Automated Source Code Instrumentation for Verifying Potential Vulnerabilities

Abstract : With a rapid yearly growth rate, software vulnerabilities are making great threats to the system safety. In theory, detecting and removing vulnerabilities before the code gets ever deployed can greatly ensure the quality of software released. However, due to the enormous amount of code being developed as well as the lack of human resource and expertise, severe vulnerabilities still remain concealed or cannot be revealed effectively. Current source code auditing tools for vulnerability discovery either generate too many false positives or require overwhelming manual efforts to report actual software flaws. In this paper, we propose an automatic verification mechanism to discover and verify vulnerabilities by using program source instrumentation and concolic testing. In the beginning, we leverage CIL to statically analyze the source code including extracting the program CFG, locating the security sinks and backward tracing the sensitive variables. Subsequently, we perform automated program instrumentation to insert security probes ready for the vulnerability verification. Finally, the instrumented program source is passed to the concolic testing engine to verify and report the existence of an actual vulnerability. We demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of our mechanism by implementing a prototype system and perform experiments with nearly 4000 test cases from Juliet Test Suite. The results show that our system can verify over 90 % of test cases and it reports buffer overflow flaws with P r e c i s i o n = 100 % (0 FP) and R e c a l l = 94.91 % . In order to prove the practicability of our system working in real world programs, we also apply our system on 2 popular Linux utilities, Bash and Cpio. As a result, our system finds and verifies vulnerabilities in a fully automatic way with no false positives.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Jaap-Henk Hoepman; Stefan Katzenbeisser. 31st IFIP International Information Security and Privacy Conference (SEC), May 2016, Ghent, Belgium. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-471, pp.211-226, 2016, ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-33630-5_15〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [15 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01369555
Contributeur : Hal Ifip <>
Soumis le : mercredi 21 septembre 2016 - 10:56:16
Dernière modification le : mercredi 21 septembre 2016 - 11:31:38
Document(s) archivé(s) le : jeudi 22 décembre 2016 - 12:49:06

Fichier

 Accès restreint
Fichier visible le : 2019-01-01

Connectez-vous pour demander l'accès au fichier

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Paternité 4.0 International License

Identifiants

Citation

Hongzhe Li, Jaesang Oh, Hakjoo Oh, Heejo Lee. Automated Source Code Instrumentation for Verifying Potential Vulnerabilities. Jaap-Henk Hoepman; Stefan Katzenbeisser. 31st IFIP International Information Security and Privacy Conference (SEC), May 2016, Ghent, Belgium. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-471, pp.211-226, 2016, ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-33630-5_15〉. 〈hal-01369555〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

86