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Software countermeasures for control flow integrity of smart card C codes

Abstract : Fault attacks can target smart card programs in order to disrupt an execution and gain an advantage over the data or the embedded functionalities. Among all possible attacks, control flow attacks aim at disrupting the normal execution flow. Identifying harmful control flow attacks as well as designing countermeasures at software level are tedious and tricky for developers. In this paper, we propose a methodology to detect harmful intra-procedural jump attacks at source code level and to automatically inject formally-proven countermeasures. The proposed software countermeasures defeat 100% of attacks that jump over at least two C source code statements or beyond. Experiments show that the resulting code is also hardened against unexpected function calls and jump attacks at assembly level.
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Contributor : Jean-François Lalande Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, September 13, 2014 - 7:00:05 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, November 16, 2021 - 4:12:37 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, December 14, 2014 - 10:21:41 AM


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Jean-François Lalande, Karine Heydemann, Pascal Berthomé. Software countermeasures for control flow integrity of smart card C codes. ESORICS - 19th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Sep 2014, Wroclaw, Poland. pp.200-218, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-11212-1_12⟩. ⟨hal-01059201⟩



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