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Conference Papers Year : 2012

## Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

Gilles Barthe
• Function : Author
Benjamin Grégoire
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
• Function : Author

#### Abstract

Provable security [6] is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for all adversary against the cryptographic construction TeX , there exists an adversary TeX against a security assumption TeX , such that if TeX has a high probability of breaking the scheme TeX in time t, then TeX has a high probability of breaking the assumption TeX in time t′ (defined as a function of t).

### Dates and versions

hal-00765869 , version 1 (17-12-2012)

### Identifiers

• HAL Id : hal-00765869 , version 1
• DOI :

### Cite

Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin. Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs. Static Analysis - 19th International Symposium, SAS 2012, Sep 2012, Deauville, France. ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1⟩. ⟨hal-00765869⟩

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