Repeated games over networks with vector payoffs: the notion of attainability

Abstract : We introduce the concept of strongly attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs in continuous time. A set of payoffs is called strongly attainable if player 1 has a strategy guaranteeing, even in the worst case, that the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff shrinks with time to zero. We characterize when any vector is strongly attainable and illustrate the motivation of our study on a multiinventory application.
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Communication dans un congrès
Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011
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Soumis le : jeudi 24 novembre 2011 - 13:31:20
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Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Dario Bauso. Repeated games over networks with vector payoffs: the notion of attainability. Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, 2011. 〈hal-00644397〉

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