Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations

Abstract : We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.
Type de document :
Rapport
[Research Report] 2013/235, Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2013, pp.24
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01102313
Contributeur : Bruno Blanchet <>
Soumis le : lundi 12 janvier 2015 - 15:05:02
Dernière modification le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 12:02:06

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  • HAL Id : hal-01102313, version 1

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Ben Smyth, David Bernhard. Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations. [Research Report] 2013/235, Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2013, pp.24. 〈hal-01102313〉

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