Can code polymorphism limit information leakage?

Antoine Amarilli Sascha Müller David Naccache 1, 2 Daniel Page Pablo Rauzy Michael Tunstall
1 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548
Abstract : In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code F and its input x. In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code Fi before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs F0, F1, . . . such that for all inputs x and for all indexes i ≠ j ⇒ Fi(x) = Fj(x) and Fi ne; Fj . This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.
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Communication dans un congrès
Claudio A. Ardagna; Jianying Zhou. 5th Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices (WISTP), Jun 2011, Heraklion, Crete, Greece. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-6633, pp.1-21, 2011, Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_1〉
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Antoine Amarilli, Sascha Müller, David Naccache, Daniel Page, Pablo Rauzy, et al.. Can code polymorphism limit information leakage?. Claudio A. Ardagna; Jianying Zhou. 5th Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices (WISTP), Jun 2011, Heraklion, Crete, Greece. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-6633, pp.1-21, 2011, Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_1〉. 〈hal-01110259〉

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