A Study of RPL DODAG Version Attacks

Anthéa Mayzaud 1 Anuj Sehgal 2 Rémi Badonnel 3 Isabelle Chrisment 1 Jürgen Schönwälder 2
1 MADYNES - Management of dynamic networks and services
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - NSS - Department of Networks, Systems and Services
3 MADYNES - Management of dynamic networks and services
INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : The IETF designed the Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL) as a candidate for use in constrained networks. Keeping in mind the different requirements of such networks, the protocol was designed to support multiple routing topologies, called DODAGs, constructed using different objective functions, so as to optimize routing based on divergent metrics. A DODAG versioning system is incorporated into RPL in order to ensure that the topology does not become stale and that loops are not formed over time. However, an attacker can exploit this versioning system to gain an advantage in the topology and also acquire children that would be forced to route packets via this node. In this paper we present a study of possible attacks that exploit the DODAG version system. The impact on overhead, delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, rank inconsistencies and loops is studied.
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Anthéa Mayzaud, Anuj Sehgal, Rémi Badonnel, Isabelle Chrisment, Jürgen Schönwälder. A Study of RPL DODAG Version Attacks. 8th IFIP International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security (AIMS), Jun 2014, Brno, Czech Republic. pp.92-104, ⟨10.1007/978-3-662-43862-6_12⟩. ⟨hal-01090993⟩

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