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Correct Code Containing Containers

Claire Dross¹, Jean-Christophe Filliâtre², and Yannick Moy¹

¹ AdaCore, 46 rue d'Amsterdam, F-75009 Paris, France

{dross,moy}@adacore.com

² CNRS, INRIA Saclay Île-de-France, Université Paris-Sud 11

filliatr@lri.fr

Abstract. For critical software development, containers such as lists, vectors, sets or maps are an attractive alternative to ad-hoc data structures based on pointers. As standards like DO-178C put formal verification and testing on an equal footing, it is important to give users the ability to apply both to the verification of code using containers. In this paper, we present a definition of containers whose aim is to facilitate their use in certified software, using modern proof technology and novel specification languages. Correct usage of containers and user-provided correctness properties can be checked either by execution during testing or by formal proof with an automatic prover. We present a formal semantics for containers and an axiomatization of this semantics targeted at automatic provers. We have proved in Coq that the formal semantics is consistent and that the axiomatization thereof is correct.

Keywords: containers, iterators, verification by contracts, annotations, axiomatization, API usage verification, SMT, automatic provers.

1 Introduction

Containers are generic data structures offering a high-level view of collections of objects, while guaranteeing fast access to their content to retrieve or modify it. The most common containers are lists, vectors, sets and maps, which are usually defined in the standard library of languages, like in C++ STL, Ada Standard Libraries or Java JCL, and sometimes even as language elements, like sets in SETL [17] or maps in Perl. In critical software where verification objectives severely restrict the use of pointers, containers offer an attractive alternative to pointer-intensive data structures. Containers offer both a better defense against errors than low-level code manipulating pointers, and a rich high-level API to express properties over data. This is particularly evident when the implementation of containers themselves obeys the coding standards of critical software, with no dynamic allocation and few pointers, as is the case for the bounded containers defined in the proposed Ada 2012 standard [3].

Standards for critical software development define comprehensive verification objectives to guarantee the high levels of dependability we expect of life-critical and mission-critical software. All requirements must be shown to be satisfied by the software, which is a costly activity. In particular, verification of low-level

requirements is usually demonstrated by developing unit tests, from which high levels of confidence are only obtained at a high cost. This is the driving force for the adoption of formal verification on an equal footing with testing to satisfy verification objectives. The upcoming DO-178C avionics standard states: *Formal methods [...] might be the primary source of evidence for the satisfaction of many of the objectives concerned with development and verification.*

Although there are some areas where formal verification can be applied independently [18], most areas where testing is the main source of evidence today would benefit from an integration of formal verification with existing testing practice. At the simplest, this combination should be provably sound and it should guarantee a coverage of atomic verifications through formal verification and testing. This is the goal of project Hi-Lite [14], a project aiming at combined unit testing and unit proof of C and Ada programs.

In the context of project Hi-Lite, this paper deals with the definition of suitable containers in Ada, based on Ada standard containers, whose properties can be both tested dynamically and proved automatically. Properties over containers offer a high level description of the code, suitable for expressing partial correctness in the form of code contracts. Therefore, we are not only interested in correct usage of container APIs, but also in partial correctness of functional properties of interest to users.

Before they can be used in the context of avionics (or similar) safety-critical software, the new library of *formal* containers will need to be certified and the verification tools we present will have to undergo qualification [2]. We present in this paper: (a) a formal proof of correctness of an implementation of the new library in Coq [1], a well-known formal programming language; and (b) a formal proof of the new library properties used in our verification tools, expressed in the Why language [12] for formal verification. Thus, this work can be seen as a contribution to the argument-based approach to certification [16].

In Section 2, we detail the changes that we introduce in formal containers w.r.t. containers as defined in language standards. In the following sections, we describe in detail formal containers for doubly linked lists, and we sketch formal containers for vectors, sets and maps: formal semantics in Section 3, formal specification in the Why language in Section 4, formal proof of correctness in Coq in Section 5. We finally give a survey of related works in Section 6.

A longer version of this article with more details and proofs is available on the web [4]. A web page gives an introduction to the code for containers' implementation and proofs [5], and instructions to anonymously access the git repository where all the source code is stored.

2 Formal Containers

We will use the following Ada code as a running example throughout the section. Procedure `Map_F`¹ modifies a list in place, by replacing each element initially contained in the list by its image through function `F`.

¹ Note that `Map_F` is client code, not part of the API.

```

procedure Map_F (L : in out List) is
  Current : Cursor := First (L);
begin
  while Current /= No_Element loop
    Replace_Element (L, Current, F (Element (Current)));
    Next (Current);
  end loop;
end Map_F;

```

2.1 Contracts in Ada 2012

The forthcoming version of the Ada standard, called Ada 2012 [3], offers a variety of new features to express properties of programs. New checks are defined as *aspects* of program entities, for which the standard defines precisely the various points at which the check is performed during execution. The most prominent of these new checks are the *Pre* and *Post* aspects which define respectively the precondition and postcondition of a subprogram. These are defined as Boolean expressions over program variables and functions. For example, a simple contract on function `Map_F` could specify that its parameter list should not be empty, and that the call does not modify its length:

```

procedure Map_F (L : in out List) with
  Pre  => Length (L) /= 0,
  Post => Length (L) = Length (L'Old);

```

Notice that, in the precondition, `L` refers to the list in the pre-state while, in the postcondition, `L` refers to the list in the post-state, hence the need to refer to the special attribute `L'Old` in the postcondition, which designates the value of `L` before the call.² The execution model for these aspects is simply to insert assertions at appropriate locations, which raise exceptions when violated. For each variable `V` whose pre-state value may be read in the postcondition (`V'Old`), the compiler inserts a shallow copy of the variable's value at the beginning of the subprogram body. It is this copy which is read to give the value of `V'Old`.

Expressing properties in contracts is greatly facilitated by the use of if-expressions, case-expressions, quantified-expressions and expression-functions, all defined in Ada 2012. The main objective of these *logic* features is verification by testing, based on their executable semantics. In particular, quantified-expressions are always expressed over finite ranges or (obviously finite) containers, with a loop through the range or container as execution model: `for all J in 0 .. 10 => P (J)` is true if-and-only-if the subprogram `P` returns `True` for every argument, starting from 0 up to 10.

2.2 Ada Standard Containers

Like in many other languages, Ada standard containers define two mutually dependent data structures: containers proper which hold the data, and iterators (or cursors) which provide handles to individual pieces of data. In function

² More precisely, attribute `'Old` can be applied to all *names* (as defined in Ada standard), so that we could use `Length (L)'Old` instead of `Length (L'Old)`.

`Map_F`, the container has type `List` and the iterator has type `Cursor`, which are both defined by the standard Ada lists. A cursor is implicitly associated with a container (implemented as a pointer field in the cursor structure), in which it designates an element. An important feature of Ada containers is that cursors remain valid as long as the container exists and the element referenced is not deleted, like many iterators in other languages (for example those in C++ STL and Java JCL). This allows modifying a container while iterating over its content with cursors, without risk of invalidating these cursors.

2.3 API Modification: Independent Cursors

Problem. A useful postcondition for `Map_F` is to state how elements are modified by the call. All cursors are preserved through replacement of an element in a list. Thus, for every cursor `Cu` that designates an element `E` in `L` before the call, `Cu` designates `F (E)` in `L` after the call. It seems like we could express it with a quantified-expression:

```
procedure Map_F (L : in out List) with
  Post => (for all Cu in L => Element (Cu) = ???);
```

The expression denoted by `???` should designate the value obtained by calling `F (Element (Cu))` in the pre-state, which could be intuitively written as `F (Element (Cu))'Old`. Unfortunately, this expression is not valid because it refers to the value in the pre-state of `Cu`, which is not defined in the pre-state since it is quantified. As a side note, notice that, even for a cursor `Cu` defined outside of the `Map_F` function, `Cu'Old` would be the same as `Cu` in our example, because the semantics of attribute `'Old` is to perform a shallow copy, so it does not copy the implicit container in a cursor.

Approach. To solve the previous two problems, we break the implicit link between cursors and containers, so that the same cursor can be used both in the pre-state and in the post-state. Then, the previous postcondition can be expressed easily:

```
procedure Map_F (L : in out List) with
  Post =>
    (for all Cu in L =>
      Element (L, Cu) = F (Element (L'Old, Cu)));
```

Notice that we passed an additional argument to function `Element`, to indicate the container from which the element at cursor `Cu` should be retrieved. This is true for every function in the API of containers which previously accessed implicitly the container through a cursor, such as `Next` in the example of Section 2.

This is the only modification to the API of containers that we introduce. The alternative of using existing containers both greatly complicates the execution model and the formal verification.

Using existing containers would require a different semantics for the `'Old` attribute, which would reach to the complete pre-state including the stack and

heap, similar to the work by Kosiuczenko on Java programs [15] that builds a complete history of updates alongside execution. Our solution has the benefits of sticking to the standard semantics for 'Old in Ada 2012, leading to a simple and efficient execution model.

The semantics of standard cursors also leads to more complex verification conditions to check the correct use of containers' API: each access through cursor `Cu` to container `Co` is valid only if 1) `Co` is alive, which can be hard to know if `Co` is implicit, and 2) `Cu` is associated to container `Co`, which amounts to deciding whether `Co` is the same as the implicit container in `Cu`. With the semantics of formal containers, both verification conditions above disappear.

2.4 API Addition: Parts of Containers

Problem. In order to prove the postcondition of `Map_F` stated above, we need to annotate the loop in `Map_F` with a loop invariant, which states the accumulated effect of `N` iterations through the loop. We would like to state that *list elements already scanned* have been modified by `F` (as in the postcondition) and that *list elements not yet scanned* are unchanged. This pattern of loop invariant, consisting of two parts for the elements scanned and the elements not yet scanned, is typical of loops that iterate over a container.

Approach. We introduce two new functions, called `Left` and `Right`, which return the containers holding respectively the elements preceding (exclusively) or following (inclusively) a given cursor in the container. With these functions, the effect of the loop on the elements already scanned resembles the postcondition:

```
pragma Assert
  (for all Cu in Left (L, Current) =>
    Element (L, Cu) = F (Element (L'Old, Cu)));
```

The effect of the loop on the elements not yet scanned is not simply the equality of right containers. Indeed, equality of lists `L1` and `L2` only implies that, while iterating separately through each of the lists, the same elements are encountered in the same order. Here, we also need to be able to iterate on both lists with the same cursor, so that the first cursors of `L1` and `L2` should be equal and then each call to `Next` should return the same cursor on both lists which is not implied by equality. This is expressed with a new function, called `Strict_Equal`:

```
pragma Assert
  (Strict_Equal (Right (L, Current), Right (L'Old, Current)));
```

3 Formal Semantics

In this section, we present a formal semantics for lists. We show briefly how the formal semantics of other containers compares to the one of lists in the last subsection.

3.1 Syntax of Lists

A program is a sequence of variable declarations for lists (in **Lvar**) and cursors (in **Cvar**) followed by a sequence of instructions (in **Instr**). Procedures *Insert*, *Delete* and *Replace_Element* modify their first argument, which must be therefore a variable, and have no return value. The remaining instructions are assignments. Notice that list assignment makes an explicit copy of its argument, which prevents aliasing between lists. **LExpr** is the set of list expressions. *Empty* is the empty list constant. Functions *Left* and *Right* return parts of containers as defined in Section 2.4. **CExpr** is the set of cursor expressions. *No_Element* is the constant invalid cursor. Functions *First*, *Last*, *Next* and *Previous* are used for iterating over lists. **EExpr** is the set of element expressions. Function *Element* accesses the element designated by a cursor in a list. **BExpr** is the set of Boolean expressions. *Has_Element* checks for the validity of a cursor in a given container, $=$ is the structural equality and *Strict_Equal* is the more constraining equality described in Section 2.4. Finally, **IExpr** is the set of integer expressions. Function *Length* returns the length of a list.

Instr := <i>Insert</i> (LVar , CExpr , EExpr) <i>Delete</i> (LVar , CVar) <i>Replace_Element</i> (LVar , CExpr , EExpr) Cvar := CExpr Lvar := <i>Copy</i> (LExpr) ... LExpr := Lvar <i>Empty</i> <i>Left</i> (LExpr , CExpr) <i>Right</i> (LExpr , CExpr) IExpr := <i>Length</i> (LExpr) ...	CExpr := Cvar <i>No_Element</i> <i>First</i> (LExpr) <i>Last</i> (LExpr) <i>Next</i> (LExpr , CExpr) <i>Previous</i> (LExpr , CExpr) EExpr := <i>Element</i> (LExpr , CExpr) ... BExpr := <i>Has_Element</i> (LExpr , CExpr) LExpr = LExpr CExpr = CExpr <i>Strict_Equal</i> (LExpr , LExpr) ...
---	--

For the sake of simplicity, we only list instructions and expressions that are specific to containers. Thus, we have not included loops or branching statements in the set of instructions, or arithmetic operations in the set of integer expressions.

3.2 Operational Semantics of Lists

Since lists are generic in the kind of element they contain, the type \mathbb{E} of elements is left unspecified. The type \mathbb{D} of cursors can be any countably infinite type. We add a specific element \perp to this set, $\mathbb{D} \cup \perp$ is written \mathbb{D}^\perp . There is an environment for lists Γ_L , and an environment for cursors Γ_C :

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_L : \mathbf{Lvar} &\rightarrow \mathbb{L} = \{Len : \mathbb{N}, Fc : [1..Len] \hookrightarrow \mathbb{D}, Fe : Im(Fc) \rightarrow \mathbb{E}\} \\ \Gamma_C : \mathbf{Cvar} &\rightarrow \mathbb{D}^\perp \end{aligned}$$

Intuitively, lists can be seen as an array Fc of cursors with a mapping Fe from cursors to elements. Fc is injective, so Fc restricted to $Im(Fc)$ is bijective, and $Fc^{-1} : Im(Fc) \rightarrow [1..Len]$ is its inverse. We extend Fc^{-1} to $Fc_{\perp}^{-1} : Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\} \rightarrow [1..Len + 1]$ with $Fc_{\perp}^{-1}(\perp) = Len + 1$. Given an instruction I in \mathbf{Instr} , a list l in \mathbf{LExpr} , a cursor c in \mathbf{CExpr} , an expression e in \mathbf{EExpr} , a Boolean expression b in \mathbf{BExpr} and an integer expression i in \mathbf{IExpr} , judgments take the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash I &\Rightarrow \Gamma'_L, \Gamma'_C & \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l &\Rightarrow \mathbb{L} & \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c &\Rightarrow \mathbb{D}^\perp \\ \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash e &\Rightarrow \mathbb{E} & \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash b &\Rightarrow \mathbb{B} & \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash i &\Rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \end{aligned}$$

If $expr$ is an expression, $\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash expr \Rightarrow val$ means that $expr$ evaluates in environments Γ_L and Γ_C to a value represented by val in the semantics. If $instr$ is an instruction, $\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash instr \Rightarrow \Gamma'_L, \Gamma'_C$ means that $instr$ change the environments Γ_L and Γ_C into Γ'_L and Γ'_C .

Below are the description of the semantics of integer, element and boolean expressions. The result of function $Length$ on a list evaluating to $\{Len, Fc, Fe\}$ is Len . Similarly, function $Element$ returns the value of Fe on d , where cursor argument c evaluates to d . Notice that $Element(l, c)$ is defined only when $d \in Im(Fc)$, which is expressed in the informal semantics as c *designates an element in l* . Indeed, the associated Ada function will raise a run-time error otherwise. $Has_Element(l, c)$ checks if c effectively designates an element in l . Equality over lists ($=$) is the structural equality. It only implies that the elements in its two list arguments appear in the same order, *i.e.*, the equality of $Fe \circ Fc : [1..Len] \rightarrow \mathbb{E}$. $Strict_Equal$ is stronger than $=$, as expected, since it also implies the equality of Fc and Fe . Equality of cursors is simply equality of their evaluations.

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Length(l) \Rightarrow Len} \\ &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d \quad d \in Im(Fc)}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Element(l, c) \Rightarrow Fe(d)} \\ &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Has_Element(l, c) \Rightarrow d \in Im(Fc)} \\ &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l_1 \Rightarrow \{Len_1, Fc_1, Fe_1\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l_2 \Rightarrow \{Len_2, Fc_2, Fe_2\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l_1 = l_2 \Rightarrow Len_1 = Len_2 \ \& \ Fe_1 \circ Fc_1 = Fe_2 \circ Fc_2} \\ &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l_1 \Rightarrow \{Len_1, Fc_1, Fe_1\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l_2 \Rightarrow \{Len_2, Fc_2, Fe_2\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Strict_Equal(l_1, l_2) \Rightarrow Len_1 = Len_2 \ \& \ Fc_1 = Fc_2 \ \& \ Fe_1 = Fe_2} \\ &\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c_1 \Rightarrow d_1 \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c_2 \Rightarrow d_2}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c_1 = c_2 \Rightarrow d_1 = d_2} \end{aligned}$$

Below are the description of the semantics of cursor expressions. The special invalid cursor $No_Element$ evaluates to \perp . This is possible because \perp cannot

appear in $Im(Fc)$, as $Fc : [1..Len] \rightarrow \mathbb{D}$. Therefore \perp is not a *valid* cursor, *i.e.*, it designates no element, in any list. Function *Next* is defined for both valid cursors and *No_Element*. It returns *No_Element* when applied to a cursor which has no valid successor (*i.e.*, for *No_Element* and the last cursor). *Previous* is similar. Function *First* is defined on every list. It returns *No_Element* when called on an empty list. *Last* is similar.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash No_Element \Rightarrow \perp} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d_1 \quad d_1 \in Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Next(l, c) \Rightarrow d_2} \\
\text{where } d_2 = \{Len \neq 0 \ \& \ d_1 \in Im(Fc) \setminus \{Fc(Len)\} \rightarrow Fc(Fc^{-1}(d_1) + 1), \text{ else } \rightarrow \perp\} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d_1 \quad d_1 \in Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Previous(l, c) \Rightarrow d_2} \\
\text{where } d_2 = \{Len \neq 0 \ \& \ d_1 \in Im(Fc) \setminus \{Fc(1)\} \rightarrow Fc(Fc^{-1}(d_1) - 1), \text{ else } \rightarrow \perp\} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash First(l) \Rightarrow d \quad \text{where } d = \{Len = 0 \rightarrow \perp, Len > 0 \rightarrow Fc(1)\}} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Last(l) \Rightarrow d \quad \text{where } d = \{Len = 0 \rightarrow \perp, Len > 0 \rightarrow Fc(Len)\}}
\end{array}$$

Below are the description of the semantics of list expressions. The empty list, returned by *Empty*, is the only list whose length is null (F_\emptyset is the only function that is defined on the empty set \emptyset). *Left* is defined for both valid cursors and *No_Element*. Its evaluation yields a list whose valid cursors are the valid cursors of the list argument which precede cursor argument c (when c is *No_Element*, that means all cursors). *Right* is similar.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Empty \Rightarrow \{0, F_\emptyset, F_\emptyset\}} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d \quad d \in Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\} \quad n = Fc_+^{-1}(d) - 1} \\
\frac{}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Left(l, c) \Rightarrow \{n, Fc', Fe'\} \quad \text{where } Fc' = Fc|_{[1..n]} \quad Fe' = Fe|_{Im(Fc')}} \\
\frac{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash l \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\}}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d \quad d \in Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\} \quad n = Fc_+^{-1}(d) - 1} \\
\frac{}{\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Right(l, c) \Rightarrow \{Len - n, Fc', Fe'\} \\ \text{where } Fc' = \lambda i : [1..Len - n].Fc(n + i) \quad Fe' = Fe|_{Im(Fc')}}
\end{array}$$

The rules below describe the semantics of instructions. Rules concerning reads or assignment of variables are omitted (they are the usual ones). *Insert* modifies the environment so that its list variable argument designates, after the call, a list where a cursor and an element have been inserted at the proper place. The cursor argument, which can be either a valid cursor or *No_Element*, encodes the place the new element is inserted. The newly created cursor is not specified. It should be different from *No_Element* and from every valid cursor in the argument list. *Delete* modifies the environment so that its cursor variable argument (which must reference a valid cursor before the call) is deleted from the list referenced by its list variable argument. The cursor variable references the special invalid cursor *No_Element* after the call. *Replace_Element* modifies the environment so

that, after the call, its cursor argument (which must be valid) designates its element argument in the list referenced by its list variable argument.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\Gamma_L(l) = \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d_1 \\
d_1 \in Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\} \quad n = Fc_+^{-1}(d_1) \quad d_2 \notin Im(Fc) \cup \{\perp\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash e \Rightarrow Ellt \\
\hline
\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Insert(l, c, e) \Rightarrow \Gamma_L[l \mapsto \{Len + 1, Fc', Fe'\}], \Gamma_C \\
\text{where } Fc' = \lambda i : [1..Len + 1]. \\
\{i \in [1..n - 1] \rightarrow Fc(i), i = n \rightarrow d_2, i \in [n + 1..Len + 1] \rightarrow Fc(i - 1)\} \\
Fe' = \lambda d : Im(Fc'). \{d \in Im(Fc) \rightarrow Fe(d), d = d_2 \rightarrow Ellt\} \\
\hline
\Gamma_L(l) = \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_C(c) = d \quad d \in Im(Fc) \quad n = Fc^{-1}(d) \\
\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Delete(l, c) \Rightarrow \Gamma_L[l \mapsto \{Len - 1, Fc', Fe'\}], \Gamma_C[c \mapsto \perp] \\
\text{where } Fc' = \lambda i : [1..Len - 1]. \{i \in [1..n - 1] \rightarrow Fc(i), i \in [n..Len - 1] \rightarrow Fc(i + 1)\} \\
Fe' = Fe|_{Im(Fc')} \\
\hline
\Gamma_L(l) = \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d_1 \quad d_1 \in Im(Fc) \quad \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash e \Rightarrow Ellt \\
\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash Replace_Element(l, c, e) \Rightarrow \Gamma_L[l \mapsto \{Len, Fc, Fe'\}], \Gamma_C \\
\text{where } Fe' = \lambda d : Im(Fc). \{d = d_1 \rightarrow Ellt, d \neq d_1 \rightarrow Fe(d)\}
\end{array}$$

3.3 Vectors, Sets and Maps

Sets. Sets do not allow duplication of elements, the order of iteration in a set is not user-defined and the link between cursors and elements is preserved in most cases. In the semantics, sets can be modeled as the same tuples as lists where Fe is injective: $\{Len : \mathbb{N}, Fc : [1..Len] \hookrightarrow \mathbb{D}, Fe : Im(Fc) \hookrightarrow \mathbb{E}\}$. For non ordered sets, the order of iteration is not specified. If the set is ordered, the order of iteration is constrained by the order over elements. As a consequence, function $Fe \circ Fc$ has to preserve order. The longer version of this article presents the modified inference rule for *Insert* for each container.

Maps. Maps behave just like sets of pairs key/element except that they only constrain keys: $(k_1, e_1) < (k_2, e_2) \leftrightarrow k_1 < k_2$ and $(k_1, e_1) = (k_2, e_2) \leftrightarrow k_1 = k_2$.

Vectors. Vectors do not expect cursors to keep designating the same element in every case. Instead, as for arrays, elements can be accessed through their position (an index). As a consequence, we model vectors as tuples $\{Len : \mathbb{N}, Fc : [1..Len] \hookrightarrow \mathbb{D}, Fe : [1..Len] \rightarrow \mathbb{E}\}$ where Fc is injective. When an element is inserted or deleted from a vector, nothing can be said for the cursors that follow the place of insertion/deletion.

4 Axiomatization

In this section, we present an axiomatization of lists in the language Why, targeted at automatic provers. We show that this axiomatization is correct w.r.t. the formal semantics we gave in Section 3. We will formally prove it is correct w.r.t. formal semantics in Coq in Section 5.

4.1 Presentation of Why

The Why platform [12] is a set of tools for deductive program verification. The first feature of Why is to provide a common frontend to a wide set of automated and interactive theorem provers. Why implements a total, polymorphic, first-order logic, in which the user can declare types, symbols, axioms and goals. These goals are then translated to the native input languages of the various supported provers. In our case, we are using the backends for the Coq proof assistant [1] and the three SMT solvers Alt-Ergo [8], Z3 [9] and Simplify [10]. For example, here is some Why syntax that declares a modulo operation over integers, together with some possible axiomatization:

```

logic mod_ : int, int -> int
axiom mod__ : forall a, b : int. 0 < b ->
  exists q : int. a = b * q + mod_(a, b)
  and 0 <= mod_(a, b) < b
goal test : mod_(7, 2) = 1

```

The second feature of Why we use here is to provide a verification condition generator for an idealized, alias-free, Hoare-logic-like programming language. The user declares and implements programs, which are annotated with pre- and postconditions, and local assertions such as loop invariants. Verification conditions are then generated and transmitted to the theorem provers. Here is for instance the declaration of a program function

```

parameter mod : a : int -> b : int ->
  {0 < b} int {result = mod_(a, b)}

```

which takes two integers `a` and `b` as arguments, has precondition `0 < b`, returns a result of type `int` and has postcondition `result = mod_(a, b)`. When used inside programs, this function will trigger verification conditions (namely, that its second argument is positive). This is one way to express that modulo is a partial operation.

4.2 Axiomatization of Lists

Note that this axiomatic is not meant to be the exact translation of our semantics, but rather is written to facilitate the verification of programs with automatic provers.

Types. The type of elements is irrelevant, and so it is defined as an abstract type `element_t`. Cursors and lists are described respectively with abstract types `cursor` and `list`, further axiomatized in the following.

Properties. To encode the semantics defined in Section 3, we introduce three logic functions:

```

logic length_ : list -> int
logic position_ : list, cursor -> int
logic element_ : list, cursor -> element_t

```

Logic functions `length_` and `element_` define accessors to the fields *Len* and *Fe* of a list. The encoding is more complex for the field *Fc*, due to the fact that *Fc* is used in three different ways in the specification: 1) directly, 2) through its inverse Fc^{-1} , and 3) through its domain $Im(Fc)$. Function `position_` is the extension of Fc^{-1} to cursors not in $Im(Fc)$, whose image is set to 0. It gives access to both $Im(Fc)$ ($c \in Im(Fc) \Leftrightarrow \text{position}_-(1, c) > 0$) and Fc^{-1} . We rewrite almost all rules of the semantics to remove occurrences of *Fc*. For example, in the rule for *Next*, $d_2 = Fc(Fc^{-1}(d_1) + 1)$ can be rewritten as $Fc^{-1}(d_2) = Fc^{-1}(d_1) + 1$. The only rule that cannot be translated that way is `=`. For this one rule, we can use an existential quantification, $\forall d_1 : Im(Fc_1). \exists d_2 : Im(Fc_2). Fc_1^{-1}(d_1) = Fc_2^{-1}(d_2) \ \& \ Fe_1(d_1) = Fe_2(d_2)$. Why functions `length_`, `element_` and `position_` are related to the semantics as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall 1, i, \text{length}_-(1) = i &\Leftrightarrow \exists Len, Fc, Fe, \\ &\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash 1 \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \ \& \ Len = i \\ \forall 1, c, i, \text{position}_-(1, c) = i &\Leftrightarrow \exists Len, Fc, Fe, d, \\ &\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash 1 \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \ \& \ \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d \\ &\ \& \ i \geq 0 \ \& \ (i = 0 \rightarrow d \notin Im(Fc)) \\ &\ \& \ (i > 0 \rightarrow d \in Im(Fc) \ \& \ Fc^{-1}(d) = i) \\ \forall 1, c, e, \text{position}_-(1, c) > 0 &\rightarrow \\ \text{element}_-(1, c) = e &\Leftrightarrow \exists Len, Fc, Fe, d, Elt, \\ &\Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash 1 \Rightarrow \{Len, Fc, Fe\} \ \& \ \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash c \Rightarrow d \\ &\ \& \ \Gamma_L, \Gamma_C \vdash e \Rightarrow Elt \\ &\ \& \ (d \in Im(Fc) \rightarrow Fe(d) = Elt) \end{aligned}$$

Axioms. We encode the semantic properties of functions `length_` and `position_` into axioms, while ensuring that the axiomatic is not unnecessarily restrictive (all semantic lists should be also axiomatic lists). We have four axioms:

1. $\forall 1, \text{length}_-(1) \geq 0$
2. $\forall 1, c, \text{length}_-(1) \geq \text{position}_-(1, c) \geq 0$
3. $\forall 1, \text{position}_-(1, \text{no_element}) = 0$
4. $\forall 1, c1, c2, \text{position}_-(1, c1) = \text{position}_-(1, c2) > 0 \rightarrow c1 = c2$

It is rather straightforward to check that these axioms are implied by the semantics. These proofs can be found in the longer version of this article.

Semantic Rules. Each Ada function represented in the semantics is translated into a Why program. Given the semantic rule $\frac{Pre_S}{Post_S}$ defining this function, we define a precondition Pre_A and a postcondition $Post_A$ on the Why program, so that $Pre_A \Rightarrow Pre_S$ and $Post_S \Rightarrow Post_A$. In fact, since preconditions are quite

simple, we usually have $Pre_A = Pre_S$. We illustrate the general pattern that we applied with function *Next*, which we translate into program `next` in Why:

```
parameter next :
  l:list -> c:cursor ->
  { c = no_element or position_(l, c) > 0 }
  cursor
  { result = next_(l, c) }
```

The precondition of this function states that either the argument cursor `c` is valid in the argument list `l` (because $position_(\mathit{l}, \mathit{c}) > 0 \Leftrightarrow c \in Im(Fc)$) or the argument cursor is equal to *No_Element*. This precondition is exactly the condition for the application of the semantic rule for *Next*.

An axiom `next__` defines the behavior of logic function `next_` over the allowed cases only, leaving the value of other applications of `next_` unspecified, as seen in Section 4.1:

```
axiom next__ :
  forall l:list. forall c:cursor. forall nxt:cursor.
  (length_(l) > position_(l,c) > 0 ->
   position_(l, nxt) = position_(l, c) + 1)
  and (length_(l) > 0 and position_(l, c) = length_(l)
       or c = no_element ->
       nxt = no_element)
```

Axiom `next__` is defined as two implications: in the first case, the next cursor of the cursor argument is valid and we define its position; in the second case, the result is *No_Element*. Intuitively, this is the same as the semantic rule for *Next*. Using the same equivalences as above, we can rewrite axiom `next__` into a logic formula that is exactly the semantics of *Next*, rewritten to use only Fc^{-1} . This proof is presented in the longer version of this article.

4.3 Effectiveness

It is worth noting that the main difficulty we faced, when developing the axiomatization presented above, was to match the somewhat fuzzy expectations of SMT automatic provers: some work best with large predicates and few axioms, some work best with many smaller axioms, *etc.*

We wrote a number of tests (30) to convince ourselves that the axiomatization of lists presented is effective. With a combination of provers we managed to prove all the generated verification conditions. Our running example is proved rather quickly (less than 1s per VC). To facilitate proofs, which impacts both provability and speed, we defined 15 lemmas. These are not a burden in the maintainability of the axiomatic and cannot introduce inconsistencies since they are also automatically proved.

Most of the tests correspond to unit-tests for specific properties of list expressions (especially for complex ones, such as *Left*) and instructions. For example, there is a test to check that after replacing the value of an element in the list, the list indeed contains this value at this position after the call:

```

let test_replace_element
  (co : list ref) (cu : cursor) (e : element_t) =
  { has_element_ (co, cu) }
  replace_element co cu e
  { element_ (co, cu) = e }

```

A few tests, such as our running example, combine expressions and instructions to validate more complex behaviors of the API. All tests were proved automatically.

4.4 Vectors, Sets and Maps

Here is a table referencing the work done for each container. It contains the size of its Why file (its number of lines), the number of lemmas given and the number of tests passed. The code and tests are available on the web.

Container	Lines	Lemmas	Tests	Container	Lines	Lemmas	Tests
List	352	15	30	Ordered Sets	506	30	38
Vectors	298	0	22	Hashed Maps	394	27	22
Hashed Sets	429	24	35	Ordered Maps	476	35	25

5 Validation of the Axiomatization

We have presented a formal semantics for containers in Section 3 and its axiomatization in Why in Section 4. We have shown a pen-and-paper proof that the axiomatization presented is correct w.r.t. formal semantics. Given the size of the axiomatization, such a manual proof may easily contain errors. In this section, we describe an implementation in Coq of the formal semantics of containers, and a formal proof of correctness of the Why axiomatization of lists w.r.t. the Coq implementation, (which also implies the consistency of the axiomatization).

5.1 Coq Implementation and Proof for Lists

Types. Our proofs are generic in the element type. For the representation of cursors, we use positive natural numbers to which we add 0 to model the special cursor \perp . For lists, we model the tuple with a functional list of pairs cursor-element (if \mathbf{a} is an element of this list, $\mathbf{fst}\ \mathbf{a}$ refers to the associated cursor and $\mathbf{snd}\ \mathbf{a}$ to the element). The field Len is the length of the functional list, the field Fc is the function that, for an integer $i \in [1..Len]$, returns the cursor of the pair at the i^{th} position in the list and Fe returns, for each cursor in $Im(Fc)$, its first association in the list. Therefore, a list of this kind always defines one and only one tuple $\{Len, Fc, Fe\}$.

Definition `cursor : Set := nat.`

Definition `Rlist : Set := List.list (cursor*element_t).`

To keep only tuples where Fc is injective and has value in \mathbb{D} , we constrain the functional lists with a predicate. This predicate states that every cursor that

appears in a list is different from \perp (positive) and does not appear again in the same list.

```

Fixpoint well_formed (l : Rlist) : Prop :=
  match l with
    nil => True
  | a :: ls =>   fst a > 0
                /\ has_element ls (fst a) = false
                /\ well_formed (ls)
  end.
Record list := {this :> Rlist; wf : well_formed this}.

```

The property of well formedness has to be preserved through every modification of the list. With the Coq lists restricted that way, there is one and only one list per tuple $\{Len : \mathbb{N}, Fc : [1..Len] \hookrightarrow \mathbb{D}, Fe : Im(Fc) \rightarrow \mathbb{E}\}$. The two representations are equivalent.

Axioms. Thanks to the `-coq` option of Why, we translate automatically our Why axioms into Coq. They can then be proved valid formally.

Semantic Rules. We have written an implementation for each construct of our language. Since Coq is a pure functional language, the instructions that modify their list argument, such as *Insert*, are modeled by a function that returns a new list. The implementations are as close as possible to the semantic of their corresponding construct. Since they are Coq functions, these implementations have to be total, so we complete them for the cases that are not described in the semantics. For example, the semantics of *Next* is only defined when the cursor that designates the element to be replaced is valid in the list or equal to *No_Element*³. In the Coq implementation below, it returns *No_Element* if we are not in that case (we could have chosen any other return value).

```

Fixpoint next (l : Rlist) (cu : cursor) :=
  match l with
    nil => no_element
  | a :: ls =>
      if beq_nat (fst a) cu then first ls
      else next ls cu
  end.

```

The result of the semantic rule for *Next* is completely defined. It is easy to be convinced that, when the cursor given as a parameter is indeed valid in the list or equal to *No_Element*, the Coq function `next` returns the appropriate cursor. We use this representation to prove formally that the contracts in our axiomatic are indeed implied by the semantics.

For nearly every rule of the semantics of lists, the result of the modification is completely defined in terms of the value of the arguments. The only rule that is not completely determined is *Insert*, since the value of the new cursor is not

³ Using it elsewhere reflects a mistake and is reported as an error when executed.

given. For the implementation, we define a function `new` that returns a valid cursor. To keep our proofs as general as possible, we took care to use only the properties of `new` that were defined in the semantic (*i.e.*, that the result of `new` $\notin \text{Im}(Fc) \cup \perp$) by enforcing it thanks to Coq’s module system.

5.2 Vectors, Sets and Maps

All containers have the same Coq representation. Therefore, some parts of the proofs are shared. Sets and maps (ordered or not) share the same lemmas and heavily rely on those of lists. Vectors also rely on the lemmas of lists but less heavily (they are quite different). To make the proofs more reliable, general lemmas, which will not be affected by a slight change in the API, are collected in a separate file named “Raw”. Here are the size of the files (the number of lemmas in each file) and the architecture.

Raw Lists (154)					
Lists (21)	Raw Vectors (108)	Raw Sets (139)			
	Vectors (29)	Hashed Sets (64)	Ordered Sets (69)	Hashed Maps (64)	Ordered Maps (70)

Like for the *Insert* rule for lists, every unspecified part of the semantic of every container is kept as general as possible thanks to a sealed Coq module that only allows proofs to use the specified parts. The whole proof is 16,000+ lines of Coq. All of it plus commented excerpts can be found on the web.

6 Related Work

Formal proof over containers is an active area of research. There are two important, complementary areas in this domain: certifying user code that uses containers while assuming that their implementation complies with their specification (what we are doing) and certifying that an implementation of containers indeed complies with its specifications.

On the one hand, Bouillaguet *et al.* [7] focus on verifying that a container’s implementation indeed complies with its specifications. They use resolution based first-order theorem provers to verify that the invariants of data structures such as sets and maps are preserved when considering operations on their encodings as arrays and trees. Zee *et al.* [19] even presented the first verification of full functional correctness for some linked data structure implementations. Unlike Bouillaguet *et al.*, they use interactive theorem provers as well to discharge their verification conditions. Since they aim at certifying an implementation once, it does not seem to be too heavy a burden.

On the other hand, Gregor and Schupp [13] focus, like we do, on the certification of user programs. They present an unsound static analysis of C++ programs using STL containers. They generate partially executable assertions in C++ to express the constraints over containers’ usage, in particular a non-executable `foreach` quantifier to iterate over all objects of a given type in the

current memory state. Blanc *et al.* [6] also work on certifying user code using the C++ STL containers. Just as we did in this work, they axiomatize the containers and then construct some preconditions (resp. postconditions) that are more (resp. less) constraining than those of the semantics. Their work is still substantially different from what we did since they only check that the containers are properly used and they have no annotation language to allow the user to express other properties. Dillig *et al.* [11] present a static analysis for reasoning precisely over the content of containers. While they assume that we can analyze the code that fills the containers to provide constraints over the containers' content, we rely instead on user annotations. This gives us the possibility to verify user properties expressed in the same annotation language.

7 Conclusion

We have presented a library of *formal containers*, a slightly modified version of the standard Ada containers. The aim was to make them usable in programs annotated with properties of interest to the user, that can be both tested and formally proved automatically. Although we have limited experience with using this library, our experiments so far indicate that most user-defined annotations can now be expressed with few quantifiers, leading to automatic proofs of rich properties with SMT provers. We are now looking forward to working with our industrial partners in project Hi-Lite to develop large use-cases with formal containers.

We have given a formal semantics for these containers, and we have proved that this semantics is consistent by implementing it in Coq. We have developed an axiomatization of these containers in the language Why, targeted at automatic proofs with SMT provers, and we have proved in Coq that this axiomatization is correct w.r.t. the formal semantics of containers. On the one hand, this formalization is an essential step towards an argument-based certification of the library of formal containers, for their use in safety-critical software development. On the other hand, the proof of correctness of the axiomatization used in automatic provers is a very strong assurance against inconsistencies in proofs, which are a sour point of formal methods in industry.

Formal containers have been implemented in Ada, and could be included in any Ada compiler's library. They have been included in the standard library of the not yet released GNAT 6.5 Ada compiler. Theoretically, the Why axiomatization could be reused to model containers in other languages, with a few modifications to comply with the particularities of their respective APIs. The implementation we provide for Ada containers should be correct w.r.t. the formal semantics in Coq, but we have not proved it formally. This is an interesting (but difficult) problem for the future.

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