A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms

Abstract : This paper presents the first side channel analysis from electromagnetic emissions on VERIFY PIN algorithms. To enter a PIN code, a user has a limited number of trials. Therefore the main difficulty of the attack is to succeed with very few traces. More precisely, this work implements a template attack and experimentally verifies its success rate. It becomes a new real threat, and it is feasible on a low cost and portable platform. Moreover, this paper shows that some protections for VERIFY PIN algorithms against fault attacks introduce new vulnerabilities with respect to side channel analysis.
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Communication dans un congrès
SECRYPT 2016, Jul 2016, Lsbonne, Portugal. pp.231 - 238, 2016, 〈10.5220/0005955102310238〉
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Contributeur : Ronan Lashermes <>
Soumis le : mardi 18 octobre 2016 - 10:45:03
Dernière modification le : vendredi 16 novembre 2018 - 01:40:44

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Hélène Le Bouder, Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Jean-Louis Lanet, Ronan Lashermes. A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms. SECRYPT 2016, Jul 2016, Lsbonne, Portugal. pp.231 - 238, 2016, 〈10.5220/0005955102310238〉. 〈hal-01383143〉

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