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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2011

Using Horn Clauses for Analyzing Security Protocols

Résumé

This chapter presents a method for verifying security protocols based on an abstract representation of protocols by Horn clauses. This method is the foundation of the protocol verifier ProVerif. It is fully automatic, efficient, and can handle an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message space. It supports various cryptographic primitives defined by rewrite rules or equations. Even if we focus on secrecy in this chapter, this method can also prove other security properties, including authentication and process equivalences.
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Dates et versions

hal-01110425 , version 1 (28-01-2015)

Identifiants

Citer

Bruno Blanchet. Using Horn Clauses for Analyzing Security Protocols. Véronique Cortier; Steve Kremer. Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols, 5, IOS Press, pp.86 - 111, 2011, Cryptology and Information Security Series, 978-1-60750-713-0. ⟨10.3233/978-1-60750-714-7-86⟩. ⟨hal-01110425⟩
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