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Experimental Comparison of Crypto-processors Architectures for Elliptic and Hyper-Elliptic Curves Cryptography

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CNRS – IRISA – University Rennes 1 – CAIRN
HAH Project

13th CryptArchi Workshop: June 29-30th, 2015



Summary

1 Context & Motivations

2 Proposed Crypto-processor(s)

3 Experiments & Comparisons

4 Conclusion & Perspectives

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1 Context & Motivations

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
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Asymmetric Cryptography: ECC and HECC

- Cryptographic primitives for protocols such as **digital signature**, **exchange of secret keys** and some **specific encryption schemes**
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC):
 - Actual standard for public key crypto-systems
 - **Better performance** and **lower cost** than RSA
- Hyper-Elliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC):
 - Evolution of ECC focusing a larger set of curves
 - Studied for future generations of asymmetric crypto-systems

Operations for (H)ECC



Metric for algorithms efficiency: number of multiplications (M) and squares (S) in \mathbb{F}_p

ECC versus HECC

	size of \mathbb{F}_p & scalar	ADD	DBL	source
ECC	ℓ_{ECC}	$12M + 2S$	$7M + 3S$	[1]
HECC	$\ell_{\text{HECC}} \approx \frac{1}{2}\ell_{\text{ECC}}$	$40M + 4S$	$38M + 6S$	[3]

- ECC:
 - Size of \mathbb{F}_p and scalar $2\times$ larger
 - Simpler ADD and DBL operations
- HECC:
 - Smaller \mathbb{F}_p and scalar
 - More operations in \mathbb{F}_p for ADD and DBL
- In theory, HECC naturally better than ECC

Objectives

- Design hardware crypto-processors based on **customisable** architecture
- Implementation of small circuits on **FPGA** and ASIC
- Study various trade-offs between:
 - **Computation speed**
 - **Area cost**
 - Energy consumption and protection against physical attacks
- **Experimental comparisons** of different architecture configurations
→ choice of the architecture parameters for the crypto-processor

Summary


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Developed Processor



- Customizable number of arithmetic units over \mathbb{F}_p : \pm, \times, \div
 $\rightarrow n_M$ multipliers of size n_B
- w : size of data words

Architecture Parameters

- $w = 32$ bits, for small processors
- 1 adder/subtractor (\pm), small and fast
- 1 inverter (\div), sufficient for the computations
- n_M multipliers (\times):
 - Based on Montgomery algorithm for modular multiplication [5]
 - n_B : number of parallel active words in the multiplier
 - 3-stage pipeline
- Classical key recoding techniques from literature:
→ standard binary, window λ NAF methods with $\lambda \in \{2...4\}$

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Details of the Experiments

- **Objective:** compare versions of the processor for various (n_M , n_B)
- Implementation on Xilinx Spartan 6 LX75 FPGA
- No DSP blocks (for ASIC compatibility)
- Design tools:
 - VHDL and assembly **code generation**: Python scripts
 - Design implementation: Xilinx design environment ISE 14.6
 - Simulations of complete scalar multiplications with Modelsim
 - Theoretical validation with SAGE (with more than 10k vectors)
- Implementation: **translate, map, place and route** of full processor
- **Same optimisation efforts** for ECC and HECC

Impact of Key Recoding Unit

- Various recoding techniques proposed to **reduce the number of curve operations**:
 - BIN: standard binary from left to right
 - NAF: non-adjacent form
 - λ NAF: window methods with $\lambda \in \{3, 4\}$
- Implementation results for an ECC processor ($n_M = 1$, $n_B = 1$)

recoding	BIN	NAF	3NAF	4NAF
area, slices (FF/LUT)	517 (1347/1433)	536 (1366/1445)	560 (1370/1454)	547 (1374/1460)
frequency, MHz	229	234	235	231

Results for ECC (256 bits) and HECC (128 bits) (1/2)

	n_M	BRAM	$n_B = 1$		$n_B = 2$		$n_B = 4$	
			area slices (FF/LUT)	freq. MHz	area slices (FF/LUT)	freq. MHz	area slices (FF/LUT)	freq. MHz
ECC	1	3	547 (1374/1460)	231	573 (1476/1625)	233	673 (1674/1875)	233
	2	3	722 (1776/1903)	220	811 (1979/2210)	227	942 (2377/2701)	220
	3	3	810 (2174/2236)	221	915 (2480/2698)	215	1130 (3077/3430)	214
	4	3	952 (2569/2656)	215	1100 (2977/3282)	217	1512 (3771/4293)	216
	5	3	1064 (2982/3136)	210	1405 (3492/3902)	206	1722 (4487/5122)	209
HECC	1	4	514 (1336/1374)	235	549 (1434/1513)	234		
	2	4	646 (1716/1783)	220	737 (1912/2055)	234		
	3	4	732 (2092/2075)	224	826 (2386/2485)	225		
	4	4	870 (2476/2424)	218	1022 (2868/2987)	214		
	5	4	976 (2865/2773)	219	1115 (3355/3465)	210		
	6	4	1089 (3233/3092)	203	1240 (3821/3908)	208		
	7	4	1145 (3601/3426)	213	1372 (4287/4365)	205		
	8	4	1281 (3981/3809)	191	1552 (4765/4890)	183		
	9	4	1379 (4363/4051)	202	1691 (5245/5277)	199		
	10	4	1543 (4739/4435)	196	1856 (5719/5801)	198		
	11	4	1547 (5114/4750)	189	1936 (6192/6240)	198		
	12	4	1738 (5499/5128)	191	2100 (6675/6771)	188		

Results for ECC (256 bits) and HECC (128 bits) (2/2)


- Average computation time (ms) for 50 $[k]\mathbf{P}$:

	n_B	n_M											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
HECC	1	15.6	8.6	5.7	4.7	3.9	3.7	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6
	2	11.9	6.2	4.5	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9
ECC	1	28.1	15.3	12.4	12.4	12.7							
	2	17.7	9.6	8.3	8.0	8.4							
	4	11.1	6.2	5.4	5.1	5.3							


- Standard deviation for 1000 $[k]\mathbf{P}$:

configuration	ECC (1,1)	ECC (3,4)	HECC (1,1)	HECC (6,2)
average time [ms]	28.2	5.3	15.5	2.8
std. deviation [ms]	0.289	0.056	0.324	0.045

Comparison of Various Configurations for our Processor



Relative Efficiency



Comparison with Literature

Source	FPGA	area slices / DSP	freq. MHz	[k]P duration ms
ECC 1,2	Spartan 6	573 / 0	233	17.7
ECC 1,4		673 / 0	233	11.1
ECC 2,4		942 / 0	220	6.2
ECC 3,4		1 130 / 0	214	5.4
[4]	Virtex-5	1 725 / 37	291	0.38
	Virtex-4	4 655 / 37	250	0.44
[2]	Virtex-4	13 661 / 0	43	9.2
		20 123 / 0	43	7.7

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Conclusion

- Implementation of ECC/HECC processors \Rightarrow cost/performance trade-offs
- We are able to select the appropriate number of multipliers and their size
- Experimental results: HECC always has **better performance** compared to ECC

Perspectives

- Improve arithmetic units (especially add DSP blocks)
- Study resistance to physical attacks (SCA¹, faults injection) of processors with good time/area trade-offs

¹Side Channel Attacks

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HAH project <http://h-a-h.inria.fr/>

Thank you for your attention



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
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
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Implementation Flow



Assembly Language: a Basic Example

$$r = (((a \times b) + c) + (d \times e))$$



1	read <code>fu_mul_0</code> , 0, 1	read operands <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>
2	launch <code>fu_mul_0</code>	launch <i>ab</i>
3	read <code>fu_mul_1</code> , 3, 4	read operands <i>d</i> and <i>e</i>
4	launch <code>fu_mul_1</code>	launch <i>de</i>
5	wait <code>fu.mul_0</code>	wait until the end of <i>ab</i>
6	write <code>fu.mul_0</code> , 5	write the result of <i>ab</i>
7	set OPMODE, 0	set addition (+) mode
8	read <code>fu.add_sub_0</code> , 5, 2	read <i>ab</i> and operand <i>c</i>
9	launch <code>fu.add_sub_0</code>	launch $(ab) + c$
10	wait <code>fu.mul_1</code>	wait until the end of <i>de</i>
11	write <code>fu.mul_1</code> , 6	write the result of <i>de</i>
12	wait <code>fu.add_sub_0</code>	wait until the end of $(ab) + c$
13	write <code>fu.add_sub_0</code> , 5	write the result of $(ab) + c$
14	read <code>fu.add_sub_0</code> , 5, 6	read $(ab) + c$ and <i>de</i>
15	launch <code>fu.add_sub_0</code>	launch $((ab) + c) + (de)$
16	wait <code>fu.add_sub_0</code>	wait until the end of $((ab) + c) + (de)$
17	write <code>fu.add_sub_0</code> , 5	write $((ab) + c) + (de)$

FPGA characteristics

FPGA	Spartan 6	Virtex-4 LX200 [2]	Virtex-5 LX110T [4]	Virtex-4 LX100 [4]
number of slices	11662	89088	17280	49152
number of FF	93296	178176	69120	98304
number of LUT	46648	178176	69120	98304