NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion

Abstract : Motivated by the subversion of ``trusted'' public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.
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Communication dans un congrès
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2016 - 22nd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Dec 2016, Hanoi, Vietnam
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01384384
Contributeur : Georg Fuchsbauer <>
Soumis le : mercredi 19 octobre 2016 - 18:08:57
Dernière modification le : jeudi 26 avril 2018 - 10:29:09

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  • HAL Id : hal-01384384, version 1

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Mihir Bellare, Georg Fuchsbauer, Alessandra Scafuro. NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion. Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2016 - 22nd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Dec 2016, Hanoi, Vietnam. 〈hal-01384384〉

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