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Finding the weakest link(s): Coalition games for decentralized discrete-event control

Abstract : In decentralized discrete-event system (DES) architectures, agents fuse their local decisions to arrive at the global decision. The contribution of each agent to the final decision is never assessed; however, it may be the case that only a subset of agents, i.e., a (static) coalition, perpetually contribute towards the correct final decisions. In casting the decentralized DES control (with and without communication) problem as a cooperative game, it is possible to quantify the average contribution that each agent makes towards synthesizing the overall correct control strategy. Specifically, we explore allocations that assess contributions of non-communicating and communicating controllers for this class of problems. This allows a quantification of the contribution that each agent makes to the coalition with respect to decisions made solely based on its partial observations and decisions made based on messages sent to another agent(s) to facilitate a correct control decision.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01373709
Contributor : Hervé Marchand <>
Submitted on : Thursday, October 6, 2016 - 11:35:40 AM
Last modification on : Friday, July 10, 2020 - 4:21:31 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, January 7, 2017 - 12:57:29 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01373709, version 1

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Laurie Ricker, Hervé Marchand. Finding the weakest link(s): Coalition games for decentralized discrete-event control. 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control , Dec 2016, Las-Vegas, United States. ⟨hal-01373709⟩

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