Vssdb: A Verifiable Secret-Sharing Distance-Bounding Protocol

Sébastien Gambs 1 Marc-Olivier Killijian 2 Cédric Lauradoux 3 Cristina Onete 1 Matthieu Roy 2 Moussa Traoré 2
1 CIDRE - Confidentialité, Intégrité, Disponibilité et Répartition
CentraleSupélec, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D1 - SYSTÈMES LARGE ÉCHELLE
2 LAAS-TSF - Équipe Tolérance aux fautes et Sûreté de Fonctionnement informatique
LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes [Toulouse]
3 PRIVATICS - Privacy Models, Architectures and Tools for the Information Society
Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes, CITI - CITI Centre of Innovation in Telecommunications and Integration of services
Abstract : Terrorist fraud is a class of relay attacks against distance-bounding (DB) protocols in which a distant malicious prover colludes with an attacker located in a verifier's proximity when authenticating. Existing DB protocols resisting such attacks are designed to be lightweight and thus symmetric, relying on a secret shared by the prover and the verifier. Recently, several asymmetric distance-bounding protocols were proposed by Gambs, Onete and Robert as well as by Hermans, Peter and Onete, but they fail to thwart terrorist fraud. One earlier asym-metric protocol aiming to be terrorist-fraud resistant is the DBPK-Log protocol due to Bussard and Bagga, which was unfortunately recently proven to achieve neither distance-nor terrorist-fraud resistance. In this work, we build on some ideas of the DBPK-Log scheme and propose a novel DB protocol resistant to terrorist fraud that does not require the pre-existence of a shared secret between the prover and the verifier. Our construction, denoted as Vssdb (for Verifiable Secret Sharing and Distance-Bounding Protocol) relies on a verifiable secret sharing scheme and on the concept of modes, which we introduce as a novel element to complement fast-round challenges in order to improve security. We prove that Vssdb resists mafia-, distance-, and terrorist fraud, as well as impersonation attacks.
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Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, Cédric Lauradoux, Cristina Onete, Matthieu Roy, et al.. Vssdb: A Verifiable Secret-Sharing Distance-Bounding Protocol. International Conference on Cryptography and Information security (BalkanCryptSec'14), Oct 2014, Istanbul, France. ⟨hal-01242265⟩

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