Public-Key Encryption Indistinguishable Under Plaintext-Checkable Attacks

Michel Abdalla 1, 2, 3 Fabrice Benhamouda 2, 3, 1 David Pointcheval 3, 2, 1
2 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548
Abstract : Indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) is now considered the de facto security notion for public-key encryption. However, the security guarantee that it offers is sometimes stronger than what is needed by certain applications. In this paper, we consider a weaker notion of security for public-key encryption, termed indistinguishability under plaintext-checking attacks (IND-PCA), in which the adversary is only given access to an oracle which says whether or not a given ciphertext encrypts a given message. After formaliz- ing the IND-PCA notion, we then design a new public-key encryption scheme satisfying it. The new scheme is a more efficient variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme with shorter ciphertexts and its secu- rity is also based on the plain Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assump- tion. Additionally, the algebraic properties of the new scheme also allow for proving plaintext knowledge using Groth-Sahai non-interactive zero- knowledge proofs or smooth projective hash functions. Finally, in order to illustrate the usefulness of the new scheme, we further show that, for many password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model, one can safely replace the underlying IND-CCA encryption schemes with our new IND-PCA one. By doing so, we were able to reduce the overall communication complex- ity of these protocols and obtain the most efficient PAKE schemes to date based on the plain DDH assumption.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Jonathan Katz. PKC 2015, Mar 2015, Maryland, United States. Springer, 9020, pp.332-352, 2015, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_15〉
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Contributeur : Michel Abdalla <>
Soumis le : lundi 16 mars 2015 - 14:47:37
Dernière modification le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 12:02:05

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Michel Abdalla, Fabrice Benhamouda, David Pointcheval. Public-Key Encryption Indistinguishable Under Plaintext-Checkable Attacks. Jonathan Katz. PKC 2015, Mar 2015, Maryland, United States. Springer, 9020, pp.332-352, 2015, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_15〉. 〈hal-01131982〉

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