Abstract : Incentive strategies are used in collaborative user-centric networks, the functioning of which depends on the willingness of users to cooperate. Classical mechanisms stimulating cooperation are based on trust, which allows to set up a reputation infrastructure quantifying the subjective reliance on the expected behavior of users, and on virtual currency, which allows to monetize the effect of prosocial behaviors. In this paper, we emphasize that a successful combination of social and economic strategies should take into account the privacy of users. To this aim, we discuss the theoretical and practical issues of two alternative tradeoff models that, depending on the way in which privacy is disclosed, reveal the relation existing among trust, privacy, and cost.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Jianying Zhou; Nurit Gal-Oz; Jie Zhang; Ehud Gudes. 8th IFIP International Conference on Trust Management (IFIPTM), Jul 2014, Singapore, Singapore. Springer, IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-430, pp.205-212, 2014, Trust Management VIII. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-43813-8_14〉
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01381689
Contributeur : Hal Ifip
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Soumis le : vendredi 14 octobre 2016 - 15:21:32
Dernière modification le : dimanche 17 décembre 2017 - 16:40:01
Alessandro Aldini, Alessandro Bogliolo, Carlos Lafuente, Jean-Marc Seigneur. On the Tradeoff among Trust, Privacy, and Cost in Incentive-Based Networks. Jianying Zhou; Nurit Gal-Oz; Jie Zhang; Ehud Gudes. 8th IFIP International Conference on Trust Management (IFIPTM), Jul 2014, Singapore, Singapore. Springer, IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-430, pp.205-212, 2014, Trust Management VIII. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-43813-8_14〉. 〈hal-01381689〉
