Tor HTTP Usage and Information Leakage

Abstract : This paper analyzes the web browsing behaviour of Tor users. By collecting HTTP requests we show which websites are of interest to Tor users and we determined an upper bound on how vulnerable Tor users are to sophisticated de-anonymization attacks: up to 78 % of the Tor users do not use Tor as suggested by the Tor community, namely to browse the web with TorButton. They could thus fall victim to de-anonymization attacks by merely browsing the web. Around 1% of the requests could be used by an adversary for exploit piggybacking on vulnerable file formats. Another 7 % of all requests were generated by social networking sites which leak plenty of sensitive and identifying information. Due to the design of HTTP and Tor, we argue that HTTPS is currently the only effective countermeasure against de-anonymization and information leakage for HTTP over Tor.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [16 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01056375
Contributor : Hal Ifip <>
Submitted on : Monday, August 18, 2014 - 6:10:32 PM
Last modification on : Friday, August 11, 2017 - 3:29:36 PM
Long-term archiving on : Thursday, November 27, 2014 - 5:32:46 AM

File

cms2010_submission_49.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Markus Huber, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar Weippl. Tor HTTP Usage and Information Leakage. 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security (CMS), May 2010, Linz, Austria. pp.245-255, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-13241-4_22⟩. ⟨hal-01056375⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

271

Files downloads

720