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Journal Articles IET Information Security Year : 2010

Design and Verification of a Non-repudiation Protocol Based on Receiver-Side Smart Card

Abstract

All the existing non-repudiation protocols ensuring strong fairness have to assume that the communication channel between TTP and each player is resilient at least. While only unreliable channel can be guaranteed, all these protocols become impractical. In this paper, based on smart card on the receiver side, we design a fair non-repudiation protocol that needs no assumptions on the communication channel. The smart card takes over some roles of a dedicated TTP server. Without a dedicated TTP server, this protocol is ideal for some ad hoc scenarios (e.g., MANET) where no infrastructure is available (i.e., even offline TTP cannot be assumed). This protocol can also be easily modified to support fair exchange of time-sensitive data. Compared with other traditional security protocols, automatic formal verification of fair nonrepudiation protocols is much harder to achieve. We use meta-reasoning method to prove that the fair exchange property of this protocol can be reduced to three secrecy properties that fall into the scope of today's most automatic verification tools and therefore can be easily verified. We also use another recently proposed automatic method to verify the non-repudiation properties and fairness property of our protocol.
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Dates and versions

inria-00426527 , version 1 (26-10-2009)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : inria-00426527 , version 1

Cite

Liu Jing, Laurent Vigneron. Design and Verification of a Non-repudiation Protocol Based on Receiver-Side Smart Card. IET Information Security, 2010, 4 (1), pp.15-29. ⟨inria-00426527⟩
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