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Security Estimates for Quadratic Field Based Cryptosystems

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Abstract. We describe implementations for solving the discrete logarithm problem in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field and in the infrastructure of a real quadratic field. The algorithms used incorporate improvements over previously-used algorithms, and extensive numerical results are presented demonstrating their efficiency. This data is used as the basis for extrapolations, used to provide recommendations for parameter sizes providing approximately the same level of security as block ciphers with 80, 112, 128, 192, and 256-bit symmetric keys.

1 Introduction

Quadratic fields were proposed as a setting for public-key cryptosystems in the late 1980s by Buchmann and Williams [7, 8]. There are two types of quadratic fields, imaginary and real. In the imaginary case, cryptosystems are based on arithmetic in the ideal class group (a finite abelian group), and the discrete logarithm problem is the computational problem on which the security is based. In the real case, the so-called infrastructure is used instead, and the security is based on the analogue of the discrete logarithm problem in this structure, namely the principal ideal problem.

Although neither of these problems is resistant to quantum computers, cryptography in quadratic fields is nevertheless an interesting alternative to more widely-used settings. Both discrete logarithm problems can be solved in subexponential time using index calculus algorithms, but with asymptotically slower complexity than the state-of-the-art algorithms for integer factorization and computing discrete logarithms in finite fields. In addition, the only known relationship to the quadratic field discrete logarithm problems from other computational problems used in cryptography is that integer factorization reduces to both of the quadratic field problems. Thus, both of these are at least as hard as

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factoring, and the lack of known relationships to other computational problems implies that the breaking of other cryptosystems, such as those based on elliptic or hyperelliptic curves, will not necessarily break those set in quadratic fields. Examining the security of quadratic field based cryptosystems is therefore of interest.

The fastest algorithms for solving discrete logarithm problem in quadratic fields are based on an improved version of Buchmann’s index-calculus algorithm due to Jacobson [17]. The algorithms include a number of practical enhancements to the original algorithm of Buchmann [5], including the use of self-initialized sieving to generate relations, a single large prime variant, and practice-oriented algorithms for the required linear algebra. These algorithms enabled the computation of a discrete logarithm in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field with 90 decimal digit discriminant [15], and the solution of the principal ideal problem for a real quadratic field with 65 decimal digit discriminant [18].

Since this work, a number of further improvements have been proposed. Biasse [3] presented practical improvements to the corresponding algorithm for imaginary quadratic fields, including a double large prime variant and improved algorithms for the required linear algebra. The resulting algorithm was indeed faster than the previous state-of-the-art and enabled the computation of the ideal class group of an imaginary quadratic field with 110 decimal digit discriminant. These improvements were adapted to the case of real quadratic fields by Biasse and Jacobson [4], along with the incorporation of a batch smoothness test of Bernstein [2], resulting in similar speed-ups in that case.

In this paper, we adapt the improvements of Biasse and Jacobson to the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field and the principal ideal problem in the infrastructure of a real quadratic field. We use versions of the algorithms that rely on easier linear algebra problems than those described in [17]. In the imaginary case, this idea is due to Vollmer [26]; our work represents the first implementation of his method. Our data obtained shows that our algorithms are indeed faster than previous methods. We use our data to estimate parameter sizes for quadratic field cryptosystems that offer security equivalent to NIST’s five recommended security levels [25]. In the imaginary case, these recommendations update previous results of Hamdy and Möller [14], and in the real case this is the first time such recommendations have been provided.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly recall the required background of ideal arithmetic in quadratic fields, and give an overview of the index-calculus algorithms for solving the two discrete logarithms in Section 3. Our numerical results are described in Section 4, followed by the security parameter estimates in Section 5.

2 Arithmetic in Quadratic Fields

We begin with a brief overview of arithmetic in quadratic fields. For more details on the theory, algorithms, and cryptographic applications of quadratic fields, see [20].

Let $K = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$ be the quadratic field of discriminant Δ , where Δ is a non-zero integer congruent to 0 or 1 modulo 4 with Δ or $\Delta/4$ square-free. The integral closure of \mathbb{Z} in K , called the maximal order, is denoted by \mathcal{O}_Δ . The ideals of \mathcal{O}_Δ are the main objects of interest in terms of cryptographic applications. An ideal can be represented by the two dimensional \mathbb{Z} -module

$$\mathfrak{a} = s \left[a\mathbb{Z} + \frac{b + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2}\mathbb{Z} \right],$$

where $a, b, s \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $4a \mid b^2 - \Delta$. The integers a and s are unique, and b is defined modulo $2a$. The ideal \mathfrak{a} is said to be primitive if $s = 1$. The norm of \mathfrak{a} is given by $\mathcal{N}(\mathfrak{a}) = as^2$.

Ideals can be multiplied using Gauss' composition formulas for integral binary quadratic forms. Ideal norm respects this operation. The prime ideals of \mathcal{O}_Δ have the form $p\mathbb{Z} + (b_p + \sqrt{\Delta})/2\mathbb{Z}$ where p is a prime that is split or ramified in K , i.e., the Kronecker symbol $(\Delta/p) \neq -1$. As \mathcal{O}_Δ is a Dedekind domain, every ideal can be factored uniquely as a product of prime ideals. To factor \mathfrak{a} , it suffices to factor $\mathcal{N}(\mathfrak{a})$ and, for each prime p dividing the norm, determine whether the prime ideal \mathfrak{p} or \mathfrak{p}^{-1} divides \mathfrak{a} according to whether b is congruent to b_p or $-b_p$ modulo $2p$.

Two ideals $\mathfrak{a}, \mathfrak{b}$ are said to be equivalent, denoted by $\mathfrak{a} \sim \mathfrak{b}$, if there exist $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{O}_\Delta$ such that $(\alpha)\mathfrak{a} = (\beta)\mathfrak{b}$, where (α) denotes the principal ideal generated by α . This is in fact an equivalence relation, and the set of equivalence classes forms a finite abelian group called the class group, denoted by Cl_Δ . Its order is called the class number, and is denoted by h_Δ .

Arithmetic in the class group is performed on reduced ideal representatives of the equivalence classes. An ideal \mathfrak{a} is reduced if it is primitive and $\mathcal{N}(\mathfrak{a})$ is a minimum in \mathfrak{a} . Reduced ideals have the property that $a, b < \sqrt{|\Delta|}$, yielding reasonably small representatives of each group element. The group operation then consists of multiplying two reduced ideals and computing a reduced ideal equivalent to the product. This operation is efficient and can be performed in $O(\log^2 |\Delta|)$ bit operations.

In the case of imaginary quadratic fields, we have $h_\Delta \approx \sqrt{|\Delta|}$, and that every element in Cl_Δ contains exactly one reduced ideal. Thus, the ideal class group can be used as the basis of most public-key cryptosystems that require arithmetic in a finite abelian group. The only wrinkle is that computing the class number h_Δ seems to be as hard as solving the discrete logarithm problem, so only cryptosystems for which the group order is not known can be used.

In real quadratic fields, the class group tends to be small; in fact, a conjecture of Gauss predicts that $h_\Delta = 1$ infinitely often, and the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [11] predict that this happens about 75% of the time for prime discriminants. Thus, the discrete logarithm problem in the class group is not in general suitable for cryptographic use.

Another consequence of small class groups in the real case is that there are no longer unique reduced ideal representatives in each equivalence class. Instead, we have that $h_\Delta R_\Delta \approx \sqrt{\Delta}$, where the regulator R_Δ roughly approximates how

many reduced ideals are in each equivalence class. Thus, since h_Δ is frequently small, there are roughly $\sqrt{\Delta}$ equivalent reduced ideals in each equivalence class. The infrastructure, namely the set of reduced principal ideals, is used for cryptographic purposes instead of the class group. Although this structure is not a finite abelian group, the analogue of exponentiation (computing a reduced principal ideal (α) with $\log \alpha$ as close to a given number as possible) is efficient and can be used as a one-way problem suitable for public-key cryptography. The inverse of this problem, computing an approximation of the unknown $\log \alpha$ from a reduced principal ideal given in \mathbb{Z} -basis representation, is called the principal ideal problem or infrastructure discrete logarithm problem, and is believed to be of similar difficulty to the discrete logarithm problem in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field.

3 Solving The Discrete Logarithm Problems

The fastest algorithms in practice for computing discrete logarithms in the class group and infrastructure use the index-calculus framework. Like other index-calculus algorithms, these algorithms rely on finding certain smooth quantities, those whose prime divisors are all small in some sense. In the case of quadratic fields, one searches for smooth principal ideals for which all prime ideal divisors have norm less than a given bound B . The set of prime ideals $\mathfrak{p}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{p}_n$ with $\mathcal{N}(\mathfrak{p}_i) \leq B$ is called the factor base, denoted by \mathcal{B} .

A principal ideal $(\alpha) = \mathfrak{p}_1^{e_1} \cdots \mathfrak{p}_n^{e_n}$ with $\alpha \in K$ that factors completely over the factor base yields the relation $(e_1, \dots, e_n, \log |\alpha|)$. In the imaginary case, the $\log |\alpha|$ coefficients are not required and are ignored. The key to the index-calculus approach is the fact, proved by Buchmann [5], that the set of all relations forms a sublattice $A \subset \mathbb{Z}^n \times \mathbb{R}$ of determinant $h_\Delta R_\Delta$ as long as the prime ideals in the factor base generate Cl_Δ . This follows, in part, due to the fact that L , the integer component of A , is the kernel of the homomorphism $\phi : \mathbb{Z}^n \mapsto Cl_\Delta$ given by $\mathfrak{p}_1^{e_1} \cdots \mathfrak{p}_n^{e_n}$ for $(e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. The homomorphism theorem then implies that $\mathbb{Z}^n / L \cong Cl_\Delta$. In the imaginary case, where the $\log |\alpha|$ terms are omitted, the relation lattice consists only of the integer part, and the corresponding results were proved by Hafner and McCurley [12].

The main idea behind the algorithms described in [17] for solving the class group and infrastructure discrete logarithm problems is to find random relations until they generate the entire relation lattice A . Suppose A is a matrix whose rows contain the integer coordinates of the relations, and \mathbf{v} is a vector containing the real parts. To check whether the relations generate A , we begin by computing the Hermite normal form of A and then calculating its determinant, giving us a multiple h of the class number h_Δ . We also compute a multiple of the regulator R_Δ . Using the analytic class number formula and Bach's $L(1, \chi)$ -approximation method [1], we construct bounds such that $h_\Delta R_\Delta$ itself is the only integer multiple of the product of the class number and regulator satisfying $h^* < h_\Delta < 2h^*$; if hR satisfies these bounds, then h and R are the correct class number and regulator and the set of relations given in A generates A .

A multiple R of the regulator R_Δ can be computed either from a basis of the kernel of the row-space of A (as in [17]) or by randomly sampling from the kernel as described by Vollmer [27]. Every kernel vector \mathbf{x} corresponds to a multiple of the regulator via $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{v} = mR_\Delta$. Given \mathbf{v} and a set of kernel vectors, an algorithm of Maurer [24, Sec 12.1] is used to compute the “real GCD” of the regulator multiples with guaranteed numerical accuracy, where the real GCD of m_1R_Δ and m_2R_Δ is defined to be $\gcd(m_1, m_2)R_\Delta$.

To solve the discrete logarithm problem in Cl_Δ , we compute the structure of Cl_Δ , i.e., integers m_1, \dots, m_k with $m_{i+1} \mid m_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, k-1$ such that $Cl_\Delta \cong \mathbb{Z}/m_1\mathbb{Z} \times \dots \times \mathbb{Z}/m_k\mathbb{Z}$, and an explicit isomorphism from \mathbb{Z}^n to $\mathbb{Z}/m_1\mathbb{Z} \times \dots \times \mathbb{Z}/m_k\mathbb{Z}$. Then, to compute x such that $\mathbf{g}^x \sim \mathbf{a}$, we find ideals equivalent to \mathbf{g} and \mathbf{a} that factor over the factor base and maps these vectors in \mathbb{Z}^n to $\mathbb{Z}/m_1\mathbb{Z} \times \dots \times \mathbb{Z}/m_k\mathbb{Z}$, where the discrete logarithm problem can be solved easily.

To solve the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem for \mathbf{a} , we find an ideal equivalent to \mathbf{a} that factors over the factor base. Suppose the factorization is given by $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. Then, since L is the kernel of ϕ , if \mathbf{a} is principal, \mathbf{v} must be a linear combination of the elements of L . This can be determined by solving $\mathbf{x}A = \mathbf{v}$, where as before the rows of A are the vectors in L . Furthermore, we have $\log \alpha = \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{v} \pmod{R_\Delta}$ is a solution to the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem. The approximation of $\log \alpha$ is computed to guaranteed numerical accuracy using another algorithm of Maurer [24, Sec 5.5].

If it is necessary to verify the solvability of the problem instance, then one must verify that the relations generate all of A , for example, as described above. The best methods for this certification are conditional on the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, both for their expected running time and their correctness. However, in a cryptographic application, it can safely be assumed that the problem instance does have a solution (for example, if it comes from the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol), and simplifications are possible. In particular, the correctness of the computed solution can be determined without certifying that the relations generate A , for example, by verifying that $\mathbf{g}^x = \mathbf{a}$. As a result, the relatively expensive linear algebra required (computing Hermite normal form and kernel of the row space) can be replaced by linear system solving.

In the imaginary case, if the discrete logarithm is known to exist, one can use an algorithm due to Vollmer [26, 28]. Instead of computing the structure of Cl_Δ , one finds ideals equivalent to \mathbf{g} and \mathbf{a} that factor over the factor base. Then, combining these factorizations with the rest of the relations and solving a linear system yields a solution of the discrete logarithm problem. If the linear system cannot be solved, then the relations do not generate A , and the process is simply repeated after generating some additional relations. The expected asymptotic complexity of this method, under reasonable assumptions about the generation of relations, is $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 3\sqrt{2}/4 + o(1)])$ [28, 6], where

$$L_N[e, c] = \exp(c(\log N)^e(\log \log N)^{1-e})$$

for e, c constants and $0 \leq e \leq 1$. In practice, all the improvements to relation generation and simplifying the relation matrix described in [3] can be applied. When

using practical versions for generating relations, such as sieving as described in [17], it is conjectured that the algorithm has complexity $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 1 + o(1)])$.

In the real case, we also do not need to compute the Hermite normal form, as only a multiple of R_Δ suffices. The consequence of not certifying that we have the true regulator is that the solutions obtained for the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem may not be minimal. However, for cryptographic purposes this is sufficient, as these values can still be used to break the corresponding protocols in the same way that a non-minimal solution to the discrete logarithm problem suffices to break group-based protocols. Thus, we use Vollmer's approach [27] based on randomly sampling from the kernel of A . This method computes a multiple that is with high probability equal to the regulator in time $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 3\sqrt{2}/4 + o(1)])$ by computing the multiple corresponding to random elements in the kernel of the row space of A . These random elements can also be found by linear system solving. The resulting algorithm has the same complexity as that in the imaginary case. In practice, all the improvements described in [4] can be applied. When these are used, including sieving as described in [17], we also conjecture that the algorithm has complexity $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 1 + o(1)])$.

4 Implementation and Numerical Results

Our implementation takes advantage of the latest practical improvements in ideal class group computation and regulator computation for quadratic number fields, described in detail in [3, 4]. In the following, we give a brief outline of the methods we used for the experiments described in this paper.

To speed up the relation collection phase, we combined the double large prime variation with the self-initialized quadratic sieve strategy of [17], as described in [3]. This results in a considerable speed-up in the time required for finding a relation, at the cost of a growth of the dimensions of the relation matrix. We also used Bernstein's batch smoothness test [2] to enhance the relation collection phase as described in [4], by simultaneously testing residues produced by the sieve for smoothness.

The algorithms involved in the linear algebra phase are highly sensitive to the dimensions of the relation matrix. As the double large prime variation induces significant growth in the dimensions of the relation matrix, one needs to perform Gaussian elimination to reduce the number of columns in order to make the linear algebra phase feasible. We used a graph-based elimination strategy first described by Cavallar [9] for factorization, and then adapted by Biasse [3] to the context of quadratic fields. At the end of the process, we test if the resulting matrix A_{red} has full rank by reducing it modulo a word-sized prime. If not, we collect more relation and repeat the algorithm.

For solving the discrete logarithm problem in the imaginary case, we implemented the algorithm due to Vollmer [26, 28]. Given two ideals \mathfrak{a} and \mathfrak{g} such that $\mathfrak{g}^x \sim \mathfrak{a}$ for some integer x , we find two extra relations $(e_1, \dots, e_n, 1, 0)$ and $(f_1, \dots, f_n, 0, 1)$ such that $\mathfrak{p}_1^{e_1} \dots \mathfrak{p}_n^{e_n} \mathfrak{g} \sim (1)$ and $\mathfrak{p}_1^{f_1} \dots \mathfrak{p}_n^{f_n} \mathfrak{a}^{-1} \sim (1)$ over the

Table 1. Comparison between class group computation and Vollmer Algorithm

Size	Strategy	$ \mathcal{B} $	Sieving	Elimination	Linear algebra	Total
140	CL	200	2.66	0.63	1.79	5.08
	CL Batch	200	1.93	0.65	1.78	4.36
	DL	200	2.57	0.44	0.8	3.81
	DL batch	200	1.92	0.41	0.76	3.09
160	CL	300	11.77	1.04	8.20	21.01
	CL Batch	300	9.91	0.87	8.19	18.97
	DL	350	10.17	0.73	2.75	13.65
	DL batch	400	6.80	0.96	3.05	10.81
180	CL	400	17.47	0.98	12.83	31.28
	CL Batch	400	14.56	0.97	12.9	28.43
	DL	500	15.00	1.40	4.93	21.33
	DL batch	500	11.35	1.34	4.46	17.15
200	CL	800	158.27	7.82	81.84	247.93
	CL Batch	800	133.78	7.82	81.58	223.18
	DL	1000	126.61	9.9	21.45	157.96
	DL batch	1100	85.00	11.21	26.85	123.06
220	CL	1500	619.99	20.99	457.45	1098.43
	CL Batch	1500	529.59	19.56	447.29	996.44
	DL	1700	567.56	27.77	86.38	681.71
	DL batch	1600	540.37	24.23	73.76	638.36

equal to the regulator with high probability. In [4], it is shown that this method is faster than the one requiring a kernel basis because it only requires the solution to a few linear systems, and it can be adapted in such a way that the linear system involves A_{red} .

Our algorithm to solve the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem also makes use of the system solving algorithm. The input ideal \mathfrak{a} is first decomposed over the factor base, as in the imaginary case, yielding the factorization $\mathfrak{a} = (\gamma)\mathfrak{p}_1^{e_1} \cdots \mathfrak{p}_n^{e_n}$. Then, we solve the system $\mathbf{x}A = (e_1, \dots, e_n)$ and compute a numerical approximation to guaranteed precision of $\log |\alpha|$ modulo our regulator multiple using Maurer’s algorithm [24, Sec 5.5] from γ , the coefficients of \mathbf{x} , and the real parts of the relation stored in \mathbf{v} .

The results of our experiments for the imaginary case are given in Table 2, and for the real case in Table 3. They were obtained on 2.4 GHz Xeon with 2GB of memory. For each bit length of Δ , denoted by “size(Δ),” we list the average time in seconds required to solve an instance of the appropriate discrete logarithm problem ($\overline{t_\Delta}$) and standard deviation (std). In the imaginary case, for each discriminant size less than 220 bits, 14 instances of the discrete logarithm problem were solved. For size 230 and 256 we solved 10, and for size 280 and 300 we solved 5 examples. In the real case, 10 instances were solved for each size up to 256, 6 for size 280, and 4 for size 300.

Table 2. Average run times for the discrete logarithm problem in Cl_Δ , $\Delta < 0$

size(Δ)	\bar{t}_Δ (sec)	std	$L_{ \Delta }[1/2, \sqrt{2}]/\bar{t}_\Delta$	$L_{ \Delta }[1/2, 1]/\bar{t}_\Delta$
140	7.89	2.33	6.44×10^8	1.79×10^8
142	8.80	1.90	7.01×10^8	1.93×10^8
144	9.91	3.13	7.55×10^8	2.06×10^8
146	10.23	1.69	8.86×10^8	2.39×10^8
148	11.80	3.45	9.29×10^8	2.48×10^8
150	12.88	2.66	10.28×10^8	2.71×10^8
152	14.42	3.38	11.09×10^8	2.89×10^8
154	17.64	5.61	10.93×10^8	2.82×10^8
156	22.06	5.57	10.53×10^8	2.69×10^8
158	28.74	12.11	9.73×10^8	2.46×10^8
160	27.12	8.77	12.39×10^8	3.10×10^8
162	32.72	15.49	12.34×10^8	3.05×10^8
164	31.08	6.85	15.58×10^8	3.82×10^8
166	41.93	14.65	13.85×10^8	3.36×10^8
168	51.92	16.51	13.39×10^8	3.21×10^8
170	59.77	15.42	13.92×10^8	3.30×10^8
172	68.39	17.79	14.54×10^8	3.42×10^8
174	99.20	62.61	11.97×10^8	2.78×10^8
176	124.86	80.29	11.35×10^8	2.61×10^8
178	140.50	55.41	12.03×10^8	2.74×10^8
180	202.42	145.98	9.94×10^8	2.24×10^8
182	166.33	63.91	14.40×10^8	3.22×10^8
184	150.76	58.37	18.90×10^8	4.18×10^8
186	198.72	63.23	17.04×10^8	3.73×10^8
188	225.90	94.94	17.79×10^8	3.86×10^8
190	277.67	234.93	17.17×10^8	3.69×10^8
192	348.88	134.36	16.20×10^8	3.45×10^8
194	395.54	192.26	16.93×10^8	3.57×10^8
196	547.33	272.83	14.48×10^8	3.02×10^8
198	525.94	153.63	17.83×10^8	3.68×10^8
200	565.43	182.75	1.96×10^9	4.01×10^8
202	561.36	202.80	2.33×10^9	4.73×10^8
204	535.29	205.68	2.89×10^9	5.80×10^8
206	776.64	243.35	2.35×10^9	4.67×10^8
208	677.43	200.08	3.17×10^9	6.25×10^8
210	1050.64	501.31	2.41×10^9	4.70×10^8
212	1189.71	410.98	2.50×10^9	4.84×10^8
214	1104.83	308.57	3.17×10^9	6.07×10^8
216	1417.64	352.27	2.90×10^9	5.51×10^8
218	2185.80	798.95	2.21×10^9	4.16×10^8
220	2559.79	1255.94	2.22×10^9	4.13×10^8
230	3424.40	1255.94	3.66×10^9	6.52×10^8
256	22992.70	13062.14	4.00×10^9	6.36×10^8
280	88031.08	34148.54	6.09×10^9	8.76×10^8
300	702142.20	334566.51	3.16×10^9	4.19×10^8

Table 3. Average run times for the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem.

size(Δ)	\bar{t}_Δ (sec)	std	$L_{ \Delta }[1/2, \sqrt{2}]/\bar{t}_\Delta$	$L_{ \Delta }[1/2, 1]/\bar{t}_\Delta$
140	11.95	3.13	4.25×10^8	1.18×10^8
142	12.47	2.06	4.95×10^8	1.36×10^8
144	15.95	5.79	4.69×10^8	1.28×10^8
146	14.61	2.94	6.20×10^8	1.67×10^8
148	17.05	3.46	6.43×10^8	1.71×10^8
150	21.65	4.55	6.12×10^8	1.61×10^8
152	25.65	7.15	6.23×10^8	1.63×10^8
154	29.01	6.97	6.65×10^8	1.72×10^8
156	27.52	4.79	8.44×10^8	2.16×10^8
158	33.59	8.80	8.32×10^8	2.10×10^8
160	36.27	12.28	9.27×10^8	2.32×10^8
162	43.55	10.73	9.27×10^8	2.29×10^8
164	49.37	11.76	9.81×10^8	2.40×10^8
166	59.73	17.18	9.72×10^8	2.36×10^8
168	73.66	18.56	9.44×10^8	2.26×10^8
170	75.50	19.80	1.10×10^9	2.62×10^8
172	101.00	20.84	9.85×10^8	2.31×10^8
174	94.80	38.87	1.25×10^9	2.91×10^8
176	106.30	23.77	1.33×10^9	3.07×10^8
178	149.70	44.04	1.13×10^9	2.57×10^8
180	132.70	30.25	1.52×10^9	3.42×10^8
182	178.80	25.67	1.34×10^9	2.99×10^8
184	211.40	52.14	1.35×10^9	2.98×10^8
186	258.20	110.95	1.31×10^9	2.87×10^8
188	352.70	94.50	1.14×10^9	2.47×10^8
190	290.90	46.57	1.64×10^9	3.52×10^8
192	316.80	51.75	1.78×10^9	3.80×10^8
194	412.90	71.90	1.62×10^9	3.42×10^8
196	395.40	94.71	2.00×10^9	4.18×10^8
198	492.30	156.69	1.90×10^9	3.94×10^8
200	598.90	187.19	1.85×10^9	3.79×10^8
202	791.40	285.74	1.65×10^9	3.35×10^8
204	888.10	396.85	1.74×10^9	3.49×10^8
206	928.40	311.37	1.96×10^9	3.90×10^8
208	1036.10	260.82	2.07×10^9	4.08×10^8
210	1262.30	415.32	2.00×10^9	3.91×10^8
212	1582.30	377.22	1.88×10^9	3.64×10^8
214	1545.10	432.42	2.27×10^9	4.34×10^8
216	1450.80	453.85	2.84×10^9	5.39×10^8
218	2105.00	650.64	2.30×10^9	4.32×10^8
220	2435.70	802.57	2.33×10^9	4.34×10^8
230	5680.90	1379.94	2.21×10^9	3.93×10^8
256	29394.01	7824.15	3.13×10^9	4.98×10^8
280	80962.80	27721.01	6.62×10^9	9.52×10^8
300	442409.00	237989.12	5.01×10^9	6.64×10^8

For the extrapolations in the next section, we need to have a good estimate of the asymptotic running time of the algorithm. As described in the previous section, the best proven run time is $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 3\sqrt{2}/4 + o(1)])$, but as we use sieving to generate relations, this can likely be reduced to $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 1 + o(1)])$. To test which running time is most likely to hold for the algorithm we implemented, we list $L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 3\sqrt{2}/4]/\overline{t_\Delta}$ and $L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 1]/\overline{t_\Delta}$ in Table 2 and Table 3. In both cases, our data supports the hypothesis that the run time of our algorithm is indeed closer to $O(L_{|\Delta|}[1/2, 1 + o(1)])$, with the exception of a few outliers corresponding to instances where only a few instances of the discrete logarithm were computed for that size,

5 Security Estimates

General purpose recommendations for securely choosing discriminants for use in quadratic field cryptography can be found in [14] for the imaginary case and [18] for the real case. In both cases, it usually suffices to use prime discriminants, as this forces the class number h_Δ to be odd. In the imaginary case, one then relies on the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [11] to guarantee that the class number is not smooth with high probability. In the real case, one uses the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics to guarantee that the class number is very small (and that the infrastructure is therefore large) with high probability.

Our goal is to estimate what bit lengths of appropriately-chosen discriminants, in both the imaginary and real cases, are required to provide approximately the same level of security as the RSA moduli recommended by NIST [25]. The five security levels recommended by NIST correspond to using secure block ciphers with keys of 80, 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits. The estimates used by NIST indicate that RSA moduli of size 1024, 2048, 3072, 7680, and 15360 should be used.

To estimate the required sizes of discriminants, we follow the approach of Hamdy and Möller [14], who provided such estimates for the imaginary case. Our results update these in the sense that our estimates are based on our improved algorithms for solving the discrete logarithms in quadratic fields, as well as the latest data available for factoring large RSA moduli. Our estimates for real quadratic fields are the first such estimates produced.

Following, Hamdy and Möller, suppose that an algorithm with asymptotic running time $L_N[e, c]$ runs in time t_1 on input N_1 . Then, the running time t_2 of the algorithm on input N_2 can be estimated using the equation

$$\frac{L_{N_1}[e, c]}{L_{N_2}[e, c]} = \frac{t_1}{t_2}. \quad (1)$$

We can also use the equation to estimate an input N_2 that will cause the algorithm to have running time t_2 , again given the time t_1 for input N_1 .

The first step is to estimate the time required to factor the RSA numbers of the sizes recommended by NIST. The best algorithm for factoring large integers is the generalized number field sieve [22], whose asymptotic running time

is heuristically $L_N[1/3, \sqrt[3]{64/9} + o(1)]$. To date, the largest RSA number factored is RSA-768, a 768 bit integer [21]. It is estimated in [21] that the total computation required 2000 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron years. As our computations were performed on a different architecture, we follow Hamdy and Möller and use the MIPS-year measurement to provide an architecture-neutral measurement. In this case, assuming that a 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron runs at 4400 MIPS, we estimate that this computation took 8.8×10^6 MIPS-years. Using this estimate in conjunction with (1) yields the estimated running times to factor RSA moduli of the sizes recommended by NIST given in Table 4. When using this method, we use $N_1 = 2^{768}$ and $N_2 = 2^b$, where b is the bit length of the RSA moduli for which we compute a run time estimate.

The second step is to estimate the discriminant sizes for which the discrete logarithm problems require approximately the same running time. The results in Table 2 and Table 3 suggest that $L_N[1/2, 1 + o(1)]$ is a good estimate of the asymptotic running time for both algorithms. Thus, we use $L_N[1/2, 1]$ in (1), as ignoring the $o(1)$ results in a conservative under-estimate of the actual running time. For N_1 and t_1 , we take the largest discriminant size in each table for which at least 10 instances of the discrete logarithm problem were run and the corresponding running time (in MIPS-years); thus we used 256 in the imaginary case and 230 in the real case. We take for t_2 the target running time in MIPS-years. To convert the times in seconds from Table 2 and Table 3 to MIPS-years, we assume that the 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon machine runs at 4800 MIPS. To find the corresponding discriminant size, we simply find the smallest integer b for which $L_{2^b}[1/2, 1] > L_{N_1}[1/2, 1]t_2/t_1$.

Our results are listed in Table 4. We list the size in bits of RSA moduli (denoted by “*RSA*”), discriminants of imaginary quadratic fields (denoted by “ Δ (imaginary)”), and real quadratic fields (denoted by “ Δ (real)”) for which factoring and the quadratic field discrete logarithm problems all have the same estimated running time. For comparison purposes, we also list the discriminant sizes recommended in [14], denoted by “ Δ (imaginary, old).” Note that these estimates were based on different equivalent MIPS-years running times, as the largest factoring effort at the time was RSA-512. In addition, they are based on an implementation of the imaginary quadratic field discrete logarithm algorithm from [17], which is slower than the improved version from this paper. Consequently, our security parameter estimates are slightly larger than those from [14]. We note also that the recommended discriminant sizes are slightly smaller in the real case, as the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem requires more time to solve on average than the discrete logarithm in the imaginary case.

6 Conclusions

It is possible to produce more accurate security parameter estimates by taking more factors into account as is done, for example, by Lenstra and Verheul [23], as well as using a more accurate performance measure than MIPS-year. However, our results nevertheless provide a good rough guideline on the required discrim-

Table 4. Security Parameter Estimates

RSA	Δ (imaginary, old)	Δ (imaginary)	Δ (real)	Est. run time (MIPS-years)
768	540	640	634	8.80×10^6
1024	687	798	792	1.07×10^{10}
2048	1208	1348	1341	1.25×10^{19}
3072	1665	1827	1818	4.74×10^{25}
7680	0	3598	3586	1.06×10^{45}
15360	0	5971	5957	1.01×10^{65}

inant sizes that is likely sufficiently accurate in the inexact science of predicting security levels.

It would also be of interest to conduct a new comparison of the efficiency of RSA as compared to the cryptosystems based on quadratic fields. Due to the differences in the asymptotic complexities of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problems in quadratic fields, it is clear that there is a point where the cryptosystems based on quadratic fields will be faster than RSA. However, ideal arithmetic is somewhat more complicated than the simple integer arithmetic required for RSA, and in fact Hamdy's conclusion [13] was that even with smaller parameters, cryptography using quadratic fields was not competitive at the security levels of interest. There have been a number of recent advances in ideal arithmetic in both the imaginary and real cases (see, for example, [16] and [19]) that warrant revisiting this issue.

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