Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards

Abstract : Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards are a special class of games that combines features from both population games (infinitely many players) with stochastic games. We extend the theory for these games to the cases of total expected cost as well as to the expected average cost. We show that equilibria in the anonymous sequential game correspond to the limit of equilibria of related finite population games as the number of players grow to infinity. We provide many examples to illustrate our results.
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Communication dans un congrès
Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011
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Soumis le : mardi 22 novembre 2011 - 16:41:09
Dernière modification le : samedi 27 janvier 2018 - 01:31:41
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 5 décembre 2016 - 10:58:26

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  • HAL Id : hal-00643737, version 1

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Piotr Wiecek, Eitan Altman. Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards. Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011. 〈hal-00643737〉

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