Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Can code polymorphism limit information leakage?

Abstract : In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code F and its input x. In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code Fi before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs F0, F1, . . . such that for all inputs x and for all indexes i ≠ j ⇒ Fi(x) = Fj(x) and Fi ne; Fj . This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [13 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01110259
Contributor : Brigitte Briot <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 27, 2015 - 5:28:15 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 1, 2021 - 5:58:06 PM

File

978-3-642-21040-2_1_Chapter.pd...
Files produced by the author(s)

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Antoine Amarilli, Sascha Müller, David Naccache, Daniel Page, Pablo Rauzy, et al.. Can code polymorphism limit information leakage?. 5th Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices (WISTP), Jun 2011, Heraklion, Crete, Greece. pp.1-21, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_1⟩. ⟨hal-01110259⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

287

Files downloads

221