Fully automated analysis of padding-based encryption in the computational model

Abstract : Computer-aided verification provides effective means of analyzing the security of cryptographic primitives. However, it has remained a challenge to achieve fully automated analyses yielding guarantees that hold against computational (rather than symbolic) attacks. This paper meets this challenge for public-key encryption schemes built from trapdoor permutations and hash functions. Using a novel combination of techniques from computational and symbolic cryptography, we present proof systems for analyzing the chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext security of such schemes in the random oracle model. Building on these proof systems, we develop a toolset that bundles together fully automated proof and attack finding algorithms. We use this toolset to build a comprehensive database of encryption schemes that records attacks against insecure schemes, and proofs with concrete bounds for secure ones.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00935737
Contributor : Benjamin Gregoire <>
Submitted on : Friday, January 24, 2014 - 7:07:26 AM
Last modification on : Friday, July 6, 2018 - 10:08:02 AM

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Gilles Barthe, Juan Manuel Crespo, Benjamin Grégoire, César Kunz, Yassine Lakhnech, et al.. Fully automated analysis of padding-based encryption in the computational model. 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2013, Berlin, Germany. pp.1247-1260, ⟨10.1145/2508859.2516663⟩. ⟨hal-00935737⟩

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