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Recovering Private Keys Generated with Weak PRNGs

Abstract : Suppose that the private key of discrete logarithm-based or factoring-based public-key primitive is obtained by concatenating the outputs of a linear congruential generator. How seriously is the scheme weakened as a result? While linear congruential generators are cryptographically very weak "pseudorandom" number generators, the answer to that question is not immediately obvious, since an adversary in such a setting does not get to examine the outputs of the congruential generator directly, but can only obtain an implicit hint about them—namely the public key. In this paper, we take a closer look at that problem, and show that, in most cases, an attack does exist to retrieve the key much faster than with a naive exhaustive search on the seed of the generator.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01094296
Contributor : Pierre-Alain Fouque <>
Submitted on : Friday, December 12, 2014 - 9:20:46 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 15, 2021 - 4:26:40 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, March 13, 2015 - 10:20:50 AM

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Pierre-Alain Fouque, Mehdi Tibouchi, Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz. Recovering Private Keys Generated with Weak PRNGs. Cryptography and Coding - 14th International Conference, Dec 2013, Oxford, United Kingdom. pp.158 - 172, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_10⟩. ⟨hal-01094296⟩

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