Secure refinements of communication channels

Vincent Cheval 1, 2 Véronique Cortier 2 Eric Le Morvan 2
2 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a practice is indeed secure. We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result, we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.
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Contributor : Eric Le Morvan <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, October 13, 2015 - 5:49:01 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 18, 2018 - 4:38:25 PM
Long-term archiving on: Thursday, April 27, 2017 - 4:30:48 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01215265, version 1


Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan. Secure refinements of communication channels. [Research Report] 8790, LORIA, UMR 7503, Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy. 2015, pp.50. ⟨hal-01215265v1⟩



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