Ghost Patches: Fake Patches for Fake Vulnerabilities

Abstract : Offensive and defensive players in the cyber security sphere constantly react to either party’s actions. This reactive approach works well for attackers but can be devastating for defenders. This approach also models the software security patching lifecycle. Patches fix security flaws, but when deployed, can be used to develop malicious exploits.To make exploit generation using patches more resource intensive, we propose inserting deception into software security patches. These ghost patches mislead attackers with deception and fix legitimate flaws in code. An adversary using ghost patches to develop exploits will be forced to use additional resources. We implement a proof of concept for ghost patches and evaluate their impact on program analysis and runtime. We find that these patches have a statistically significant impact on dynamic analysis runtime, increasing time to analyze by a factor of up to 14x, but do not have a statistically significant impact on program runtime.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [27 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01648988
Contributor : Hal Ifip <>
Submitted on : Monday, November 27, 2017 - 10:30:57 AM
Last modification on : Monday, November 27, 2017 - 10:34:21 AM

File

 Restricted access
To satisfy the distribution rights of the publisher, the document is embargoed until : 2020-01-01

Please log in to resquest access to the document

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Jeffrey Avery, Eugene Spafford. Ghost Patches: Fake Patches for Fake Vulnerabilities. 32th IFIP International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (SEC), May 2017, Rome, Italy. pp.399-412, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-58469-0_27⟩. ⟨hal-01648988⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

388