Abstract : For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and information flow security strategies, this work discovers and proves universal insights about security invariants. This enables secure and convenient auto-completion of host attribute configurations. We demonstrate our results in a civil aviation scenario. All results are machine-verified with the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Erika Ábrahám; Catuscia Palamidessi. 34th Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems (FORTE), Jun 2014, Berlin, Germany. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-8461, pp.133-148, 2014, Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-43613-4_9〉
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01398013
Contributeur : Hal Ifip
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Soumis le : mercredi 16 novembre 2016 - 15:36:13
Dernière modification le : mercredi 16 novembre 2016 - 16:23:24
Document(s) archivé(s) le : jeudi 16 mars 2017 - 16:47:57
Cornelius Diekmann, Stephan-A. Posselt, Heiko Niedermayer, Holger Kinkelin, Oliver Hanka, et al.. Verifying Security Policies Using Host Attributes. Erika Ábrahám; Catuscia Palamidessi. 34th Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems (FORTE), Jun 2014, Berlin, Germany. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-8461, pp.133-148, 2014, Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems. 〈10.1007/978-3-662-43613-4_9〉. 〈hal-01398013〉
