Studying Formal Security Proofs for Cryptographic Protocols

Abstract : This paper discusses the problem of teaching provable security in cryptography when studying information security. The concept of provable security is one of the most important in modern cryptography, soit is necessary to integrate it into the syllabus on cryptographic protocols. Now provable security is not rare thing in basic cryptography courses. However, security proofs for cryptographic protocols are far more complicated than for primitives. We suggest the way of embedding Sequence of Games technique, Universally Composability framework, module design of protocols and other techniques into the cryptography protocols course. Our experience of teaching formal security proofs for cryptographic protocols brings quite positive effect for students’ research and development.
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Konstantin Kogos, Sergey Zapechnikov. Studying Formal Security Proofs for Cryptographic Protocols. 10th IFIP World Conference on Information Security Education (WISE), May 2017, Rome, Italy. pp.63-73, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-58553-6_6⟩. ⟨hal-01690962⟩

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