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Joint Pricing and Cognitive Radio Network Selection: a Game Theoretical Approach

Abstract : This paper addresses the joint pricing and network selection problem in cognitive radio networks, considering both the point of view of network users and the Primary Operator. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg (leader-follower) game where first the PO sets the network subscription price to maximize its revenue. Then, users perform the network selection process, deciding whether to pay for having a guaranteed service, or use a cheaper, best-effort secondary network, where congestion and low throughput may be experienced. Such process is modeled as a population game to study the strategic interactions among a large number of agents. For our pricing and network selection game, we provide equilibrium and convergence properties, and derive optimal stable price and network selection settings. Numerical results illustrate that our game model captures the main factors behind cognitive network pricing and channel selection, thus representing a promising framework for the design and understanding of cognitive radio systems.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, December 12, 2012 - 1:49:09 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, June 26, 2022 - 11:57:36 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, March 13, 2013 - 3:51:32 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-00763303, version 1



Jocelyne Elias, Fabio Martignon, Eitan Altman. Joint Pricing and Cognitive Radio Network Selection: a Game Theoretical Approach. WiOpt'12: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, May 2012, Paderborn, Germany. pp.49-53. ⟨hal-00763303⟩



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