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Conference Papers Year : 2014

Towards Synthesis of Attack Trees for Supporting Computer-Aided Risk Analysis

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Sophie Pinchinat
Mathieu Acher
Didier Vojtisek

Abstract

Attack trees are widely used in the fields of defense for the analysis of risks (or threats) against electronics systems, computer control systems or physical systems. Based on the analysis of attack trees, practitioners can define actions to engage in order to reduce or annihilate risks. A major barrier to support computer-aided risk analysis is that attack trees can become largely complex and thus hard to specify. This paper is a first step towards a methodology, formal foundations as well as automated techniques to synthesize attack trees from a high-level description of a system. Attacks are expressed as a succession of elementary actions and high-level actions can be used to abstract and organize attacks into exploitable attack trees. We describe our tooling support and identify open challenges for supporting the analysis of risks.
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Dates and versions

hal-01064645 , version 1 (16-09-2014)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01064645 , version 1

Cite

Sophie Pinchinat, Mathieu Acher, Didier Vojtisek. Towards Synthesis of Attack Trees for Supporting Computer-Aided Risk Analysis. Workshop on Formal Methods in the Development of Software (co-located with SEFM), Sep 2014, Grenoble, France. ⟨hal-01064645⟩
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