Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks

Abstract : In this work, we are interested on the analysis of competing marketing campaigns between an incumbent who dominates the market and a challenger who wants to enter the market. We are interested in (a) the simultaneous decision of how many resources to allocate to their potential customers to advertise their products for both marketing campaigns, and (b) the optimal allocation on the situation in which the incumbent knows the entrance of the challenger and thus can predict its response. Applying results from game theory, we characterize these optimal strategic resource allocations for the voter model of social networks.
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Pré-publication, Document de travail
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Contributeur : Alonso Silva <>
Soumis le : jeudi 30 juillet 2015 - 09:02:39
Dernière modification le : jeudi 22 novembre 2018 - 14:28:41
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 31 octobre 2015 - 10:11:39


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  • HAL Id : hal-01180954, version 1
  • ARXIV : 1507.08462


Antonia Maria Masucci, Alonso Silva. Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks. 2015. 〈hal-01180954〉



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