Price-Setting Combinatorial Auctions for Coordination and Control of Manufacturing Multiagent Systems: Updating Prices Methods

Abstract : Combinatorial auctions are used as a distributed coordination mechanism in Multiagent Systems. The use of combinatorial auctions as negotiation and coordination mechanism is especially appropriate in systems with interdependencies and complementarities such as manufacturing scheduling systems. In this work we review some updating price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions based on the Lagrangian Relaxation Method. We focus our research to solve the optimization scheduling problem in the shop floor, taking into account the objectives of resource allocation in dynamic environments, i.e. -robustness, stability, adaptability, and efficiency-.
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Juan José Lavios Villahoz, Ricardo Olmo Martínez, Alberto Arauzo Arauzo. Price-Setting Combinatorial Auctions for Coordination and Control of Manufacturing Multiagent Systems: Updating Prices Methods. 9th IFIP WG 5.5 International Conference on Balanced Automation Systems for Future Manufacturing Networks (BASYS), Jul 2010, Valencia, Spain. pp.293-300, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-14341-0_34⟩. ⟨hal-01060735⟩

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