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A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms

Abstract : This paper presents the first side channel analysis from electromagnetic emissions on VERIFY PIN algorithms. To enter a PIN code, a user has a limited number of trials. Therefore the main difficulty of the attack is to succeed with very few traces. More precisely, this work implements a template attack and experimentally verifies its success rate. It becomes a new real threat, and it is feasible on a low cost and portable platform. Moreover, this paper shows that some protections for VERIFY PIN algorithms against fault attacks introduce new vulnerabilities with respect to side channel analysis.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01383143
Contributor : Ronan Lashermes <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, October 18, 2016 - 10:45:03 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, April 14, 2021 - 3:37:32 AM

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Hélène Le Bouder, Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Jean-Louis Lanet, Ronan Lashermes. A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms. SECRYPT 2016, Jul 2016, Lsbonne, Portugal. pp.231 - 238, ⟨10.5220/0005955102310238⟩. ⟨hal-01383143⟩

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