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Rapport (Rapport De Recherche) Année : 2007

Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-Repudiation Protocols with an Active Intruder

Résumé

Non-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where secured transactions with proofs of participation are necessary. Formal methods are clever and without error, therefore using them for verifying such protocols is crucial. In this purpose, we show how to partially represent non-repudiation as a combination of authentications on the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. After discussing its limits, we define a new method based on the handling of the knowledge of protocol participants. This method is very general and is of natural use, as it consists in adding simple annotations, like for authentication problems. The method is very easy to implement in tools able to handle participants knowledge. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool and analyzed the optimistic Cederquist-Corin- Dashti protocol, discovering two unknown attacks. This extension of the AVISPA Tool for handling non-repudiation opens a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any more change in the tool itself.
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Dates et versions

inria-00179550 , version 1 (15-10-2007)
inria-00179550 , version 2 (22-10-2007)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : inria-00179550 , version 2
  • ARXIV : 0710.3305

Citer

Francis Klay, Judson Santiago, Laurent Vigneron. Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-Repudiation Protocols with an Active Intruder. [Research Report] RR-6324, INRIA. 2007, pp.22. ⟨inria-00179550v2⟩
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