Ballot secrecy and ballot independence coincide

Abstract : We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and show that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also show that non-malleable ballots are sufficient, but not necessary, for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy under practical assumptions. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions will enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2013, Egham, United Kingdom. Springer, 8134, pp.463-480, 2013, LNCS
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Contributeur : Ben Smyth <>
Soumis le : mercredi 18 septembre 2013 - 17:35:13
Dernière modification le : jeudi 30 novembre 2017 - 01:17:48

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  • HAL Id : hal-00863370, version 1

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Ben Smyth, David Bernhard. Ballot secrecy and ballot independence coincide. ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2013, Egham, United Kingdom. Springer, 8134, pp.463-480, 2013, LNCS. 〈hal-00863370〉

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