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Conference papers

Reflections on Vote Manipulation

Jan van Eijck 1 Floor Sietsma 1 Sunil Simon 1 
1 ATEAMS - Analysis and Transformation based on rEliAble tool coMpositionS
Inria Lille - Nord Europe, CWI - Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica
Abstract : The notion of non-manipulability (or: strategy-proofness) used in the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is too strong to make useful distinctions between voting rules.We explore alternative definitions and suggest how these can be used to classify voting rules.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, November 23, 2011 - 10:43:59 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 20, 2022 - 5:32:59 PM

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Jan van Eijck, Floor Sietsma, Sunil Simon. Reflections on Vote Manipulation. Proceedings of LORI 2011, Oct 2011, Guangzhou, China. pp.386-387, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30⟩. ⟨hal-00644260⟩



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