Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

Abstract : We consider the problem of designing the distribution rule used to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many distribution rules known to guarantee the existence of a (pure Nash) equilibrium in this setting, e.g., the Shapley value and its weighted variants; however a characterization of the space of distribution rules that yield the existence of a Nash equilibrium is unknown. Our work provides a step towards such a characterization. We prove that when the welfare function is strictly submodular, a budgetbalanced distribution rule guarantees equilibrium existence for all games (i.e., all possible sets of resources, agent action sets, etc.) if and only if it is a weighted Shapley value.
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Communication dans un congrès
Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011
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Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden, Adam Wierman. Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games. Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011. 〈hal-00643725〉

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