Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies

Abstract : Do evolutionary processes lead economic or biological agents to behave as if they were rational? To test this idea, many authors examined whether evolutionary game dynamics eliminate strictly dominated strategies.We survey, unify, and fill some gaps in this literature in the case of monotonic dynamics: a class of selection dynamics in which the growth rates of the pure strategies are ordered in accordance with their payoffs. We also survey results for other dynamics.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01253535
Contributeur : Yannick Viossat <>
Soumis le : dimanche 10 janvier 2016 - 22:58:48
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:12:21

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Yannick Viossat. Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, 3 (1), pp.91-113. 〈10.1007/s40505-014-0062-4〉. 〈hal-01253535〉

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