Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

Abstract : This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We study when an exclusive contract is beneficial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be beneficial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is profitable to the colluding entities.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [7 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01232014
Contributor : Eitan Altman <>
Submitted on : Saturday, November 21, 2015 - 7:09:10 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, March 23, 2019 - 1:22:44 AM
Long-term archiving on : Monday, February 22, 2016 - 10:41:16 AM

File

WPIN2012.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Manjesh K. Hanawal, Eitan Altman, Rajesh Sundaresan. Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Association for Computing Machinery, 2012, 40 (2), pp.18-21. ⟨10.1145/2381056.2381061⟩. ⟨hal-01232014⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

160

Files downloads

188