hal-00650086, version 1
Dependability Evaluation of Cluster-based Distributed Systems
International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 22, 5 (2011) 1123-1142
Résumé : Awerbuch and Scheideler have shown that peer-to-peer overlay networks can survive Byzantine attacks only if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we inves- tigate adversarial strategies by following speci c protocols. Our analysis demonstrates rst that an adversary can very quickly subvert overlays based on distributed hash tables by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from the initial amount of corruption in the system.
- a – INRIA
- 1 :
- CNRS : UMR6074 – INRIA – Université de Rennes 1
- 2 :
- Université de Rennes 1 – Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA) - Rennes – CNRS : UMR6074
- 3 :
- Universidade Federal de Campina Grande
- 4 :
- INRIA – Université de Rennes 1 – CNRS : UMR6074
- 5 :
- SUPELEC
- 6 :
- INRIA – SUPELEC
- Domaine : Informatique/Informatique et théorie des jeux
- Mots-clés : P2P overlay network – Byzantine attack – cluster-based overlay – Markovian analysis
- Commentaire : 19
- hal-00650086, version 1
- http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00650086
- oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00650086
- Contributeur :
- Soumis le : Vendredi 9 Décembre 2011, 14:34:09
- Dernière modification le : Vendredi 9 Décembre 2011, 14:44:37





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