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Independent Lazy Better-Response Dynamics on Network Games

Abstract : We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a function of this probability, the degree of the network, and the potential of the underlying games. These dynamics are somewhat more suitable for distributed environments than the classical better- and best-response dynamics where players revise their strategies "sequentially'", i.e., no two players revise their strategies simultaneously.
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Contributor : Laurent Viennot Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, February 5, 2019 - 5:43:45 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 11, 2022 - 11:16:04 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01373411, version 3
  • ARXIV : 1609.08953


Paolo Penna, Laurent Viennot. Independent Lazy Better-Response Dynamics on Network Games. CIAC 2019 2019 : 11th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, May 2019, Rome, Italy. ⟨hal-01373411v3⟩



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