Measuring Vote Privacy, Revisited.

David Bernhard 1 Véronique Cortier 2 Olivier Pereira 3 Bogdan Warinschi 1
2 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : We propose a new measure for privacy of votes. Our measure relies on computational conditional entropy, an extension of the traditional notion of entropy that incorporates both information-theoretic and computational aspects. As a result, we capture in a unified manner privacy breaches due to two orthogonal sources of insecurity: combinatorial aspects that have to do with the number of participants, the distribution of their votes and published election outcome as well as insecurity of the cryptography used in an implementation. Our privacy measure overcomes limitations of two previous approaches to defining vote privacy and we illustrate its applicability through several case studies. We offer a generic way of applying our measure to a large class of cryptographic protocols that includes the protocols implemented in Helios. We also describe a practical application of our metric on Scantegrity audit data from a real election.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'12), Oct 2012, Raleigh, United States. ACM, 2012
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00732904
Contributeur : Véronique Cortier <>
Soumis le : lundi 17 septembre 2012 - 13:26:01
Dernière modification le : vendredi 6 juillet 2018 - 15:06:10

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  • HAL Id : hal-00732904, version 1

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David Bernhard, Véronique Cortier, Olivier Pereira, Bogdan Warinschi. Measuring Vote Privacy, Revisited.. 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'12), Oct 2012, Raleigh, United States. ACM, 2012. 〈hal-00732904〉

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