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Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs

Abstract : This paper studies the security of Ring Oscillator Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs as proposed by Delavar et al. We present an attack that can predict all PUF responses after querying the PUF with $$n+2$$n+2 attacker-chosen queries. This result renders the proposed RO-PUF with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs inapt for most typical PUF use cases, including but not limited to all cases where an attacker has query access.
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Contributor : Hal Ifip <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 21, 2019 - 4:25:17 PM
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Nils Wisiol, Marian Margraf. Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs. 33th IFIP International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (SEC), Sep 2018, Poznan, Poland. pp.122-126, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-99828-2_9⟩. ⟨hal-02023734⟩



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