Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

Abstract : Provable security [6] is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for all adversary against the cryptographic construction TeX , there exists an adversary TeX against a security assumption TeX , such that if TeX has a high probability of breaking the scheme TeX in time t, then TeX has a high probability of breaking the assumption TeX in time t′ (defined as a function of t).
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Static Analysis - 19th International Symposium, SAS 2012, Sep 2012, Deauville, France. 2012, 〈10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1〉
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Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin. Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs. Static Analysis - 19th International Symposium, SAS 2012, Sep 2012, Deauville, France. 2012, 〈10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1〉. 〈hal-00765869〉

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