Abstract : For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and information flow security strategies, this work discovers and proves universal insights about security invariants. This enables secure and convenient auto-completion of host attribute configurations. We demonstrate our results in a civil aviation scenario. All results are machine-verified with the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01398013 Contributor : Hal IfipConnect in order to contact the contributor Submitted on : Wednesday, November 16, 2016 - 3:36:13 PM Last modification on : Thursday, January 6, 2022 - 11:38:04 AM Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, March 16, 2017 - 4:47:57 PM
Cornelius Diekmann, Stephan-A. Posselt, Heiko Niedermayer, Holger Kinkelin, Oliver Hanka, et al.. Verifying Security Policies Using Host Attributes. 34th Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems (FORTE), Jun 2014, Berlin, Germany. pp.133-148, ⟨10.1007/978-3-662-43613-4_9⟩. ⟨hal-01398013⟩