Election Verifiability for Helios under Weaker Trust Assumptions

Véronique Cortier 1 David Galindo 1 Stephane Glondu 2, 1 Malika Izabachène 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
2 CARAMEL - Cryptology, Arithmetic: Hardware and Software
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - ALGO - Department of Algorithms, Computation, Image and Geometry
Abstract : Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Proceedings of the 19th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'14), Sep 2014, Wroclaw, Poland. 2014
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01080292
Contributeur : Véronique Cortier <>
Soumis le : mardi 4 novembre 2014 - 21:40:35
Dernière modification le : jeudi 22 septembre 2016 - 14:31:08

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  • HAL Id : hal-01080292, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, David Galindo, Stephane Glondu, Malika Izabachène. Election Verifiability for Helios under Weaker Trust Assumptions. Proceedings of the 19th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'14), Sep 2014, Wroclaw, Poland. 2014. <hal-01080292>

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