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Conference Papers Year : 2019

Independent Lazy Better-Response Dynamics on Network Games

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Abstract

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a function of this probability, the degree of the network, and the potential of the underlying games. These dynamics are somewhat more suitable for distributed environments than the classical better- and best-response dynamics where players revise their strategies "sequentially'", i.e., no two players revise their strategies simultaneously.
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Dates and versions

hal-01373411 , version 1 (28-09-2016)
hal-01373411 , version 2 (28-02-2017)
hal-01373411 , version 3 (05-02-2019)

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Paolo Penna, Laurent Viennot. Independent Lazy Better-Response Dynamics on Network Games. CIAC 2019 2019 : 11th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, May 2019, Rome, Italy. ⟨hal-01373411v3⟩
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