



Online Sparse Bandits

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Online Sparse bandit

What is a zero-sum Matrix Game (MG) ?

M = KxK matrix, coefficients in [0,1]
Player 1 chooses i in {1,2,3,...,K}
Player 2 chooses j in {1,2,3,...,K}
Player 1 gets reward Mij
Player 2 gets reward 1-Mij

Is solving a MG hard ?

= polynomial time (by linear programming)
best known coef 3.5

How to find approximate solutions ?

Grigoriadis & Khachiyan or Exp3 or Inf:
time O(Klog K / ε²) with proba 1/2
(Auer et al, Audibert et al, Grigoriadis et al)

Sparse versions ?

Very often, (x*,y*) is very sparse; plenty of 0's.
How to benefit from this ?
Algo. in Flory et al.:

1. Approximate solving by t iterations of EXP3
2. Remove small components (keep only components ≥ (max(tx))^(4/5) / t)
3. Re-normalize ==> no proof

We propose the following online version ==> (EXP3 recalled below...)

Algorithm 1 EXP3 algorithm for iteration t with K arms.

```
Initialise  $\forall i, p(i) = \frac{1}{K}, n(i) = 0, S(i) = 0; t = 0$ 
while t < T do
  Arm i is chosen with probability p(i)
  n(i) ← n(i)+1
  Receive reward r
  t ← t+1
  Si modified by the update formula  $S_i \leftarrow S_i + r/p(i)$  (and Sj for j ≠ i is not modified).
   $\forall i, p(i) = 1/(K\sqrt{t}) + (1 - 1/\sqrt{t}) \times \exp(S_i/\sqrt{t}) / \sum_j \exp(S_j/\sqrt{t})$ 
end while
return n
```

What means “solving” a MG ?

Strategy x: probability distribution on {1,2,3,...,K}
Strategy y: probability distribution on {1,2,3,...,K}

Expected Reward:

$$R(x,y) = \sum_{i,j} M_{ij} x_i y_j$$

Nash equilibrium:

$$(x^*, y^*) = \text{Nash}$$

<==> for all (x,y)

$$R(x, y^*) \geq R(x^*, y^*) \geq R(x^*, y)$$

Approximate solving ?

(x*,y*) ε-approximate Nash equilibrium if for all (x,y), R(x,y*)+ε ≥ R(x*,y*) ≥ R(x*,y)-ε

So what ?

There is a *offline* solution (i.e. sparsity used at the end).
Can we use it online ?

Algorithm 3 onEXP3, an online EXP3 algorithm with a cut solely based on T.

```
Initialise  $\forall i, p(i) = \frac{1}{K}, n(i) = 0, S(i) = 0; t = 0$ 
while t < T do
  Arm i is chosen with probability p(i)
  n(i) ← n(i)+1
  t ← t+1
  Receive reward r
  Si modified by the update formula  $S_i \leftarrow S_i + r/p(i)$ 
   $\forall i, p(i) = 1/(K\sqrt{t}) + (1 - 1/\sqrt{t}) \times \exp(S_i/\sqrt{t}) / \sum_j \exp(S_j/\sqrt{t})$ 
  if  $x_i > \lceil \frac{t}{K} \rceil$  and  $x_i < (b_1 \times T^\delta \times (\frac{t}{T})^\beta)$  then
    Remove arm i
  end if
  if every arm has been pruned then
    Use plain EXP3
  end if
  Renormalize:  $p = p / \sum_i p(i)$ 
end while
Execute the truncation TEXP3 as presented in 2.3
return n
```

Conclusions ?

(i) it works (see numbers in paper) (ii) theory missing (iii) better (parameter-free ?) versions



<== application: Urban Rivals (free, you can test!)
Next application: Pokemon ==>

