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On the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations

Abstract : Two new notions of stability of coalitions, based on the idea of exclusion or integration of players depending on how they affect allocations, are introduced for cooperative transferable utility games. The first one, called internal stability, requires that no coalition member would find that her departure from the coalition would improve her allocation or those of all her partners. The second one, called external stability, requires that coalitions members do not wish to recruit a new partner willing to join the coalition, since her arrival would hurt some of them. As an application of these two notions, we study the stability of Group Purchasing Organizations using the Shapley value to allocate costs between buyers. Our main results suggest that, when all buyers are initially alone, while small buyers will form internally and externally stable Group Purchasing Organizations to benefit from the best price discount, big buyers will be mutually exclusive and may cooperate with only small buyers.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02860639
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Submitted on : Monday, June 8, 2020 - 2:41:06 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, June 17, 2020 - 11:50:27 AM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-02860639, version 1

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Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Hao Sun. On the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations. 2020. ⟨halshs-02860639⟩

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