, even if they address the QUD. For instance, the following examples (61) are strange, unless it is understood that *p* (*x* is a wonderful vase) explains *q* (*x* should be put on the buffet) :

- (61) a. Quels vases tu m’as dit de déposer sur le buffet ?  
 ‘Which vases did you tell me I should put on the buffet ?’  
 # *Dépose sur le buffet les vases MAGNIFIQUES*  
 Put on the buffet the vases wonderful  
 ‘Put on the buffet the wonderful vases !’
- b. Quels livres tu m’as dit que je devais te passer ?  
 ‘Which vases did you tell me I should give you ?’  
 # *Passe-moi les livres HORRIBLES !*  
 Give me the books horrible  
 ‘Give me the horrible books !’

Interestingly, under the causal interpretation induced in (58)-(60), the Judge does not have to be the speaker, but can also be the hearer. For instance, the answer in (58b) can very well be understood as ‘he got rid of the clothes that are horrible *according to him*’. This raises an issue for those accounts that rely on the premise that *wonderful N* systematically defines the set of wonderful N *according to the speaker*.

A second point to note about the difficulty for *wonderful* predicates to get a restrictive reading is that it is restricted to restrictivity<sub>h</sub>. *Wonderful* predicates have no problem to get the restrictive<sub>c</sub> reading. This explains why they have no difficulty to appear in post-head position although they are nonrestrictive<sub>h</sub>, as with indefinites, cf. (31a) repeated below, or with adverbials, cf. (63).

- (62) *Je vais lui acheter des fleurs [MAGNIFIQUES]<sub>F</sub> (= (31a))*  
 I will her buy some flowers magnificent  
 ‘I’ll buy her magnificent flowers.’
- (63) *Pierre a exécuté cette sonate [MAGNIFIQUEMENT]<sub>F</sub>*  
 Pierre has played this sonate marvelously

‘Pierre played this sonate marvelously.’

The next relevant new observation is that in French, *wonderful* adjectives can appear in post-nominal position with a nonrestrictive<sub>h</sub> and restrictive<sub>c</sub> reading in *first mention definites*. First-mention definites introduce a set of MH without presupposing the existence of a superset of H, exactly like indefinites (except that they still presuppose the unicity of the referent). Definites modified by what Hawkins (1978) an ‘establishing relative’ are of this kind. I give a relevant example in (64b).

- (64) a. # *Regarde le vase MAGNIFIQUE!*  
Look the vase wonderful  
‘Look at the wonderful vase!’
- b. *Regarde le vase MAGNIFIQUE que Chuck vient de m’offrir!*  
Look the vase wonderful that Chuck comes to  
m’offer!  
PRN.1SG.DAT offer  
‘Look at the wonderful vase Chuck just gave me!’

With Hawkins’ establishing relatives, the referent is then introduced within the total definite NP, rather than prior to the definite NP, and it not extracted from a contextual superset. So the vase described in (64b) is understood as the only contextual vase. Therefore, *magnifique* is nonrestrictive<sub>h</sub>, exactly as with non-partitive indefinites. But I take it to be restrictive<sub>c</sub> : it may bear narrow focus and answer an implicit QUD (*how is the vase you just received from Chuck?*).<sup>34</sup>

Note that (64b) is acceptable although the *wonderful* predicate does not have any explanatory function. This function is therefore required only if the *wonderful* adjective has the restrictive<sub>h</sub> reading as in (58)-(60), something that one should explain too.

Finally, another desirable goal is to provide a unified explanation for the pre-

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34. Another similar contrast, taken from Martin (2006), is given in (65) below : the relative is establishing in (65a), but not in (65b) (Martin (2006) makes use of the distinction introduced by Kleiber (1981) between the *relatives spécifiantes* and *non spécifiantes*, which is roughly similar to the one introduced by Hawkins (1978)) :

- (65) a. Pierre observait les clients du bar. La femme MAGNIFIQUE qui venait d’entrer commanda une bière.  
‘Pierre was observing the customers of the bar. The WONDERFUL woman who just entered ordered a beer.’
- b. Pierre observait les clients du bar. #La femme MAGNIFIQUE qui était blonde commanda une bière.  
‘Pierre was observing the customers of the bar. The WONDERFUL woman who was blond ordered a beer.’

vious observations and the difficulty of *wonderful* predicates to be used in anaphorical definite NPs *even if used nonrestrictively*, something that both Milner and Umbach observe independently. Umbach illustrates this through her example (66). In the answer (66b), the vase referred to is the only vase in the situation; the modifier is consequently nonrestrictive<sub>h</sub>. It is also nonrestrictive<sub>c</sub> (its content is not at-issue and does not address a QUD) : in a context where A just asserted that the vase was wonderful, it would be indeed very implausible to assume that we accommodate an implicit question to A answered by *wonderful*.

- (66) a. Sue : Guck mal, Chuck hat mir eine wunderbare Vase geschenkt.  
 ‘Look, Chuck gave me a wonderful vase.’  
 b. # Bob : Ich helfe dir gleich. Stell die wunderbare Vase schon mal auf das Büffet.  
 ‘I’ll help you in a minute. Put the wonderful vase on the sideboard.’

Umbach (2006) suggests that the oddity of (66b) is due to the fact that *wonderful* predicates are expressives, and as such, not only take widest scope but are also ‘plugged by the turn they are used in’, which would explain the fact that (66b) seems like a ironic quote.

However, as we saw above, several facts suggest on the contrary that *wonderful* predicates differ from expressives *à la* Potts : they are not always speaker-oriented, do not systematically take widest scope, etc (cf. the discussions of examples (53)-(55) above). Also, according to my German informants, the problem of (66b) tends to disappear when the definite is replaced with a demonstrative, something that is not obviously expected if the difficulty is due to the expressive character of *wunderbar*.

The French translations of Umbach’s example raise an independent problem that arises not only with evaluative modifiers, but also with factual adjectives. The problem is that the demonstrative tends to win in the competition with the definite when the entity of type *N* (here the vase) is not contrasted with an entity of another type, cf. Corblin (1987). So for this independent problem to be controlled in the translations (67) of Umbach’s example, I introduce a contrast between the vase and an object of another type in the context.

- (67) a. Regarde un peu, Chuck m’a offert une bouteille de vin et un vase MAGNIFIQUE !  
 ‘Look, Chuck offered me a bottle of wine and a wonderful vase !’  
 b. # *Je t’aide dans une minute. En attendant, installe le*  
 I you help in a minute. While waiting, put the  
*vase MAGNIFIQUE sur le buffet.*  
 vase wonderful on the sideboard  
 ‘I’ll help you in a minute. Put the wonderful vase on the sideboard.’

- c. # *Je t'aide dans une minute. En attendant, installe le*  
 I you help in a minute. While waiting, put the  
 # *magnifique/(OK)* MAGNIFIQUE vase sur le buffet.  
 wonderful wonderful vase on the sideboard  
 'I'll help you in a minute. Put the wonderful vase on the sideboard.'

In such examples, *wonderful* predicates are indeed odd in a postnominal position, cf. (67b). This is also true even if the adjective receives prosodic prominence, through e.g. what we called *f*-focus in the previous section. In pre-nominal position, things are more complex ; cf. (67c). If *magnifique* is used in (67c) as a simple repetition of the previous description (the by default interpretation when the predicate is not *f*-focused), the example gives rise to the same funny effect as the one described by Umbach. However, if it is understood as a (new) commitment from the speaker, communicating she agrees with her addressee (the by default interpretation when the predicate is *f*-focused), the problem vanishes.

Table 3 summarizes the observations collected throughout this section wrt the acceptability of *wonderful* predicates in post-head position in French ; the first column gives the type of constituents the modifier makes part of (DPs or VPs, types of DPs), the second and third indicate the acceptability in pre-head position (MH) and the associated readings, and the last two provide the same information for the post-head (HM) position.

	MH		HM	
standard definite DPs	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>	#/OK	R <sub>h</sub> , R <sub>c</sub>
non-part. indefinites DPs	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , R <sub>c</sub>
VPs (adverbials)	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , R <sub>c</sub>
first mention definite DPs	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>	OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , R <sub>c</sub>
anaphorical definite DPs	#/OK	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>	#	NR <sub>h</sub> , NR <sub>c</sub>

TABLE 3 – Distribution of *wonderful* predicates in pre- and post-head position in French

Two conclusions can be brought out from Table 3 : (i) the restrictive<sub>h</sub> reading is not responsible alone for the unacceptability of *wonderful* predicates (another factor is the absence of an additional discursive function, like the explanatory function) ; (ii) the nonrestrictive<sub>h</sub> reading does not guarantee its acceptability. This suggests that the nonrestrictive bias of these predicates is the consequence of another of their properties.

I recapitulate below the questions raised by the use of *wonderful* predicates that were added to the agenda through this section :

- a. Why can postnominal *wonderful* adjectives in standard definite DPs be restrictive<sub>h</sub> iff they are restrictive<sub>c</sub> and have an explanatory use ? (cf. ex.

- (58)-(60)). The account should also explain why no problem arises in the prenominal position of standard definites (cf. (1a)).
- b. Why can post-head *wonderful* modifiers be restrictive<sub>c</sub> without having an explanatory use in indefinites, first-mention definites and adverbials? (cf. ex. (64b), (65), (63)).
  - c. Why *post-nominal wonderful* adjectives are odd in anaphorical definites? (cf. ex. (67b)).
  - d. Why *pre-nominal wonderful* adjectives are sometimes acceptable, and sometimes not in anaphorical definites? (cf. ex. (66)-(67c)).

### 4.3. New proposal

I claim that the restrictions just collected on the uses of evaluative predicates originates from a single rule. Put simply, this rule states that the predicative content of an evaluative predicate *must matter* : those cannot be used regardless of the description they provide, precisely because of their evaluative nature. On this point, evaluative modifiers drastically differ from factual ones. It is indeed a trivial observation that a factual adjective like *blond* can be used regardless of its description, as a simple ‘pointing stick’, for the simple purpose of tracking reference (e.g. designating the single blond element of a contextual set or establishing an anaphorical link to a previous discourse referent). The fact that *x* is blond can be totally irrelevant in the discourse, and the speaker does not have to care about *x*’ blondness to use *blond*. This echoes a familiar assumption about the way the descriptive content functions in standard definites. As Wettstein (1991) :36 puts it :

Consider the referential use [of definite descriptions] ; there are contexts in which a speaker wants to draw his audience’s attention to an entity, perhaps one visually present to both speaker and audience, in order to go on and, for example, predicate something of it. *It is irrelevant to the purposes of the speaker, in many such cases, how the attention of the audience is directed to the referent.* Pointing with one’s finger or uttering a proper name would do as well as some elaborate description. (italics mine)

My proposal (summarized below in (68)) is therefore that with evaluative predicates, the speaker *must* care about the description used – it has to be relevant for the purposes of the speaker. Since *beautiful* predicates behave like regular predicates when they express universal judgements (Umbach (2012a,b)), they can be used as factual adjectives, too.

In (68b) I state more precisely what I mean when saying that the predicative content of a *wonderful* predicate must matter :

- (68) a. *Wonderful* predicates cannot be used for a pure referential/denotational purpose *only*. Their descriptive content has to be relevant for the discourse.
- b. The descriptive content  $p$  of a predicate is presented as relevant for the discourse when
- i.  $p$  provides a new description of the referent/denotation given the current CG, or
  - ii.  $p$  is positively/negatively relevant for the proposition  $q$  described by the rest of the sentence (i.e. the sentence without the modifier). In case  $p$  explains  $q$ ,  $p$  is *positively relevant* for  $q$ ; in case  $p$  contrasts with  $q$ ,  $p$  is *negatively relevant* for  $q$ .

The relation of positive and negative relevance can be more formally defined through the notion of relevance of Merin (1999), repeated in (69) :

- (69)  $p$  is positively relevant for  $q$  in the context  $i$  iff  $[P^i(p|q) > P^i(q)]$   
 $p$  is negatively relevant for  $q$  in the context  $i$  iff  $[P^i(p|q) < P^i(q)]$

For instance, in (58), that the clothes in question were horrible ( $p$ ) are presented in the context  $i$  as positively relevant (as a positive argument) for the fact that they had been thrown away ( $q$ ). But in (61), that the vase in question is horrible ( $p$ ) is by default presented as totally irrelevant (neither as a positive argument nor as a negative one) for the fact that it should be put on the buffet ( $q$ ).

Importantly for our problem, the fact that the propositional content  $p$  conveyed by the modifier is *at-issue* does not guarantee that it is presented *as relevant* for the discourse according to (68). If, for instance,  $p$  answers a *which* QUD,  $p$  is at issue. But  $p$  might very well be known in the current CG, and used for the single purpose of pointing the right referent.

Let us see now how (68) explains the data. Firstly, it answers Question (b.) (Why can post-head *wonderful* modifiers be restrictive<sub>c</sub> without having an explanatory use in indefinites, first-mention definites and adverbials ?) : in these three cases, *wonderful(ly)* modifiers provide a *new* description of the referent/denotation in the content, since the referent is each time newly introduced by the VP or DP that contains the modifier. This description is therefore always potentially relevant for the discourse as defined in (68). Since the newness of the description suffices to make it relevant, the propositional content  $p$  conveyed by the modifier does not need to be relevant for  $q$ , the propositional content of the rest of the sentence (as e.g. through an explanatory use).

Another related fact that we explain for free is that *wonderful* adjectives are always acceptable in demonstratives, in pre- and post-nominal positions. Compare for instance (67b) with (70b), completely uncontroversial :

- (70) a. Sue : Regarde un peu, Chuck m'a offert un vase MAGNIFIQUE !

‘Look, Chuck offered me a wonderful vase !’

- b. Bob : Waouw, super ! Je t’aide dans une minute. En attendant, installe ce MAGNIFIQUE vase/ce vase MAGNIFIQUE vase sur le buffet par exemple.  
‘Waouw, great ! I help you in a minute. In the meantime, put this wonderful vase on the buffet for instance.’

It suffices to admit with Corblin (1987) that demonstratives systematically present the description they provide of the referent as *new*. Even in cases where this description is already assumed in the common ground, demonstratives *reintroduce* it, as if it were new.

We can also answer Question (c.) (Why *post*-nominal *wonderful* adjectives are odd in anaphorical definites ?) Let us come back to (67b). On one hand, given that we deal with an anaphorical definite, the context makes clear that there is only one vase on the context. But on the other hand, since the neutral modifier is in post-nominal position, it has to be restrictive<sub>*h*</sub> (i.e. contrasts the vase with another contextual vase); cf. Section 2.1. The contradiction between these two requirements explains the unacceptability.<sup>35</sup>

Question (d) can be answered too (Why *pre*-nominal *wonderful* adjectives are sometimes acceptable, and sometimes not in anaphorical definites ?) In the ‘vase’ Umbach’s example (66), the description provided by the predicate is already given in the context. It has additionally no explanatory value. If it is used as a simple repetition of the previous description, the adjective is presented as a simple ‘pointing stick’, used regardless of its descriptive content, directly violating (68). We predict however that in anaphorical definite DPs of this kind, *wonderful* predicates should be more at ease once the description is new, which can be the case if they do not make part of the previous mention that serves as an antecedent for the anaphorical definite. This predication is in fact correct. Firstly, (71) is acceptable :

- (71) a. Sue : Regarde un peu, Chuck m’a offert un vase et un tapis.  
‘Look, Chuck offered me a vase and a rug.’  
b. Bob : Waouw, super ! Je t’aide dans une minute. En attendant, installe le MAGNIFIQUE vase sur le buffet par exemple.  
‘Waouw, nice ! I’ll help you in a minute. In the meantime, put the WONDERFUL vase on the buffer for instance.’

Secondly, in (67c) above, when *magnifique* is *f*-focused, it can also be understood as conveying a *new* description of the referent : the emphasis indicates that the vase is now described as wonderful *according to the speaker*, and not according to the addressee (the Judge/Experiencer does not have the same value as in the

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35. A post-nominal neutral adjective can only be nonrestrictive<sub>*h*</sub> in a definite if we deal with a first mention definite.

Note that a problem similar to the one in (67b) would arise if *horrible* were post-nominal in (72b) below.

previous description).

Another prediction of the account proposed here is that in anaphorical definite DPs, *wonderful* predicates should be acceptable when an explanatory use is plausible, even if the implication  $p$  they convey is already familiar in the CG. The acceptability of (72b) confirms this prediction (that  $x$  is horrible can very well explain that  $x$  is put on E-bay). Note that in this example, when *horrible* is used for the second time, it cannot be understood as a new description of the antecedent (as this was the case in (67c)), since the Experiencer has to be the same for the two uses.

The explanatory use is by contrast not plausible in (72a), therefore showing the same problem as Umbach's example.

- (72) a. Regarde, pour Noël, j'ai reçu un vase horrible et un tapis tout aussi horrible. # Tu peux tenir l'HORRIBLE vase une seconde ?  
'Look, for Christmas, I received a horrible vase and an equally horrible rug. Can you please take the HORRIBLE vase for one second ?'
- b. Pour Noël, j'ai reçu un vase horrible et un tapis tout aussi horrible. J'ai déjà mis l'HORRIBLE vase à vendre sur e-bay, mais je n'en espère pas grand-chose.  
'For Christmas, I received a HORRIBLE vase and an equally HORRIBLE rug. I've already put the HORRIBLE vase on sale on E-bay, but I don't

hope much out of it.’<sup>36</sup>

Finally, we can also answer question (a.) (Why can post-nominal *wonderful* adjectives in standard definites be restrictive<sub>h</sub> iff they are restrictive<sub>c</sub> and have an explanatory use? And why no problem arises in prenominal position in standard definites?). Let us begin with the prenominal position, cf. ex. (1a). In examples of this kind, contrary to what we had in Umbach’s vase example, the implication *p* is not anymore explicitly presented as known in the CG, since it is not introduced through a previous mention that serves as an antecedent for the definite. It is therefore possible to assume that *p* is newly introduced in the CG. The rule (68b) is therefore respected, and no problem arises :

- (1) a. *J’ai vu l’affreux voisin ce matin.*  
I have seen the horrible neighbour this morning  
'I saw the horrible neighbour this morning.'
- b. *#J’ai vu le voisin affreux ce matin.*  
I have seen the neighbour horrible this morning  
'I saw the neighbour horrible this morning.'

The situation is more complex in the postnominal position of standard definites, cf. (1b). For then, the modifier must have the restrictive<sub>h</sub> reading. This means that the speaker uses the modifier in order to point to the right referent (the right neighbour

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36. Unsurprisingly, the same facts hold for *wonderfully* adverbials. If used purely anaphorically, independently of their description content, they are odd, as shown in (73a). However, if they are positively relevant for the rest of the sentence (e.g. they get the explanatory use), the problem vanishes, cf. (73b).

- (73) a. Il a exécuté cette sonate MERVEILLEUSEMENT. # Pendant qu’il a MERVEILLEUSEMENT joué, j’ai fait la vaisselle.  
'He played this sonate wonderfully. While he had been wonderfully playing, I washed the dishes.'
- b. Il a exécuté cette sonate MERVEILLEUSEMENT. Comme il a MERVEILLEUSEMENT joué, le jury s’est extasié et il a reçu le premier prix.  
'He played this sonate wonderfully. Since he wonderfully played, the committee was extactic and he received the first Prize.'

The description *p* conveyed by the modifier is also relevant for the propositional content *q* denoted by the rest of the sentence when the rhetorical relation *Contrast* (as defined by Asher and Lascarides (2003)) takes place between the two. In that case, *p* is *negatively* relevant to *q*. This licences the anaphorical use of *wonderful(ly)* modifiers too, as shown by the acceptability of (74) (for adverbials).

- (74) Il a exécuté cette sonate MERVEILLEUSEMENT. Mais alors qu’il a MERVEILLEUSEMENT joué, son accompagnant a été vraiment horrible.  
'He played this sonate wonderfully. But while he wonderfully played, his co-player really played in a horrible way.'

into the superset of neighbours). But in order for this strategy to be presented as realistic, the implication  $p$  conveyed by the modifier must be presented as familiar to the addressee ; otherwise, how could the address be able to track reference with the help of *affreux* ? Therefore,  $p$  cannot be presented as new in the CG. The rule (68b) is then *ceteris paribus* violated, which explains the problem of (1b).

However, if the descriptive content  $p$ , although presented as shared, has an explanatory use, we are insured that it is relevant for the discourse. The rule (68a) is then not violated anymore, since the adjective is not used anymore for the single purpose of narrowing down the denotation out of a superset. This explains why (58)-(60) are acceptable (the explanatory use is then plausible), whereas (1b) remains odd (this use is here unlikely).

## 5. Conclusions

In its first part (Section 1-3), this paper showed that the strong version of the complementarity hypothesis (in Romance, pre-head modifiers get the nonrestrictive interpretation only, while post-head modifiers receive the restrictive interpretation only) can be saved for neutral modifiers once admitted that restrictive modifiers can in principle restrict two different domains. While restrictive<sub>*h*</sub> modifiers restrict the denotation of their head, restrictive<sub>*c*</sub> ones restrict the common ground updated with the focus value of the sentence containing them. Both kind of restrictive modifiers eliminate entities from a superset of entities, but in one case, we deal with entities denoted by the head, and in the other, with propositions. In definites or partitive indefinites, modifiers can be restrictive<sub>*h*</sub> or nonrestrictive<sub>*h*</sub>, but in non-partitive indefinites and adverbials, they are systematically nonrestrictive<sub>*h*</sub>. However, in these latter contexts, pre- and post-head neutral modifiers still differ in terms of restrictivity : they are nonrestrictive<sub>*c*</sub> in pre-head position, and restrictive<sub>*c*</sub> in post-head position. By pointing out the common core shared by the two kinds of restrictive modifiers, I provided a definition of restrictivity that encompasses different classes of ambiguities and cuts across categories (applying both to adjectival and adverbial modifiers).

Additionally, I showed that the implication conveyed by attributive nonrestrictive modifiers should not be analysed as a conventional implicature, nor as a presupposition in the classical sense. Rather, what is characteristic of this implication is that it is non at issue (although it does not systematically project). It was also made clear that nonrestrictive attributives differ on several points from nonrestrictive appositives (summarized in Table 2).

The second part of this paper (Section 4) addresses the nonrestrictive bias of evaluative predicates. I adopted Umbach's characterization of the two classes of evaluative predicates, *beautiful* and *wonderful* ones, and Umbach/Milner's obser-

vation that the nonrestrictive bias is mostly salient within the second class. It was then shown that the two crucial assumptions of previous accounts, namely that *wonderful* predicates, *qua* expressives, are always speaker-oriented and cannot induce alternatives, have to be given up. After having compared the contexts where the restrictive reading of *wonderful* predicates is unacceptable with those where it is in fact unproblematic, I proposed a unified account of old and new data, where the problem sometimes raised by *wonderful* predicates in post-head position is seen as the consequence of the violation of a rule governing their use. According to this rule, the implication conveyed by *wonderful* has to be presented as relevant for the discourse (which is the case when *p* is new or is a positive/negative argument for the proposition *q* denoted by the rest of the sentence), differently from what happens with factual predicates.

Finally, this paper mostly deals with the *attributive* rather than the *predicative* uses of evaluative predicates. This is in contrast with much of the literature on predicates of personal taste within the relativist debate, which has tended to be concerned exclusively with predicative uses.

## Acknowledgments

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