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Article Dans Une Revue ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review Année : 2012

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

Résumé

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We study when an exclusive contract is beneficial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be beneficial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is profitable to the colluding entities.
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Dates et versions

hal-01232014 , version 1 (21-11-2015)

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Manjesh K. Hanawal, Eitan Altman, Rajesh Sundaresan. Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2012, 40 (2), pp.18-21. ⟨10.1145/2381056.2381061⟩. ⟨hal-01232014⟩
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