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Cryptanalysis of Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

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Abstract

At Eurocrypt 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [7] presented a new primitive called Proxy Re-Encryption (*PRE*). This new primitive allows semi trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) into a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) without knowing the message. Ateniese et al [6] introduced *master secret security* as another security requirement for unidirectional *PRE*. *Master secret security* demands that no coalition of dishonest proxy and malicious delegatees can compute the master secret key (private key) of the delegator. In this paper, first we have shown that Aono et al's scheme [4] is not secure under *master secret security* model. In other words if proxy and delegatee collude they can compute the private key of the delegator. Second, based on Aono et al's paper [4] we have constructed unidirectional *PRE* which is also secure under *master secret security* model. Like [4], our scheme is also multi-use.

keywords: Lattice, Proxy Re-encryption, Learning With Error (LWE).

1 Introduction

At Eurocrypt 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [7] presented a new primitive called Proxy Re-Encryption *PRE*. This new primitive allows semi trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) into a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) without knowing the message. A natural application of *PRE* is to forward encrypted e-mail to others. For example, Director (delegator) can authorize his secretary (proxy) to convert encrypted mail for Director into encrypted mail for Dean (delegatee) whenever he is on leave. Then Dean can decrypt the encrypted mail using his secret key. Blaze et al gave first *PRE* scheme which was bidirectional and multi-use. Bidirectional means proxy can transform a ciphertext for Alice to a ciphertext for Bob and vice-versa without knowing the message. In multi use, proxy can transform a ciphertext from Alice to Bob, then from Bob to Carol and so on. Ateniese et al [6] presented a first unidirectional *PRE* scheme. In unidirectional, proxy can transform a ciphertext for Alice to a ciphertext for Bob but does not allow vice-versa.

Lattice based cryptography have bloomed in recent years because of the following advantages.

- Number-theoretic hard problems like prime factorization and discrete logarithm problem can be solved in polynomial time by Shor's algorithm [11]. But till now there is no polynomial time quantum algorithm for lattice hard problems.
- Ajtai [2] in his seminal result on the average case / worst case has shown that lattice based cryptosystem in the average case is as hard as solving some lattice based hard problems in the worst case. So lattice problems give strong hardness guarantee in the average case. Lattice based cryptosystems are also efficient and parallelizable.

Recently Regev [10] defined the Learning With Error (LWE) problem and showed that it also enjoys similar average case / worst case equivalence hardness properties through a quantum reduction.

Combining these two concepts Xagawa [14] presented bidirectional lattice based proxy re-encryption scheme under LWE assumption. Singh et al [13] gave bidirectional identity based lattice based proxy re-encryption scheme. Recently Aono et al [4] presented first unidirectional lattice based proxy re-encryption scheme.

Our Contribution: Ateniese et al [6] introduced *master secret security* as another security requirement for unidirectional *PRE*. *Master secret security* demands that no coalition of dishonest proxy and malicious delegates can compute the master secret key (private key) of the delegator. Ateniese et al [6] gave following motivation for *master secret security*.

1. Some PRE may define two or more type of encryption schemes. In one encryption scheme ciphertext may be decrypted by only master secret (private key) of the delegator. Other encryption scheme re-encrypted ciphertext may be decrypted by private key of the delegatee.
2. Delegator may want to delegate decryption rights to delegatee but may not want to delegate signing rights to delegatee. With this security it is possible.

In this paper, first we have shown that Aono et al's scheme [4] is not secure under *master secret security* model. In other words if proxy and delegatee collude they can compute the private key of the delegator. Second, based on Aono et al's paper [4] we have constructed unidirectional *PRE* which is also secure under *master secret security* model. Like [4], our scheme is also multi-use.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We denote $[j] = \{0, 1, \dots, j\}$. We assume vectors to be in column form and are written using bold letters, e.g. \mathbf{x} . Matrices are written as bold capital letters, e.g. \mathbf{X} . The norm $\|\cdot\|$ here is the standard Euclidean norm in R^n . We denote probabilistic polynomial time as *PPT*.

2.2 Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme(PRE)

PRE consists of seven algorithms.

PublicParameters(n): On input a security parameter n , this algorithm outputs public parameters.

KeyGeneration(n): On input a security parameter n , this algorithm outputs a secret key sk and the corresponding public key pk of the user.

Encrypt(pk, M): This algorithm takes input as a public parameters, a public key and a message, and outputs ciphertext C .

Re-Encryption Key(sk_i, pk_i, pk_j): This algorithm takes input as a secret key sk_i , a public key pk_i and a public key pk_j , and outputs unidirectional reencryption key $rk_{i,j}$.

Re-Encryption($rk_{i,j}, C_i$): On input a ciphertext C_i and re-encryption key $rk_{i,j}$, this algorithm outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext C_j .

Decrypt(sk_j, C_j): This algorithm takes input as public parameters PP , a private key sk_j and a ciphertext C_j , and outputs message m .

Correctness. Unidirectional Proxy Re-encryption is correct if suppose $C_i \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(pk_i, m)$, $rk_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Re-Encryption Key}(sk_i, pk_i, pk_j)$ and $C_j \leftarrow \text{Re-Encryption}(rk_{i,j}, C_i)$, following equation holds.

- $\text{Decrypt}(sk_i, C_i) = m$.
- $\text{Decrypt}(sk_j, C_j) = m$.

2.3 Security Model for Unidirectional Proxy Re-encryption Scheme

Here security model is adapted from [6]. Security of *PRE* is defined using two properties: semantic security (IND-p-CPA) and master secret security.

2.3.1 Semantic Security (IND-p-CPA)

Following security model captures the idea that when a group of polynomially bounded adversarial users and proxy collude against target delegator *B*, they can not get any bit of information with the condition that target delegator *B* never gives delegation rights to any adversarial users (including delegatee). We define security model using the following game that is played between the challenger and adversary.

Setup: The challenger *C* runs $\text{Setup}(1^k)$ and gives the public parameters *PP* to the adversary. Challenger *C* runs the KeyGeneration algorithm n_u times to obtain a list of public/private keys PK_{good}, SK_{good} , and runs the KeyGeneration algorithm for n_c times to obtain a list of corrupted private/public keys PK_{corr}, SK_{corr} . Adversary gets *PP*, SK_{corr} , and $PK = (PK_{good} \cup PK_{corr})$.

Phase 1: The adversary can make following queries.

- The adversary can issue re-encryption key query $rk_{i,j}$ corresponding to the public keys pk_i and pk_j such that either $pk_i, pk_j \in PK_{good}$ or $pk_i, pk_j \in PK_{corr}$ or $pk_i \in PK_{corr}$ and $pk_j \in PK_{good}$. Adversary can repeat this query polynomial times for different pair of public keys adaptively.
- The adversary can issue re-encryption query $rk_{i,j}$ corresponding to public keys pk_i and pk_j such that either $pk_i, pk_j \in PK_{good}$ or $pk_i, pk_j \in PK_{corr}$ or $pk_i \in PK_{corr}$ and $pk_j \in PK_{good}$. Challenger runs *RKGen* algorithm to obtain $rk_{i,j}$ corresponding to public keys pk_i and pk_j then challenger generates ciphertext C_2 by running *Re-encryption* algorithm.

Challenge: The adversary submits target public key pk_{i^*} and message *m* with the conditions that pk_{i^*} should belong to PK_{good} . Challenger randomly choose a bit $r \in \{0, 1\}$ and a random string *C* with the size of valid ciphertext. If $r = 0$ it sets the challenge ciphertext to $C^* := \text{Encrypt}(PP, pk_{i^*}, m)$. If $r = 1$ it assigns the challenge ciphertext $C^* := C$. It sends challenge ciphertext C^* to the adversary.

Phase 2: Phase 1 procedure is repeated.

Guess: Adversary finally outputs a answer $r' \in \{0, 1\}$ and wins the game if $r = r'$.

Adversary *A* is referred as an IND-p-CPA adversary. The advantage of the adversary *A* in attacking a PRE scheme ξ is defined as

$$Adv_{\xi, A}(n) = |Pr[r = r'] - 1/2|$$

Definition 1. *PRE* scheme is IND-p-CPA if for all PPT algorithm *A* and negligible function ϵ , $Adv_{\xi, A}(n) \leq \epsilon$.

2.3.2 Master Secret Security

Security model captures the idea that no coalition of dishonest proxy and malicious delegates can compute the master secret key (private key) of the delegator. We define security model using a game that is played between the challenger and adversary. The game proceeds as follows.

Setup: The challenger C runs $\text{Setup}(1^k)$ and gives the public parameters PP to adversary.

Challenge: The adversary submits target delegator B .

Query Phase:

1. The adversary can issue re-encryption key query $rk_{i,j}$ corresponding to any public keys pk_i and pk_j .
2. The adversary can issue re-encryption query $rk_{i,j}$ corresponding to any public keys pk_i and pk_j .

Guess: Adversary finally outputs a guess x for private key sk_B of target delegator B and wins if $x = sk_B$. We define the adversary's advantage in winning this game as $\text{AdvMSS}_{\xi,A}(n) = |\Pr[x = sk_B]|$

Definition 2. *PRE scheme is secure if for all PPT algorithm A and negligible function ϵ , $\text{Adv}_{\xi,A}(n) \leq \epsilon$ and $\text{AdvMSS}_{\xi,A}(n) \leq \epsilon$.*

2.4 Integer Lattices ([8])

A lattice is the set of all integer combinations

$$L(b_1, \dots, b_n) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n x_i b_i : x_i \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n \right\}$$

of n linearly independent vectors $\{b_1, \dots, b_n\} \in \mathbb{R}^n$. The set of vectors $\{b_1, \dots, b_n\}$ is called a lattice basis.

Definition 3. For q prime, $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, define:

$$\Lambda_q(A) := \{e \in \mathbb{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } \exists s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ where } A^T s = e \pmod{q}\}$$

$$\Lambda_q^\perp(A) := \{e \in \mathbb{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } Ae = 0 \pmod{q}\}$$

$$\Lambda_q^u(A) := \{e \in \mathbb{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } Ae = u \pmod{q}\}$$

Theorem 1. ([2, 3]) Let q be prime and $m := \lceil 6n \log q \rceil$.

There is PPT algorithm $\text{TrapGen}(q, n)$ that outputs a pair $(A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}, T \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m})$ such that statistically distance between matrix A and a uniform matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is negligible and T is a basis for $\Lambda_q^\perp(A)$ satisfying

$$\|\tilde{T}\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q}) \text{ and } \|T\| \leq O(n \log q)$$

with overwhelming probability in n .

2.5 The LWE Hardness Assumption ([10, 1])

Regev [10] proposed the LWE (learning with error) assumption.

Definition 4. LWE: Consider a prime number q , a positive integer n , and a Gaussian distribution χ^m over \mathbb{Z}_q^m . Given $(A, As + x)$ where matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ is uniformly random and $x \in \chi^m$. LWE hard problem is to find s with non-negligible probability.

Definition 5. Decision LWE: Consider a prime number q , a positive integer n , and a Gaussian distribution χ^m over Z_q^m . The input is a pair (A, v) from an unspecified challenge oracle O , where $A \in Z_q^{m \times n}$ is chosen uniformly. An unspecified challenge oracle O is either a noisy pseudo-random sampler O_s or a truly random sampler $O_\$$. It is based on how v is chosen.

1. When v is chosen to be $As + e$ for a uniformly chosen $s \in Z_q^n$ and a vector $e \in \chi^m$, an unspecified challenge oracle O is a noisy pseudo-random sampler O_s .
2. When v is chosen uniformly from Z_q^m , an unspecified challenge oracle O is a truly random sampler $O_\$$.

Goal of the adversary is to distinguish between the above two cases with non-negligible probability. Or we say that an algorithm A decides the (Z_q, n, χ) -LWE problem if $|\Pr[A^{O_s} = 1] - \Pr[A^{O_\$} = 1]|$ is non-negligible for a random $s \in Z_q^n$.

Above decision LWE is also hard even if s is chosen from the Gaussian distribution rather than the uniform distribution [5, 9].

2.6 Small Integer Solution (SIS) Assumption ([2])

SIS and ISIS hard problems were proposed by Ajtai [2] in 1996.

Definition 6. Given an integer q , a matrix $A \in Z_q^{n \times m}$ and real β , find a short nonzero integer vector $x \in Z_q^m$ such that $Ax = 0 \pmod q$ and $\|x\| \leq \beta$.

OR find a nonzero integer vector $x \in Z_2^m$ such that $Ax = 0 \pmod q$.

2.7 Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS) Assumption

Definition 7. Given an integer q , a matrix $A \in Z_q^{n \times m}$, a syndrome $u \in Z_q^n$ and real β , find a short nonzero integer vector $x \in Z_q^m$ such that $Ax = u \pmod q$ and $\|x\| \leq \beta$.

OR find a nonzero integer vector $x \in Z_2^m$ such that $Ax = u \pmod q$.

3 Cryptanalysis of the Aono et al's Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

3.1 Aono et al's Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

In Indocrypt 2013, Aono et al [4] presented key private unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme. First, we describe Aono et al's scheme [4]. Before that we describe functions **Bits()** and **Power2()** used in [4]. Let $v = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \in Z_q^n$, $k = \lceil \lg q \rceil$ and $(b_{i,1}, \dots, b_{i,k})$ be the bit representation of v_i such that $v_i = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} 2^j b_{i,j}$. Then **Bits()** is defined as

$$\text{Bits}(v) = [b_{1,1} \dots b_{n,1} | b_{1,2} \dots b_{n,2} | \dots | b_{1,k} \dots b_{n,k}] \in \{0, 1\}^{1 \times nk}$$

(First n bits are first bit of v_1, \dots, v_n and next n bits are second bit of v_1, \dots, v_n and so on).

Let $X = [X_1 | \dots | X_l] \in Z_q^{n \times l}$ where X_i are columns. Then

$$\text{Power2}(X) = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 \dots X_l \\ 2X_1 \dots 2X_l \\ \vdots \\ 2^{k-1}X_1 \dots 2^{k-1}X_l \end{bmatrix} \in Z_k^{nk \times l}$$

It can be shown that

$$\text{Bits}(v)\text{Power2}(X) = vX \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times l}$$

Setup(n): On input a security parameter n , set the parameter $q = \text{poly}(n)$ and randomly choose matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$.

KeyGeneration(n): Let $s = \alpha q$ for $0 < \alpha < 1$. Choose Gaussian noise matrices $R, S \in \psi_s^{n \times l}$ and $E \in \psi_s^{nk \times l}$ where l is message length. Compute $P = R - AS$. So private key is S and public key is P .

Proxy Key Gen(PP, S_A, P_B): On input of Alice's private key S_A and Bob's public key P_B , do the following.

1. Bob chooses matrices $X \in \psi_s^{nk \times l}$ ($k = \lceil \lg q \rceil$) randomly and noise Matrix $E \in \psi_s^{nk \times l}$ where ψ_s is a gaussian distribution. Bob computes $-XS_B + E$ and sends $X, -XS_B + E$ secretly to the Alice.
2. Alice compute proxy re-encryption key $rk_{A,B} = (P_B, Q)$ where

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} X & -XS_B + E + \text{Power2}(S_A) \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix}$$

Above three algorithm is enough for our cryptanalysis. Complete scheme is given in [4].

3.2 Attack on Aono et al's Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

In Aono et al's scheme, if proxy and delegatee collude they can compute delegator's private key. It works as follows.

Let $S = [S_1 | \dots | S_l] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l}$ where S_i are columns. Then $\text{Power2}(S)$ is defined as

$$\text{Power2}(S) = \begin{bmatrix} S_1 \dots S_l \\ 2S_1 \dots 2S_l \\ \vdots \\ 2^{k-1}S_1 \dots 2^{k-1}S_l \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_k^{nk \times l}$$

Here first n rows are S . So if we know $\text{Power2}(S)$ then we can find S . (Here k is number of bits required to represent q).

Now let us see the expression of proxy key Q

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} X & -XS_B + E + \text{Power2}(S_A) \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix},$$

where S_B is private key of Bob (delegatee). Bob (delegatee) creates X, E and securely sends $X, -XS_B + E$ to Alice. Basically Bob knows $X, -XS_B + E$. Both Bob (delegatee) and proxy know Q, X and $-XS_B + E$ and they can compute $\text{Power2}(S_A)$. So they can compute private key of Alice (delegator) S_A which is first n rows of the $\text{Power2}(S_A)$.

4 Lattice Based Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

We describe our scheme to avoid the above attack. Our scheme is variant of Aono et al [4].

Setup(n): On input a security parameter n , we set the parameters $q = \text{poly}(n)$ and $m = O(n \lg n)$ accordingly. We choose a matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ and matrix $X \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nk \times n}$ randomly, where $k = \lceil \lg q \rceil$. Public parameters (PP) are matrix A and matrix X .

KeyGeneration(n): Let $s = \alpha q$ for $0 < \alpha < 1$. We choose noise matrices $R, S \in \Psi_s^{n \times l}$ and $E \in \Psi_s^{nk \times l}$ where l is message length. We compute $P_1 = R - AS$ and $P_2 = -XS + E$. So private key is S and public key $P = (P_1, P_2) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l}, \mathbb{Z}_q^{nk \times l})$.

Encrypt(PP, m, P_1, P_2): To encrypt a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^l$, we do the following.

1. We choose noise vectors $e_1, e_2 \in \Psi_s^{1 \times n}$ and $e_3 \in \Psi_s^{1 \times l}$ where Ψ_s is a gaussian distribution.
2. Compute $c_1 = e_1 A + e_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times n}$, $c_2 = e_1 P_1 + e_3 + m \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor$.
3. Output the ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times (n+l)}$.

RKGen(PP, S_A, P_B): On input of Alice's private key S_A and Bob's public key P_B , we do the following.

1. We choose noise vectors $e_4 \in \Psi_s^{nk \times nk}$ and $e_5 \in \Psi_s^{nk \times l}$ where Ψ_s is a gaussian distribution.
2. We compute proxy re-encryption key $rk_{A,B} = Q$ where

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} e_4 X & e_4 P_2 + e_5 + \text{Power2}(S_A) \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix}$$

Re-Encrypt($PP, rk_{A,B}, C_A$): On input of re-encryption key $rk_{A,B}$, proxy transforms Alice's ciphertext C_A to Bob's ciphertext C_B by the following equation.

$$C_B = (c_{1B}, c_{2B}) = [\text{Bits}(c_1) | c_2] \cdot rk_{A,B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times (n+l)}$$

Decrypt(PP, S_B, C_B): To decrypt $C_B = (c_1, c_2)$, we do the following.

1. We compute

$$m = \begin{bmatrix} c_1 & c_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S_B \\ I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix}$$

2. Let $m = (m_1, \dots, m_l)$. If m_i is less than $\lfloor \frac{q}{4} \rfloor \bmod q$ than $m_i = 0$ otherwise $m_i = 1$.

Correctness: First we decrypt the normal ciphertext

$$c_1 S_A + c_2 = e_2 S_A + e_3 + m \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor,$$

which will yield m if $e_2 S_A + e_3$ is less than $\lfloor \frac{q}{4} \rfloor$. Now we decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext

$$\begin{aligned} [\text{Bits}(c_1) | c_2] \cdot rk_{A,B} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} S_B \\ I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix} &= [\text{Bits}(c_1) | c_2] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} e_4 X & e_4 P_2 + e_5 + \text{Power2}(S_A) \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S_B \\ I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= [\text{Bits}(c_1) | c_2] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} e_4 E + e_5 + \text{Power2}(S_A) \\ I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \text{Bits}(c_1) e_4 E + \text{Bits}(c_1) e_5 + \text{Bits}(c_1) \text{Power2}(S_A) + c_2 \\ &= \text{Bits}(c_1) e_4 E + \text{Bits}(c_1) e_5 + c_1 S_A + c_2 \\ &= \text{Bits}(c_1) e_4 E + \text{Bits}(c_1) e_5 + e_2 S_A + e_3 + m \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor \end{aligned}$$

which will yield m if $\text{Bits}(c_1)e_4E + \text{Bits}(c_1)e_5 + e_2S_A + e_3$ is less than $\lfloor \frac{q}{4} \rfloor$.

Since e_2, e_3, e_4, e_5, S_A are from Gaussian distribution ψ_s so with some $s = \alpha q$ it is possible that $\text{Bits}(c_1)e_4E + \text{Bits}(c_1)e_5 + e_2S_A + e_3$ is less than $\lfloor \frac{q}{4} \rfloor$.

Theorem 2. *Lattice based unidirectional PRE scheme is IND-p-CPA (semantic) secure assuming the $LWE_{q,\chi}$ is hard or $\text{Adv}_{B,LWE_{q,\chi}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{\chi,A}(n)$.*

Proof: Here proof has similar structure as in the proof of [4, 14, 12]. Now we show semantic security (IND-p-CPA) of PRE . Suppose there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with non-negligible probability breaks PRE scheme. Then we construct PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} (challenger) that solves LWE hard problem with non-negligible probability. Here CU denotes set of corrupted users and HU denotes set of honest users. Challenger \mathcal{B} obtains the $n + l$ LWE samples from LWE oracle, which is parsed as $(A, c_1 = e_1A + e_2)$ and $(P_1, c_2 = e_1P_1 + e_3)$. Now challenger \mathcal{B} sets the master public key $mpk = A$ and public key of target delegator $PK^* = P_1$.

Re-encryption Queries: Challenger \mathcal{B} answers re-encryption key queries and re-encryption queries of the adversary \mathcal{A} in following way.

- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a re-encryption key query for the the identities u_j and u_k such that $u_j, u_k \in HU$, challenger \mathcal{B} randomly choose matrices $X_1, X_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n_k \times l}$ and returns

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & X_2 \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix}$$

to the challenger \mathcal{B} .

- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a re-encryption query for the the public keys u_j and u_k such that $u_j, u_k \in HU$, Challenger \mathcal{B} returns a random vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times (n+l)}$.
- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a re-encryption key query or a re-encryption query for the the public keys u_j and u_k such that $u_j, u_k \in CU$. Since private key is known to corrupted users so adversary himself can compute re-encryption key or re-encrypted ciphertext. (This query may not be required)

Challenge ciphertext: Now adversary \mathcal{A} submits a message m . Now challenger \mathcal{B} computes $c_1^* = c_1$ and $c_2^* = c_2 + m \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor$ and sends $C^* = (c_1^*, c_2^*)$ to adversary \mathcal{A} .

Phase 2: Adversary can ask query with some restriction same as in phase one.

Now adversary \mathcal{A} outputs that challenged ciphertext is a valid ciphertext, then challenger will output that oracle O as pseudo-random LWE oracle. If adversary \mathcal{A} outputs random ciphertext then adversary will output random LWE oracle. In other words if adversary \mathcal{A} terminates with some output then challenger \mathcal{B} outputs the same. So if adversary \mathcal{A} breaks the scheme then one can construct challenger \mathcal{B} which solves LWE .

$\text{Adv}_{B,LWE_{q,\chi}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{\chi,A}(n)$. Hence our scheme is semantically secure.

Theorem 3. *Lattice based unidirectional PRE scheme is master secret security assuming the $LWE_{q,\chi}$ is hard or $\text{Adv}_{B,LWE_{q,\chi}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{MSS_{\chi,A}}(n)$.*

Proof: Here proof has similar structure as in the proof of [4, 14]. We now show master secret security of *PRE*. Suppose there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can compute private key of the delegator D in our *PRE* scheme with non-negligible probability then we construct a PPT algorithm (challenger \mathcal{B}) that solves LWE hard problem with non-negligible probability. Here CU denotes set of corrupted users and HU denotes set of honest users.

For $i = 1$ to $i = l$,

- Challenger \mathcal{B} obtains the $nk + n$ LWE samples from LWE oracle, which is parsed as $(-A, P_{1,i} = -AS_i + R_i)$ and $(-X, P_{2,i} = -XS_i + E_i)$.

Now challenger \mathcal{B} sets the master public key $mpk = A$ and public key of the target delegator $P = (P_1, P_2)$, where

$$P_1 = (P_{1,1}, \dots, P_{1,l}) \text{ and } P_2 = (P_{2,1}, \dots, P_{2,l}).$$

\mathcal{B} does not know about private key $S = (S_1, \dots, S_l)$.

Re-encryption Queries: Challenger \mathcal{B} answers re-encryption key queries and re-encryption queries of the adversary \mathcal{A} in following way.

- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a re-encryption key query for the the public keys u_j and u_x such that $u_j \in HU$, $u_k \in CU$, challenger \mathcal{B} randomly choose matrices $X_1, X_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nk \times l}$ and returns

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & X_2 \\ 0_{l \times n} & I_{l \times l} \end{bmatrix}$$

to the challenger \mathcal{B} . Here X_1 is random because $X_1 = e_4 X$, where e_4 is random and X is public key of corrupt user. But in [4] $X_1 = X$, so \mathcal{B} can not return random X_1 as one part of Q in [4].

- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a re-encryption query for the the public keys u_j and u_x such that $u_j \in HU$, $u_k \in CU$, challenger \mathcal{B} returns a random vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times (n+l)}$.

Now adversary \mathcal{A} outputs private key of the target delegator, challenger \mathcal{B} outputs the same as the solution for *LWE* problem. So if adversary \mathcal{A} can compute private key of the delegator D in our *PRE* scheme then one can construct challenger \mathcal{B} which solves LWE.

$Adv_{B, LWE_{q,\chi}}(n) = Adv_{\mathcal{A}, A}(n)$. Hence our scheme is secure under *master secret security*.

5 Conclusion

We have shown that Aono et al's [4] scheme is not secure under *master secret security*. We have also shown that our scheme is not only semantically secure but also secure under *master secret security* model. Lattice based *PRE* in identity based setting is an open problem.

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