Quantitative Anonymity Evaluation of Voting Protocols

Fabrizio Biondi 1 Axel Legay 1
1 ESTASYS - Efficient STAtistical methods in SYstems of systems
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL
Abstract : In an election, it is imperative that the vote of the single voters remain anonymous and undisclosed. Alas, modern anonymity approaches acknowledge that there is an unavoidable leak of anonymity just by publishing data related to the secret, like the election's result. Information theory is applied to quantify this leak and ascertain that it remains below an acceptable threshold. We apply modern quantitative anonymity analysis techniques via the state-of-the-art QUAIL tool to the voting scenario. We consider different voting typologies and establish which are more effective in protecting the voter's privacy. We further demonstrate the effectiveness of the protocols in protecting the privacy of the single voters, deriving an important desirable property of protocols depending on composite secrets.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
12th International Conference on Software Engineering and Formal Methods, Sep 2014, Grenoble, France
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [15 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01088188
Contributeur : Fabrizio Biondi <>
Soumis le : jeudi 27 novembre 2014 - 15:18:31
Dernière modification le : vendredi 16 novembre 2018 - 01:39:29
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 14 avril 2017 - 22:10:34

Fichier

main.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01088188, version 1

Citation

Fabrizio Biondi, Axel Legay. Quantitative Anonymity Evaluation of Voting Protocols. 12th International Conference on Software Engineering and Formal Methods, Sep 2014, Grenoble, France. 〈hal-01088188〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

479

Téléchargements de fichiers

80