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Secure refinements of communication channels

Vincent Cheval 1, 2 Véronique Cortier 2 Eric Le Morvan 2 
2 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a practice is indeed secure. We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result, we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.
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Submitted on : Friday, December 4, 2015 - 12:04:49 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:09:05 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 29, 2017 - 5:25:50 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01238094, version 1


Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan. Secure refinements of communication channels. FSTTCS 2015, Dec 2015, Bangalore, India. ⟨hal-01238094⟩



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