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On communication models when verifying equivalence properties

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Abstract. Symbolic models for security protocol verification, following the seminal ideas of Dolev and Yao, come in many flavors, even though they share the same ideas. A common assumption is that the attacker has complete control over the network: he can therefore intercept any message. Depending on the precise model this may be reflected either by the fact that any protocol output is directly routed to the adversary, or communications may be among any two participants, including the attacker — the scheduling between which exact parties the communication happens is left to the attacker. These two models may seem equivalent at first glance and, depending on the verification tools, either one or the other semantics is implemented. We show that, unsurprisingly, they indeed coincide for reachability properties. However, when we consider indistinguishability properties, we prove that these two semantics are incomparable. We also introduce a new semantics, where internal communications are allowed but messages are always eavesdropped by the attacker. We show that this new semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations. We also identify two subclasses of protocols for which the three semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented verification of trace equivalence for each of these semantics in the APTE tool and compare their performances on several classical examples.

1 Introduction

Automated, symbolic analysis of security protocols, based on the seminal ideas of Dolev and Yao, comes in many variants. All of these models however share a few fundamental ideas:

- messages are represented as abstract terms,
- adversaries are computationally unbounded, but may manipulate messages only according to pre-defined rules (this is sometimes referred to as the perfect cryptography assumption), and
- the adversary completely controls the network.

In this paper we will revisit this last assumption. Looking more precisely at different models we observe that this assumption may actually slightly differ among the models. The fact that the adversary controls the network is supposed to represent a *worst case* assumption.

In some models this assumption translates to the fact that every protocol output is sent to the adversary, and every protocol input is provided by the adversary. This is the

case in the original Dolev Yao model and also in the models underlying several tools, such as AVISPA [6], Scyther [12], Tamarin [19], Millen and Shmatikov’s constraint solver [16], and the model used in Paulson’s inductive approach [17].

Some other models, such as those based on process algebras, e.g. work based on CSP [18], the Spi [3] and applied pi calculus [1], but also the strand space model [20], consider a slightly different communication model: any two agents may communicate. Scheduling whether communication happens among two honest participants, or a honest participant and the attacker is under the attacker’s control.

When considering *reachability properties*, these two communication models indeed coincide: intuitively, any internal communication could go through the adversary who acts as a relay and increases his knowledge by the transmitted message. However, when considering *indistinguishability properties*, typically modelled as process equivalences, these communication models diverge. Interestingly, when forbidding internal communication, i.e., forcing all communication to be relayed by the attacker, we may weaken the attacker’s distinguishing power.

In many recent work privacy properties have been modelled using process equivalences, see for instance [13, 5, 14]. The number of tools able to verify such properties is also increasing [8, 21, 10, 9]. We have noted that for instance the AKISS tool [9] does not allow any direct communication on public channels, while the APTE tool [10] allows the user to choose among the two semantics. One motivation for disallowing direct communication is that it allows for more efficient verification (as less actions need to be considered and the number of interleavings to be considered is smaller).

Our contributions. We have formalised three semantics in the applied pi calculus which differ by the way communication is handled:

- the *classical* semantics (as in the original applied pi calculus) allows both internal communication among honest participants and communication with the adversary;
- a *private* semantics allows internal communication only on private channels while all communication on public channels is routed through the adversary;
- an *eavesdropping* semantics which allows internal communication, but as a side-effect adds the transmitted message to the adversary’s knowledge.

For each of the new semantics we define may-testing and observational equivalences. We also define corresponding labelled semantics and trace equivalence and bisimulation relations (which may serve as proof techniques).

We show that, as expected, the three semantics coincide for reachability properties. For equivalence properties we show that the classical and private semantics yield incomparable equivalences, while the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations than both other semantics. The results are summarized in Figure 7.

An interesting question is whether these semantics coincide for specific subclasses of processes. We first note that the processes that witness the differences in the semantics do not use replication, private channels, nor terms other than names, and no equational theory. Moreover, all except one of these examples only use trivial *else* branches (of the form *else 0*); the use of a non-trivial *else* branch can however be avoided by allowing a single free symbol.

However conditions on the channel names may yield such a subclass. We first observe that the class of *simple processes* [11], for which already observational, testing, trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation coincide, do have this property. Simple processes may however be too restrictive for modelling some protocols that should guarantee anonymity (as no parallel processes may share channel names). We therefore identify a syntactic class of processes, that we call *I/O-unambiguous*. For this class we forbid communication on private channels, communication of channel names and an output may not be sequentially followed by an input on the same channel directly, or with only conditionals in between. Note that I/O-unambiguous processes do however allow outputs and inputs on the same channel in parallel. We show that for this class the eavesdropping semantics (which is the most strict relation) coincides with the private one (which is the most efficient for verification).

Finally, we have extended the APTE tool to support verification of trace equivalence for the three semantics. Verifying existing protocols in the APTE example repository we verified that the results, fortunately, coincided for each of the semantics. We also made slight changes to the encodings, renaming some channels, to make them I/O-unambiguous. Interestingly, using different channels, significantly increased the performance of the tool. Finally, we also observed that, as expected, the private semantics yields more efficient verification. The results of our experiments are summarized in Figure 8.

Outline. In Section 2 we define the three semantics we consider. In Section 3 we present our main results on comparing these semantics. We present subclasses for which (some) semantics coincide in Section 4 and compare the performances when verifying protocols for different semantics using APTE in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6.

2 Model

The *applied pi calculus* [1] is a variant of the pi calculus that is specialised for modelling cryptographic protocols. Participants in a protocol are modelled as processes and the communication between them is modelled by message passing on channels. In this section, we describe the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus as well as the two new variants that we study in this paper.

2.1 Syntax

We consider an infinite set \mathcal{N} of names of *base type* and an infinite set \mathcal{Ch} of names of *channel type*. We also consider an infinite set of variables \mathcal{X} of base type and channel type and a signature \mathcal{F} consisting of a finite set of *function symbols*. We rely on a sort system for terms. In particular, the sort base type differs from the sort channel type. Moreover, any function symbol can only be applied and returns base type terms. We define *terms* as names, variables and function symbols applied to other terms. Given $N \subseteq \mathcal{N}$, $X \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ and $F \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, we denote by $\mathcal{T}(F, X, N)$ the sets of terms built from X and N by applying function symbols from F . We denote $fv(t)$ the sets of variables occurring in t . We say that t is *ground* if $fv(t) = \emptyset$. We describe the behaviour of

cryptographic primitives by the means of an *equational theory* E that is a relation on terms closed under substitutions of terms for variables and closed under one-to-one renaming. Given two terms u and v , we write $u =_E v$ when u and v are equal modulo the equational theory.

In the original syntax of the applied pi calculus, there is no distinction between an output (resp. input) from a protocol participant and from the environment, also called the attacker. In this paper however, we will make this distinction in order to concisely present our new variants of the semantics. Therefore, we consider two *process tags* ho and at that respectively represent honest and attacker actions. The syntax of *plain processes* and *extended processes* is given in Figure 1.

$P, Q := 0$	plain processes	$A, B := P$	extended processes
	$P \mid Q$		$A \mid B$
	$!P$		$\nu n.A$
	$\nu n.P$		$\nu x.A$
	if $u = v$ then P else Q		$\{^u/x\}$
	$\text{in}^\theta(c, x).P$		ωc
	$\text{out}^\theta(c, u).P$		
	$\text{eav}(c, x).P$		

where u and v are base type terms, n is a name, x is a variable and c is a name or variable of channel type, θ is a tag, *i.e.* $\theta \in \{ho, at\}$.

Fig. 1. Syntax of processes

The process $\text{out}^\theta(c, u)$ represents the output by θ of the message u on the channel c . The process $\text{in}^\theta(c, x)$ represents an input by θ on the channel c . The input message will instantiate the variable x . The process $\text{eav}(c, x)$ models the capability of the attacker to eavesdrop a communication on channel c . The process $!P$ represents the replication of the process P , *i.e.* unbounded number of copies of P . The process $P \mid Q$ represents the parallel composition of P and Q . The process $\nu n.P$ (resp. $\nu x.A$) is the restriction of the name n in P (resp. variable x in A). The process if $u = v$ then P else Q is the conditional branching under the equality test $u = v$. The process ωc records that a private channel c has been opened, *i.e.*, it has been sent on a public or previously opened channel. Finally, the substitution $\{^u/x\}$ is an active substitution that replaces the variable x with the term u of base type.

We say that a process P (resp. extended process A) is an *honest process* (resp. *honest extended process*) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with ho and when P (resp. A) does not contain eavesdropping processes and ωc . We say that a process P (resp. extended process A) is an *attacker process* (resp. *attacker extended process*) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with at .

As usual, names and variables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions, inputs and eavesdrops. We denote $fv(A)$, $bv(A)$, $fn(A)$, $bn(A)$ the sets of free variables, bound variables, free names and bound names respectively in A . Moreover, we denote by $oc(A)$ the sets of terms c of channel type opened in A , *i.e.* that occurs in a process ωc . We say that an extended process A is closed when all variables in A are either

bound or defined by an active substitution in A . We define an *evaluation context* $C[_]$ as an extended process with a hole instead of an extended process. As for processes, we define an *attacker evaluation context* as an evaluation context where all outputs and inputs in the context are tagged with a .

Note that our syntax without the eavesdropping process, opened channels and tags correspond exactly to the syntax of the original applied pi calculus.

Lastly, we consider the notion of *frame* that are extended processes built from 0 , parallel composition, name and variable restrictions and active substitution. Given a frame φ , we consider the domain of φ , denoted $dom(\varphi)$, as the set of free variables in φ that are defined by an active substitution in φ . Given an extended process A , we define the frame of A , denoted $\phi(A)$, as the process A where we replace all plain processes by 0 . Finally, we write $dom(A)$ as syntactic sugar for $dom(\phi(A))$.

2.2 Operational semantics

In this section, we define the three semantics that we study in this paper, namely:

- the *classical semantics* from the applied pi calculus, where internal communication can occur on both public and private channels;
- the *private semantics* where internal communication can only occur on private channels; and
- the *eavesdropping semantics* where the attacker is able to eavesdrop on a public channel.

We first define the *structural equivalence* between extended processes, denoted \equiv , as the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under renaming of names and variables, closed by application of evaluation contexts, that is associative and commutative w.r.t. $|$, and such that:

$$\begin{array}{l}
A \equiv A \mid 0 \qquad !P \equiv !P \mid P \qquad \nu n.0 \equiv 0 \\
\nu i.\nu j.A \equiv \nu j.\nu i.A \qquad \nu x.\{u/x\} \equiv 0 \qquad \{u/x\} \mid A \equiv \{u/x\} \mid A\{u/x\} \\
A \mid \nu i.B \equiv \nu i.(A \mid B) \quad \text{when } i \notin fv(A) \cup fn(A) \qquad \omega c \equiv \omega c \mid \omega c \\
\{u/x\} \equiv \{v/x\} \qquad \text{when } u =_{\text{E}} v
\end{array}$$

The three operational semantics of extended processes are defined by the structural equivalence and by three respective *internal reductions*, denoted \rightarrow_c , \rightarrow_p and \rightarrow_e . These three reductions are the smallest relations on extended processes that are closed

under application of evaluation context, structural equivalence and such that:

$\begin{array}{l} \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \xrightarrow{\tau}_s P \\ \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \xrightarrow{\tau}_s Q \end{array}$	where $u =_{\text{E}} v$ and $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{p}, \text{e}\}$ where u, v ground, $u \neq_{\text{E}} v$ and $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{p}, \text{e}\}$	THEN ELSE
$\text{out}^\theta(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\theta'}(c, x).Q \xrightarrow{\tau}_c P \mid Q\{u/x\}$		COMM
$\nu c.(\text{out}^\theta(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\theta'}(c, x).Q \mid R) \xrightarrow{\tau}_s \nu c.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R)$	where $c \notin \text{oc}(R)$ and $s \in \{\text{p}, \text{e}\}$	C-PRIV
$\text{out}^\theta(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\theta'}(c, x).Q \xrightarrow{\tau}_s P \mid Q\{u/x\}$	at $\in \{\theta, \theta'\}$, u is of base type and $s \in \{\text{p}, \text{e}\}$	C-ENV
$\text{out}^\theta(c, d).P \mid \text{in}^{\theta'}(c, x).Q \xrightarrow{\tau}_s P \mid Q\{d/x\} \mid \omega d$	at $\in \{\theta, \theta'\}$, d is of channel type and $s \in \{\text{p}, \text{e}\}$	C-OPEN
$\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid \text{eav}(c, y).R \xrightarrow{\tau}_e P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R\{u/y\}$	where u is of base type	C-EAV
$\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid \text{eav}(c, y).R \xrightarrow{\tau}_e P \mid Q\{d/x\} \mid R\{d/y\} \mid \omega d$	where d is of channel type	C-OEAV

We emphasise that the application of the rule is closed under application of arbitrary evaluation contexts. In particular the context may restrict channels, *e.g.* the rule C-OPEN may be used under the context $\nu c.$ resulting in a private channel c , but with the attacker input/output being in the scope of this restriction. It follows from the definition of evaluation contexts that the resulting processes are always well defined. We denote by \Rightarrow_s the reflexive, transitive closure of $\xrightarrow{\tau}_s$ for $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{p}, \text{e}\}$. We note that the classical semantics $\xrightarrow{\tau}_c$ is independent of the tags θ, θ' , the eavesdrop actions and the ωc processes.

Example 1. Consider the process

$$A = (\nu d. \text{out}^\theta(c, d). \text{in}^\theta(d, x).P) \mid (\text{in}^{\theta'}(c, y). \text{out}^{\theta'}(y, t).Q)$$

where d is a channel name and t a term of base type. Suppose $\theta = \theta' = \text{ho}$ then we have that communication is only possible in the classical semantics (using twice the COMM rule):

$$\begin{aligned} A &\xrightarrow{\tau}_c \nu d. (\text{in}^\theta(d, x).P \mid \text{out}^{\theta'}(d, t).Q\{d/y\}) \\ &\xrightarrow{\tau}_c \nu d. (P\{t/x\} \mid Q\{d/y\}) \end{aligned}$$

while no transitions are available in the two other semantics. To enable communication in the eavesdropping semantics we need to explicitly add eavesdrop actions. Applying the rules C-OEAV and C-EAV we have that

$$\begin{aligned} A \mid \text{eav}(c, z_1). \text{eav}(z_1, z_2).R &\xrightarrow{\tau}_e \nu d. (\text{in}^\theta(d, x).P \mid \text{out}^{\theta'}(d, t).Q\{d/y\} \\ &\quad \mid \text{eav}(d, z_2).R\{d/z_1\} \mid \omega d) \\ &\xrightarrow{\tau}_e \nu d. (P\{t/x\} \mid Q\{d/y\} \mid R\{d/z_1\}\{t/z_2\} \mid \omega d) \end{aligned}$$

We note that the first transition adds the information ωd to indicate that d is now available to the environment.

Finally, if we consider that $at \in \theta, \theta'$ then internal communication on a public channel is possible and, using rules C-OPEN and C-ENV we obtain for $s \in \{p, e\}$ that

$$\begin{aligned} A &\xrightarrow{\tau}_s \nu d.(\text{in}^\theta(d, x).P \mid \text{out}^{\theta'}(d, t).Q\{d/y\} \mid \omega d) \\ &\xrightarrow{\tau}_s \nu d.(P\{t/x\} \mid Q\{d/y\} \mid \omega d) \end{aligned}$$

2.3 Reachability and behavioural equivalences

We are going to compare the relation between the three semantics for the two general kind of security properties, namely *reachability properties* encoding security properties such as secrecy, authentication, and *equivalence properties* encoding anonymity, unlinkability, strong secrecy, receipt freeness, Intuitively, reachability properties encode that a process cannot reach some bad state. Equivalences define the fact that no attacker can distinguish two processes. This was originally defined by the (*may*)-testing equivalence [3] in the spi-calculus. An alternate equivalence, which was considered in the applied pi calculus [1], is observational equivalence.

Reachability properties can simply be encoded by verifying the capability of a process to perform an output on a given channel. We define $A \Downarrow_c^{s, \theta}$ to hold when $A \Rightarrow_s C[\text{out}^\theta(c, t).P]$ for some evaluation context C that does not bind c , some term t and some plain process P , and $A \Downarrow_c^s$ to hold when $A \Downarrow_c^{s, \theta}$ for some $\theta \in \{at, ho\}$. For example the secrecy of s in the process $\nu s.A$ can be encoded by checking whether for all attacker plain process I , we have that

$$I \mid \nu s.(A \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{if } x = s \text{ then } \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(\text{bad}, s)) \not\Downarrow_{\text{bad}}^{s, \text{ho}}$$

where $\text{bad} \notin \text{fn}(A)$.

Authentication properties are generally expressed as correspondence properties between events annotating processes, see e.g. [7]. A correspondence property between two events begin and end , denoted $\text{begin} \Leftarrow \text{end}$, requires that the event end is preceded by the event begin on every trace. A possible encoding of this correspondence property consists in first replacing all instances of the events in A by outputs $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(ev, \text{begin})$ and $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(ev, \text{end})$ where $ev \notin \text{fn}(A) \cup \text{bn}(A)$. This new process A' can then be put in parallel with a cell $Cell$ that reads on the channel ev and stores any new value unless the value is end and the current stored value in the cell is not begin . In such a case, the cell will output on the channel bad . The correspondence property can therefore be encoded by checking whether for all attacker plain process I , we have that $I \mid \nu ev.(A' \mid Cell) \not\Downarrow_{\text{bad}}^{s, \text{ho}}$.

We say that an attacker evaluation context $C[_]$ is c -closing for an extended process A if $\text{fv}(C[A]) = \emptyset$. For $s \in \{p, e\}$, we say that $C[_]$ is s -closing for A if it is c -closing for A , variables and names are bound only once in $C[_]$ and for all channels $c \in \text{bn}(C[_]) \cap \text{fn}(A)$, if the scope of c includes $_$ then the scope of c also includes ωc .

We next introduce the two main notions of behavioural equivalences: may testing and observational equivalence.

Definition 1 ((May-)Testing equivalences $\approx_m^c, \approx_m^p, \approx_m^e$). Let $s \in \{c, p, e\}$. Let A and B two closed honest extended processes such that $\text{dom}(A) = \text{dom}(B)$. We say that $A \approx_m^s B$ if for all attacker evaluation contexts $C[\cdot]$ s -closing for A and B , for all channels c , we have that $C[A] \Downarrow_c^s$ if and only if $C[B] \Downarrow_c^s$.

Definition 2 (Observational equivalences $\approx_o^c, \approx_o^p, \approx_o^e$). Let $s \in \{c, p, e\}$. Let A and B two closed extended processes such that $\text{dom}(A) = \text{dom}(B)$. We say that $A \approx_m^s B$ if \approx_m^s is the largest equivalence relation such that:

- $A \Downarrow_c^s$ implies $B \Downarrow_c^s$;
- $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_s A'$ implies $B \xrightarrow{\epsilon}_s B'$ and $A' \approx_m^s B'$ for some B' ;
- $C[A] \approx_m^s C[B]$ for all attacker evaluation contexts $C[\cdot]$ s -closing for A and B .

For each of the semantics we have the usual relation between these two notions: observational equivalence implies testing equivalence.

Proposition 1. $\approx_o^s \subsetneq \approx_m^s$ for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$.

Example 2. Consider processes A and B of Figure 2. Process A computes a value $h^n(a)$ to be output on channel c , where $h^n(a)$ denotes n applications of h and $h^0(a) = a$. The value is initially a and A may choose to either output the current value, or update the current value by applying the free symbol h . B may choose non-deterministically to either behave as A or output the fresh name s . (The non-deterministic choice is encoded by a communication on the private channel e which may be received by either the process behaving as A or the process outputting s .)

We have that $A \not\approx_o^s B$. The two processes can indeed be distinguished by the context

$$C[\cdot] \hat{=} - \mid \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c_a, a) \mid !(\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c_a, x).\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c_a, h(x)) \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c_a, y).\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, z).\text{if } y = z \text{ then } \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c_t, h(x)))$$

Intuitively, when B outputs s the attacker context $C[\cdot]$ can iterate the application of h the same number of times as would have done process A . Comparing the value computed by the adversary ($h^n(a)$) and the honestly computed value (either $h^n(a)$ or s) the adversary distinguishes the two processes by outputting on the test channel c_t .

However, we have that $A \approx_m^s B$. Indeed, for any s -closing context $D[\cdot]$ and all public channel ch we have that $D[A] \Downarrow_{ch}^s$ if and only if $D[B] \Downarrow_{ch}^s$. In particular for context $C[\cdot]$ defined above we have that both $C[A] \Downarrow_{ch}^s$ and $C[B] \Downarrow_{ch}^s$ for $ch \in \{c_a, c_t, c\}$. Unlike observational equivalence, may testing does not require to “mimick” the other process stepwise and we cannot force a process into a particular branch.

$$\begin{aligned} A &\hat{=} \nu d.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid !\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, h(x)) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, y).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(e, y) \\ B &\hat{=} \nu e.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(e, a) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(e, z).A \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(e, z).\nu s.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s) \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 2. Processes A and B such that $A \approx_m^s B$, but $A \not\approx_o^s B$ and $A \not\approx_t^s B$ for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$.

2.4 Labelled semantics

The internal reduction semantics introduced in the previous section requires to reason about arbitrary contexts. Similar to the original applied pi calculus, we extend the three operational semantics by a *labelled operational semantics* which allows processes to directly interact with the (adversarial) environment: we define the relation $\xrightarrow{\ell}_c$, $\xrightarrow{\ell}_p$ and $\xrightarrow{\ell}_e$ where ℓ is part of the alphabet $\mathcal{A} = \{\tau, out(c, d), eav(c, d), in(c, w), \nu k.out(c, k), \nu k.eav(c, k) \mid c, d \in Ch, k \in \mathcal{X} \cup Ch \text{ and } w \text{ is a term of any sort}\}$. The labelled rules are given in Figure 3.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{IN} \quad \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P \xrightarrow{in(c,t)}_s P\{t/y\} \\
\text{OUT-CH} \quad \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).P \xrightarrow{out(c,d)}_s P \\
\text{OPEN-CH} \quad \frac{A \xrightarrow{out(c,d)}_s A' \quad d \neq c}{\nu d.A \xrightarrow{\nu d.out(c,d)}_s A'} \\
\text{EAV-OCH} \quad \frac{A \xrightarrow{eav(c,d)}_e A' \quad d \neq c}{\nu d.A \xrightarrow{\nu d.eav(c,d)}_e A'} \\
\text{EAV-CH} \quad \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \xrightarrow{eav(c,d)}_e P \mid Q\{d/x\} \\
\text{EAV-T} \quad \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \xrightarrow{\nu y.eav(c,y)}_e P \mid Q\{t/x\} \mid \{t/y\} \\
\text{OUT-T} \quad \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t).P \xrightarrow{\nu x.out(c,x)}_s P \mid \{t/x\} \\
\hspace{15em} x \notin fv(P) \cup fv(t)
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{l}
\text{SCOPE} \quad \frac{A \xrightarrow{\ell}_s A' \quad u \text{ does not occur in } \ell}{\nu u.A \xrightarrow{\ell}_s \nu u.A'} \\
\text{PAR} \quad \frac{bn(\ell) \cap fn(B) = \emptyset \quad A \xrightarrow{\ell}_s A' \quad bv(\ell) \cap fv(B) = \emptyset}{A \mid B \xrightarrow{\ell}_s A' \mid B} \\
\text{STRUCT} \quad \frac{A \equiv B \quad B \xrightarrow{\ell}_s B' \quad B' \equiv A'}{A \xrightarrow{\ell}_s A'}
\end{array}$$

where $s \in \{c, p, e\}$.

Fig. 3. Labelled semantics

Consider our alphabet of actions \mathcal{A} defined above. Given $w \in \mathcal{A}^*$, $s \in \{c, p, e\}$ and an extended process A , we say that $A \xrightarrow{w}_s A_n$ when $A \xrightarrow{\ell_1}_s A_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_2}_s A_2 \xrightarrow{\ell_3}_s \dots \xrightarrow{\ell_n}_s A_n$ for some extended processes A_1, \dots, A_n and $w = \ell_1 \cdot \dots \cdot \ell_n$. By convention, we say that $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon}_s A$ where ϵ is the empty word. Given $\text{tr} \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$, we say that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$ when there exists $w \in \mathcal{A}^*$ such that tr is the word w where we remove all τ actions and $A \xrightarrow{w}_s A'$.

Example 3. Coming back to Example 1, we saw that $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_c \xrightarrow{\tau}_c \nu d.(P\{t/x\} \mid Q\{d/y\})$ and no τ -actions in the other two semantics were available. Instead of explicitly adding eavesdrop actions, we can apply the rules EAV-OCH and EAV-T and obtain that

$$\frac{A \xrightarrow{\nu d.eav(c,d)}_e \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, x).P \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, t).Q\{d/y\}}{\nu z.eav(d,z) \xrightarrow{\nu z.eav(d,z)}_e P\{t/x\} \mid Q\{d/y\} \mid \{t/z\}}$$

We can now define both reachability and different equivalence properties in terms of these labelled semantics and relate them to the internal reduction. To define reachability properties in the labelled semantics, we define $A \Downarrow_c^s$ to hold when $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}} A'$, $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1 \text{out}(c, t) \text{tr}_2$ and tr_1 does not bind c for some $\text{tr}, \text{tr}_1, \text{tr}_2 \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$, term t and extended process A' .

The following proposition states that any reachability property modelled in terms of $A \Downarrow_c^{s, \theta}$ and universal quantification over processes, can also be expressed using $A \Downarrow_c^s$ without the need to quantify over processes.

Proposition 2. *For all closed honest plain processes A , for all $s \in \{c, e, p\}$, $A \Downarrow_c^s$ iff there exists an attacker plain process I^s such that $I^s \mid A \Downarrow_c^{s, \text{ho}}$.*

Next, we define equivalence relations using our labelled semantics that may serve as proof techniques for the may testing relation. First we need to define an indistinguishability relation on frames, called static equivalence.

Definition 3 (Static equivalence \sim). *Two terms u and v are equal in the frame ϕ , written $(u =_{\text{E}} v)\phi$, if there exists \tilde{n} and a substitution σ such that $\phi \equiv \nu \tilde{n}. \sigma$, $\tilde{n} \cap (\text{fn}(u) \cup \text{fn}(v)) = \emptyset$, and $u\sigma =_{\text{E}} v\sigma$.*

Two closed frames ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 are statically equivalent, written $\phi_1 \sim \phi_2$, when:

- $\text{dom}(\phi_1) = \text{dom}(\phi_2)$, and
- for all terms u, v we have that: $(u =_{\text{E}} v)\phi_1$ if and only if $(u =_{\text{E}} v)\phi_2$.

Example 4. Consider the equational theory generated by the equation $\text{dec}(\text{enc}(x, y), y) = x$. Then we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \nu k. \{ \text{enc}(a, k) / x_1 \} &\sim \nu k. \{ \text{enc}(b, k) / x_1 \} \\ \nu k. \{ \text{enc}(a, k) / x_1, k / x_2 \} &\not\sim \nu k. \{ \text{enc}(b, k) / x_1, k / x_2 \} \\ \nu k, a. \{ \text{enc}(a, k) / x_1, k / x_2 \} &\sim \nu k, b. \{ \text{enc}(b, k) / x_1, k / x_2 \} \end{aligned}$$

Intuitively, the first equivalence confirms that encryption hides the plaintext when the decryption key is unknown. The second equivalence does not hold as the test $(\text{dec}(x_1, x_2) =_{\text{E}} a)$ holds on the left hand side, but not on the right hand side. Finally, the third equivalence again holds as two restricted names are indistinguishable.

Now we are ready to define two classical equivalences on processes, based on the labelled semantics: trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation.

Definition 4 (Trace equivalences $\approx_t^c, \approx_t^p, \approx_t^e$). *Let $s \in \{c, p, e\}$. Let A and B be two closed honest extended processes. We say that $A \sqsubseteq_t^s B$ if for all $A' \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$ such that $\text{bn}(\text{tr}) \cap \text{fn}(B) = \emptyset$, there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B'$ and $\phi(A') \sim \phi(B')$. We say that $A \approx_t^s B$ when $A \sqsubseteq_t^s B$ and $B \sqsubseteq_t^s A$.*

Definition 5 (Labeled bisimulations $\approx_\ell^c, \approx_\ell^p, \approx_\ell^e$). *Let $s \in \{c, p, e\}$. Let A and B two closed honest extended processes such that $\text{dom}(A) = \text{dom}(B)$. We say that $A \approx_\ell^s B$ if \approx_ℓ^s is the largest equivalence relation such that:*

- $\phi(A) \sim \phi(B)$

- $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_s A'$ implies $B \xrightarrow{\epsilon}_s B'$ and $A' \approx_\ell^s B'$ for some B' ,
- $A \xrightarrow{\ell}_s A'$ and $\text{bn}(\ell) \cap \text{fn}(B) = \emptyset$ implies $B \xrightarrow{\ell}_s B'$ and $A' \approx_\ell^s B'$ for some B' .

We again have, as usual that labelled bisimulation implies trace equivalence.

Proposition 3. $\approx_\ell^s \subsetneq \approx_t^s$ for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$.

In [1] it is shown that $\approx_o^c = \approx_\ell^c$. We conjecture that for the new semantics p and e this same equivalence holds as well. Re-showing these results is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will mainly focus on testing/trace equivalence. As shown in [11], for the classical semantics trace equivalence implies may testing, while the converse does not hold in general. The two relations do however coincide on image-finite processes.

Definition 6. Let A be a closed extended process. A is image-finite for the semantics $s \in \{c, e, p\}$ if for each trace tr the set of equivalence classes $\{\phi(B) \mid A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B\} / \sim$ is finite.

Note that any replication-free process is necessarily image-finite as there are only a finite number of possible traces for any given sequence of labels tr . The same relations among trace equivalence and may testing shown for the classical semantics hold also for the other semantics.

Theorem 1. $\approx_t^s \subsetneq \approx_m^s$ and $\approx_t^s = \approx_m^s$ on image-finite processes for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$.

The proof of this result (for the classical semantics) is given in [11] and is easily adapted to the other semantics. To see that the implication is strict, we continue Example 2 on processes A and B defined in Figure 2. We already noted that $A \approx_m^s B$, but will now show that $A \not\approx_t^s B$ (for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$). All possible traces of A are of the form $A \xrightarrow{\nu x.\text{out}(c,x)}_s A'$ where $\phi(A') = \{h^n(a)/x\}$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We easily see that $A \not\approx_t^s B$ as for any n we have that $\{h^n(a)/x\} \not\sim \{s/x\}$, by testing $x = h^n(a)$. On the other hand, given an image-finite process, we can only have a finite number of different frames for a given trace, and therefore we can bound the context size that is necessary for distinguishing the processes.

3 Comparing the different semantics

In this section we state our results on comparing these semantics. We first show that, as expected, all the semantics coincide for reachability properties.

Theorem 2. For all ground, closed honest extended processes A , for all channels d , we have that $A \Downarrow_d^p$ iff $A \Downarrow_d^c$ iff $A \Downarrow_d^e$.

The next result is, in our opinion, more surprising. As the private semantics force the adversary to observe all information, one might expect that his distinguishing power increases over the classical one. This intuition is however wrong: the classical and private trace equivalences, testing equivalence and labelled bisimulations appear to be incomparable.

$$\begin{aligned}
A &\hat{=} \nu s_1.\nu s_2.((\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1).\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1(x)) \mid (\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P_2(y))) \\
B &\hat{=} \nu s_1.\nu s_2.((\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1).\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2(x)) \mid (\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P_1(y)))
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
P_1(x) &\hat{=} (\text{if } x = s_1 \text{ then } \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, s_2)) \mid (\text{if } x = s_2 \text{ then } \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(e, x)) \\
P_2(x) &\hat{=} (\text{if } x = s_1 \text{ then } \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, s_2))
\end{aligned}$$

To emit on channel e , processes A and B must execute $P_2(s_1)$ followed by $P_1(s_2)$. In the classical semantics, a trace of A emitting on e through an internal communication between $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1)$ and $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y)$ forces B to execute $P_1(s_1)$ thus preventing it to emit on e .

Fig. 4. Processes A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^p B$ and $A \not\approx_m^c B$.

Theorem 3. $\approx_r^p \not\subseteq \approx_r^c$ and $\approx_r^c \not\subseteq \approx_r^p$ for $r \in \{\ell, t, m\}$.

Proof. We first show that there exist A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^p B$, but $A \not\approx_m^c B$. Note that, as $\approx_\ell^s \subseteq \approx_t^s \subseteq \approx_m^s$ for $s \in \{c, p\}$ these processes demonstrate both that $\approx_\ell^p \not\subseteq \approx_\ell^c$, $\approx_t^p \not\subseteq \approx_t^c$ and $\approx_m^p \not\subseteq \approx_m^c$.

Consider processes A and B defined in Figure 4. In short, the result follows from the fact that if A performs an internal communication on channel c followed by an output on d (from P_1), B has no choice other than performing the output on d in P_2 . In the private semantics, however, the internal communication will be split in an output followed by an input: after the output on c , the input $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2(x)$ following the output becomes available. More precisely, to see that $A \approx_\ell^p B$ we first observe that if $A \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c, z)}_p A'$ then $B \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c, z)}_p B'$ and $A' \equiv B'$, and vice-versa. If $A \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_p A'$ then $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_p B'$. As $t \notin \{s_1, s_2\}$ we have that $P_1(t) \approx_\ell^p 0 \approx_\ell^p P_2(t)$. Finally, if $t \neq s_2$ we also have that $P_1(t) \approx_\ell^p P_2(t)$ as in particular $P_1(s_1) \approx_\ell^p P_2(s_1)$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\nu s_1.\nu s_2.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1).\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1(x)) \\
&\quad \approx_\ell^p \\
&\nu s_1.\nu s_2.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1).\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2(x))
\end{aligned}$$

which allows us to conclude.

As A and B are image-finite, we have that $A \approx_m^c B$ if and only if $A \approx_t^c B$. To see that $A \not\approx_t^c B$ we observe that A may perform the following transition sequence, starting with an internal communication on a public channel:

$$\begin{aligned}
&A \xrightarrow{\tau}_c \nu s_1.\nu s_2.((\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1(x)) \mid (P_2(s_1))) \\
&\xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(d, z)}_c \nu s_1.\nu s_2.((\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1(x)) \mid \{s_2/z\}) \\
&\xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, z)}_c \nu s_1.\nu s_2.(P_1(s_2) \mid \{s_2/z\})
\end{aligned}$$

In order to mimic the behaviour of A , B must perform the same sequence of observable transitions:

$$B \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(d, z) \text{ in}(c, z)}_c \nu s_1.\nu s_2.(P_2(s_2) \mid \{s_2/z\})$$

We conclude as $\nu s_1.\nu s_2.(P_1(s_2) \mid \{s_2/z\}) \xrightarrow{\nu z'.\text{out}(e, z')} \nu s_1.\nu s_2.(\{s_2/z\} \mid \{s_2/z'\})$, but $\nu s_1.\nu s_2.(P_2(s_2) \mid \{s_2/z\}) \not\xrightarrow{\nu z'.\text{out}(e, z')}$. This trace inequivalence has also been shown using APTE.

$$\begin{aligned}
A &\triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y)) \\
B &\triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y)))
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$P(y) \triangleq \text{if } y = s \text{ then } \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, z).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \text{ else } \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a)$$

In the private semantics, a trace of A starting with the execution of $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y)$ can only be matched on B by executing $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x)$. B could then emit on channel c , which is not the case for A , hence yielding non equivalence. In the classic semantics, an internal communication between $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s)$ and $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y)$ allows to *hide* the fact that B can emit on c .

Fig. 5. Processes A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \not\approx_m^p B$.

To show that $\approx_r^c \not\subseteq \approx_r^p$ for $r \in \{\ell, t, m\}$ we show that there exist processes A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \not\approx_m^p B$. As in the first part of the proof, note that, as $\approx_\ell^s \subseteq \approx_t^s \subseteq \approx_m^s$ for $s \in \{c, p\}$ these processes demonstrate that $\approx_\ell^c \not\subseteq \approx_\ell^p$, $\approx_t^c \not\subseteq \approx_t^p$ and $\approx_m^c \not\subseteq \approx_m^p$.

Consider the processes A and B defined in Figure 5. The proof crucially relies on the fact that B may perform an internal communication in the classical semantics to mimic A , which becomes visible in the attacker in the private semantics. To see that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ we first observe that the only first possible action from A or B is an input. In particular, given a term t , there is a unique B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} B'$ where $B' = \nu s.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y))$. However, if $A \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} A'$ then either $A' = B'$ or $A' = A''$ with $A'' \triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid P(t))$. Therefore, to complete the proof, we only need to find B'' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} B''$ and $A'' \approx_\ell^c B''$. Such process can be obtain by applying an internal communication on B' , i.e. $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_c B' \xrightarrow{\tau} \nu s.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid P(s))$. Note that $t \neq s$ since s is bound, meaning that $P(t) \approx_\ell^c \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a)$. Moreover, $P(s) \approx_\ell^c \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a)$. This allows us to conclude that $\nu s.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid P(s)) \approx_\ell^c A''$.

Again, as A and B are image-finite may and trace equivalence coincide. To see that $A \not\approx_t^p B$ we first observe that A may perform the following transition sequence:

$$\begin{aligned}
A &\xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_p A'' \xrightarrow{\tau}_p \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a)) \\
&\xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(d, z)}_p \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a) \mid \{a/z\})
\end{aligned}$$

We conclude as $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_p B'$ but $B' \not\xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(d, z)}_p$. This trace disequivalence has also been shown using APTE. \square

One may also note that the counter-example witnessing that equivalences in the private semantics do not imply equivalences in the classical semantics is *minimal*: it does not use function symbols, equational reasoning, private channels, replication nor else branches. The second part of the proof relies on the use of else branches. We can however refine this result in the case of labeled bisimulation to processes without else branches, the counter-example being the same processes A and B described in the proof but where we replace each $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, a)$ by 0 . In the case of trace equivalence, we can also

produce a counter-example without else branches witnessing that trace equivalences in the classical semantics do not imply trace equivalences in the private semantics but provided that we rely on a function symbol h . In the appendix we describe in more details these processes and give the proofs of them being counter-examples.

Next, we show that the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger bisimulations and trace equivalences: the eavesdropping semantics is actually strictly included in the intersection of the classic and private semantics.

Theorem 4. $\approx_\ell^e \subseteq \approx_\ell^p \cap \approx_\ell^c$.

Proof (Sketch).

1. We first show that $\approx_\ell^e \subseteq \approx_\ell^p$. Suppose $A \approx_\ell^e B$ and let \mathcal{R} be the relation witnessing this equivalence. We will show that \mathcal{R} is also a labelled bisimulation in the private semantics. Suppose $A \mathcal{R} B$.
 - as $A \approx_\ell^e B$, we have that $\phi(A) \sim \phi(B)$.
 - if $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_p A'$ then, as $\xrightarrow{\tau}_p \subseteq \xrightarrow{\tau}_e$, $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_e A'$. As $A \approx_\ell^e B$ there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_e B'$ and $A' \mathcal{R} B'$. As B is a honest process no COMM-EAV transition is possible, and hence $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_p B'$.
 - if $A \xrightarrow{\ell}_p A'$ and $bn(\ell) \cap fn(B) = \emptyset$ then we also have that $A \xrightarrow{\ell}_e A'$ (as $\xrightarrow{\ell}_p \subseteq \xrightarrow{\ell}_e$ and there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\ell}_e B'$ and $A' \mathcal{R} B'$. As no COMM-EAV are possible and ℓ is not of the form $eav(c, d)$ nor $\nu y.eav(c, y)$ we have that $B \xrightarrow{\ell}_p B'$.
2. We next show that $A \approx_\ell^e B$ implies $A \approx_\ell^c B$ for any A, B . We will show that \approx_ℓ^e is also a labelled bisimulation in the classical semantics. The proof relies on similar arguments as in Item 2 of the proof of Theorem 5 and the facts that
 - $\nu \tilde{n}.(A' \mid \{t/x\}) \approx_\ell^e \nu \tilde{n}.(B' \mid \{u/x\})$ implies $\nu \tilde{n}.A' \approx_\ell^e \nu \tilde{n}.B'$,
 - $A' \approx_\ell^e B'$ implies $\nu c.A' \approx_\ell^e \nu c.B'$

The first property is needed when an internal communication of a term or public channel is replaced by an eavesdrop action and an input. The second property handles the case when we replace the internal communication of a private channel by an application of the EAV-OCH rule and an input.

3. We now show that the implication $\approx_\ell^e \subseteq \approx_\ell^c \cap \approx_\ell^i$ is strict, i.e., there exist A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$, $A \approx_\ell^p B$ but $A \not\approx_\ell^e B$ (which implies $A \not\approx_\ell^i B$).

Consider the processes A and B defined in Figure 6. This example is a variant of the one given in Figure 4. The difference is the addition of “ $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, z).$ if $z = s_1$ then ” in processes $P_1(x)$ and $P_2(x)$: this additional check is used to verify whether the adversary learned s_1 or not. The proofs that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \approx_\ell^p B$ follow the same lines as in Theorem 3. We just additionally observe that $\nu s_1.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, z).$ if $z = s_1$ then $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(d, s_2)) \approx_\ell^s \nu s_1.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, z).0)$ for $s \in \{c, p\}$.

The trace witnessing that $A \not\approx_\ell^e B$ (which implies $A \not\approx_\ell^i B$) is again similar to the one in Theorem 3, but starting with an eavesdrop transition which allows the attacker to learn s_1 , which in turn allows him to learn s_2 and distinguish $P_1(s_2)$ from $P_2(s_2)$. We have also verified using APTE that $A \not\approx_\ell^e B$ which implies $A \not\approx_\ell^i B$. \square

$$\begin{aligned}
A &\hat{=} \nu s_1. \nu s_2. ((\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1). \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x). P_1(x)) \mid (\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y). P_2(y))) \\
B &\hat{=} \nu s_1. \nu s_2. ((\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1). \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x). P_2(x)) \mid (\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y). P_1(y)))
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
P_1(x) &\hat{=} (\text{if } x = s_1 \text{ then in}^{\text{ho}}(d, z). \text{if } z = s_1 \text{ then out}^{\text{ho}}(d, s_2)) \mid \\
&\quad (\text{if } x = s_2 \text{ then out}^{\text{ho}}(e, x)) \\
P_2(x) &\hat{=} (\text{if } x = s_1 \text{ then in}^{\text{ho}}(d, z). \text{if } z = s_1 \text{ then out}^{\text{ho}}(d, s_2))
\end{aligned}$$

To emit on channel e , processes A and B must execute $P_2(s_1)$ by inputting twice s_1 followed by $P_1(s_2)$. In the classical semantics, an internal communication on A between $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s_1)$ and $\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y)$ forces B to execute $P_1(s_1)$ but *hides* s_1 , preventing a second input of s_1 by A . However, in the eavesdropping semantics, the internal communication *reveals* s_1 allowing A to emit on e but not B .

Fig. 6. Processes A and B such that $A \approx_t^c B$, $A \approx_t^p B$ but $A \not\approx_t^e B$.

Again we note that the implications are strict, even for processes containing only public channels.

Theorem 5. $\approx_t^e \subsetneq \approx_t^p \cap \approx_t^c$.

Proof (Sketch).

1. We first prove that $\approx_t^e \subseteq \approx_t^p$. Suppose that $A \approx_t^e B$. We need to show that for any A' such that $A \xrightarrow{tr}_p A'$ there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_p B'$. It follows from the definition of the semantics that whenever $A \xrightarrow{tr}_p A'$ then we also have $A \xrightarrow{tr}_e A'$ as $\xrightarrow{\ell}_p \subseteq \xrightarrow{\ell}_e$. As $A \approx_t^e B$, we have that there exists B' , such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_e B'$ and $\phi(A') \sim \phi(B')$. As tr does not contain labels of the form $eav(c, d)$ nor $\nu y. eav(c, y)$ and as no COMM-EAV are possible (A and B are honest processes) we also have that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_p B'$. Hence $A \approx_t^p B$.
2. We next prove that $\approx_t^e \subseteq \approx_t^c$. Similar to Item 1 we suppose that $A \approx_t^e B$ and $A \xrightarrow{tr_c}_c A'_c$. From the semantics, we obtain that $A \xrightarrow{tr_e}_e A'_e$, where
 - $\phi(A'_c) \subseteq \phi(A'_e)$, i.e., $\text{dom}(\phi(A'_c)) \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(A'_e))$ and the frames coincide on the common domain.
 - tr_e is constructed from tr by replacing any τ action resulting from the COMM rule by an application of an eavesdrop rule (EAV-T, EAV-CH, or EAV-OCH).
The proof is done by induction on the length of tr and the proof tree of each transition. As $A \approx_t^e B$ we also have that $B \xrightarrow{tr_e}_e B'_e$ and $A'_e \sim B'_e$. We show by the definition of the semantics that $B \xrightarrow{tr_c}_c B'_c$ and $\phi(B'_c) \subseteq \phi(B'_e)$ (replacing each eavesdrop action by an internal communication). Due to the inclusions of the frames and $A'_e \sim B'_e$ we also have that $A'_c \sim B'_c$.
3. To show that the implication $\approx_t^e \subsetneq \approx_t^p \cap \approx_t^c$ is strict, i.e., there exist processes A and B such that $A \approx_t^c B$, $A \approx_t^p B$ but $A \not\approx_t^e B$. The processes defined in Figure 6 witness this fact (cf the discussion of these processes in the proof of Theorem 4). These trace (in)equivalences have also been verified using APTE.

We note from the processes defined in Figure 6 that the implications are strict even for processes that do not communicate on private channels, do not use replication, nor

else branches and terms are simply names (no function symbols nor equational theories).

Theorem 6. $\approx_m^e \subsetneq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$.

Proof (Sketch).

1. We first prove that $\approx_m^e \subseteq \approx_m^p$. Suppose that $A \approx_m^e B$. Suppose that $A \approx_m^e B$. We need to show that for all channel c , for all $C[_]$ attacker evaluation contexts p -closing for A and B , $C[A] \Downarrow_c^p$ is equivalent to $C[B] \Downarrow_c^p$. It follows from the definition of the private semantics that any process $\text{eav}(c, x).P$ in $C[_]$ has the same behaviour as the process 0. Hence, we generate a context $C^1[_]$ by replacing in $C[_]$ any instance of $\text{eav}(c, x).P$ by 0, and thus obtaining $C[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p$ and $C[B] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p$. Notice that the definition of semantics gives us $\rightarrow_p \subseteq \rightarrow_e$. Hence, $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p$ implies $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e$ and $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p$ implies $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. Furthermore, since we built $C^1[_]$ to not contain any process of the form $\text{eav}(c, x).P$, we deduce that rules C-EAV and C-OEAV can never be applied in a derivation of $C^1[A]$ or $C^1[B]$. It implies that $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e$ and $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. Thanks to $A \approx_m^e B$, we know that $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$ and so we conclude that $C[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C[B] \Downarrow_c^p$.
2. We next prove that $\approx_m^e \subseteq \approx_m^c$. Similarly to Item 1, we consider a channel c and an attacker evaluation context $C[_]$ that is c -closing for A and B . The main difficulty of this proof is to match the application of the rule COMM in the classical semantics with the rules C-EAV and C-OEAC. However, $C[_]$ does not necessarily contain eavesdrop process $\text{eav}(d, x) \mid \omega c$. Moreover, as mentioned in Item 1, a process $\text{eav}(d, x).P$ has the same behavior as 0 in the classical semantics but can have a completely different behaviour in the eavesdropping semantics if P is not 0. Thus, we remove from $C[_]$ the eavesdrop processes, obtaining $C'[_]$. Then, we define a new context $C''[_]$ based on $C'[_]$ where will add harmless eavesdrop process $\text{eav}(d, y).0$. We first add in parallel the processes $!\text{eav}(a, y) \mid \omega a$ for all free channels a in $C'[_]$, A and B . Moreover, since private channels can be opened, we also replace any process $\nu d.P$, $\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).P$ where d, x are of channel type with $\nu d.(P \mid \text{eav}(d, y))$ and $\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).(P \mid \text{eav}(x, y))$. By induction of the derivations, we can show that $C[A] \Downarrow_c^c \Leftrightarrow C''[A] \Downarrow_c^e$ and $C[B] \Downarrow_c^c \Leftrightarrow C''[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. Since $A \approx_m^e B$, we deduce that $C''[A] \Downarrow_c^e \Leftrightarrow C''[B] \Downarrow_c^e$ and so $C[A] \Downarrow_c^c \Leftrightarrow C[B] \Downarrow_c^c$.
3. To show that the implication $\approx_m^e \subsetneq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$ is strict, i.e., there exist processes A and B such that $A \approx_m^c B$, $A \approx_m^p B$ but $A \not\approx_m^e B$. The processes defined in Figure 6 witness this fact. They already were witness of the strict inclusion $\approx_i^e \subsetneq \approx_i^p \cap \approx_i^c$ (see proof of Theorem 5) and since A and B are image finit, we know from Theorem 1 that may and trace equivalences between A and B coincide. \square

4 Subclasses of processes for which the semantics coincide

4.1 Simple processes

The class of simple processes was defined in [11]. It was shown that for these processes observational and may testing equivalences coincide. Intuitively, these processes are

4.2 I/O-unambiguous processes

Restricting processes to simple processes is often too restrictive. For instance, when verifying unlinkability and anonymity properties, two outputs by different parties should not be distinguishable due to the channel name. We therefore introduce another class of processes, that we call io-unambiguous for which we also show that the different semantics (although not the different equivalences) do coincide.

Intuitively, an io-unambiguous process forbids an output and input on the same public channel to follow each other directly (or possibly with only conditionals in between). For instance, we forbid processes of the form $\text{out}^\theta(c, t).\text{in}^\theta(c, x).P$, $\text{out}^\theta(c, t).(\text{in}^\theta(c, x).P \mid Q)$ as well as $\text{out}^\theta(c, t).\text{if } t_1 = t_2 \text{ then } P \text{ else } \text{in}^\theta(c, x).Q$. We however allow inputs and outputs on the same channel in parallel.

Definition 9. We define an honest extended process A to be I/O-unambiguous when $\text{ioua}(A, _) = \top$ where

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{ioua}(0, c) &= \top \\
\text{ioua}(\{u/x\}, c) &= \top \\
\text{ioua}(A \mid B, c) &= \text{ioua}(A, c) \wedge \text{ioua}(B, c) \\
\text{ioua}(!P, c) &= \text{ioua}(P, c) \\
\text{ioua}(\nu n.A, c) &= \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } n \in \mathcal{Ch} \\ \text{ioua}(A, c) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
\text{ioua}(\nu x.A, c) &= \text{ioua}(A, c) \\
\text{ioua}(\text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q, c) &= \text{ioua}(P, c) \wedge \text{ioua}(Q, c) \\
\text{ioua}(\text{out}^\theta(d, u).P, c) &= \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } u \text{ is of channel type} \\ \text{ioua}(P, d) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
\text{ioua}(\text{in}^\theta(d, x).P, c) &= \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } x \text{ is of channel type or } d = c \\ \text{ioua}(P, _) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

Note that an I/O-unambiguous process does not contain private channels and always input/output base-type terms. We also note that a simple way to enforce that processes are I/O-unambiguous is to use disjoint channel names for inputs and outputs (at least in the same parallel thread).

Theorem 8. When restricted to I/O-unambiguous processes, we have that $\approx_r^p = \approx_r^e$ but $\approx_r^e \subsetneq \approx_r^c$ for $r \in \{\ell, t\}$.

Proof. From Theorems 4 and 5, we already know that $\approx_r^e \subseteq \approx_r^p$ and $\approx_r^e \subseteq \approx_r^c$. Hence, we only need to show that $\approx_r^p \subseteq \approx_r^e$ and $\approx_r^p \subsetneq \approx_r^c$. The latter is easily shown by noticing that the processes A and B in Figure 5 are I/O-unambiguous. Thus, we focus on $\approx_r^p \subseteq \approx_r^e$.

We start by proving that for all I/O-unambiguous processes A , for all $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}} A'$, we have that A' is I/O-unambiguous. Note that structural equivalence preserves I/O-unambiguity, i.e. for all extended processes A, B , for all channel name c , $A \equiv B$ implies $\text{ioua}(A, c) = \text{ioua}(B, c)$. Hence, we assume w.l.o.g. that a name is bound at most once and the set of bound and free names are disjoint.

Second, we will show that for all I/O-unambiguous processes A , for all $A \xrightarrow{\nu z.out(c,z).in(c,z)}_p$ A' , we have that $\xrightarrow{\nu z.eav(c,z)}_e A'$. To prove this property, denoted \mathcal{P} , let us assume w.l.o.g. that $A \xrightarrow{\nu z.out(c,z)}_p A_1 \rightarrow_p^* A_2 \xrightarrow{in(c,z)}_p A'$. The transition $A \xrightarrow{\nu z.out(c,z)}_p A_1$ indicates that $A \equiv \nu \tilde{n}.(out^{ho}(c, u).P \mid Q)$ and $A_1 \equiv \tilde{n}.(P \mid Q \mid \{u/z\})$ for some P, Q, \tilde{n}, c, u . Note that A is I/O-unambiguous, and hence $ioua(P, c) = \top$.

As A is I/O-unambiguous implies that A does not contain private channels, we have that the rule applied in $A_1 \rightarrow_p^* A_2$ is either the rule THEN or ELSE. Therefore, there exists P' and Q' such that $P \rightarrow_p^* P', Q \rightarrow_p^* Q', A_n \equiv \nu \tilde{n}.(P' \mid Q' \mid \{u/x\})$ and $ioua(P', c) = \top$. Hence, we deduce that there exists Q_1, Q_2 such that $Q' \equiv \nu \tilde{m}.(in(c, x)Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $A' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}. \nu \tilde{m}.(P' \mid Q_1\{u/x\} \mid Q_2)$. We conclude the proof of this property by noticing that we can first apply on A the reduction rules of $Q \rightarrow_p^* Q'$, then apply the rule C-EAV and finally apply the rules of $P \rightarrow_p^* P'$.

1. To prove $\approx_t^p \subseteq \approx_t^e$, we assume that A, B are two closed honest extended processes such that $A \approx_t^p B$. For all $A \xrightarrow{tr}_e A'$, it follows from the semantics that $A \xrightarrow{tr_p}_p A'$ where tr_p is obtained by replacing in tr each $\nu z.eav(c, z)$ by $\nu z.out(c, z).in(c, z)$. Since $A \approx_t^p B$, there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{tr_p}_p B'$ and $\phi(A') \sim \phi(B')$. Thanks to the property \mathcal{P} , we conclude that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_e B'$.
2. To prove $\approx_\ell^p \subseteq \approx_\ell^e$, we assume that A, B are two closed honest extended processes such that $A \approx_\ell^p B$ and let \mathcal{R} be the relation witnessing this equivalence. We will show that \mathcal{R} is also a labelled bisimulation in the eavesdropping semantics. Suppose ARB .
 - as $A \approx_\ell^p B$, we have that $\phi(A) \sim \phi(B)$.
 - if $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_e A'$ then, as A is honest, $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_p A'$. As $A \approx_\ell^p B$ there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_p B'$ and $A'\mathcal{R}B'$. As $\xrightarrow{\tau}_p \subseteq \xrightarrow{\tau}_e$, $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_e B'$.
 - if $A \xrightarrow{\ell}_e A'$ then, as A is I/O-unambiguous, $A \xrightarrow{tr}_e A'$ where $tr = \nu z.out(c, z).in(c, z)$ when $\ell = \nu z.eav(c, z)$ else $tr = \ell$. As $A \approx_\ell^p B$, there exists B' such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_p B'$ and $A'\mathcal{R}B'$. When $tr = \ell$, the definition of the semantics directly gives us $B \xrightarrow{\ell}_e B'$. When $tr = \nu z.out(c, z).in(c, z)$, the property \mathcal{P} gives us $B \xrightarrow{\ell}_e B'$. \square

5 Different semantics in practice

As we have seen, in general, the three proposed semantics may yield different results. A conservative approach would consist in verifying always the eavesdropping semantics which is stronger than the two other ones, as shown before. However, this semantics seems also to be the least efficient one to verify.

We have implemented the three different semantics in the APTE tool, for processes with static channels, i.e. inputs and outputs may only have names in the channel position and not variables. This allowed us to investigate the difference in results and performance between the semantics.

In our experiments we considered several examples from APTE's example repository:

- the Private Authentication protocol proposed by Abadi and Fournet [2];
- the passive authentication protocol implemented in the European Passport protocol [15, 4];
- the French and UK versions of the Basic Access Protocol (BAC) implemented in the European passport [15, 5].

For all these examples we found that the results, i.e., whether trace equivalence holds or not, was unchanged, independent of the semantics. However, as expected, performance of the private semantics was generally better. The existing protocol encodings generally used a single public channel. To enforce I/O-unambiguity, we introduced different channels and, surprisingly, noted that distinct channels significantly enhance the tool’s performance. (The model using different channels in the case of RFID protocols such as the electronic passport is certainly questionable.)

The results are summarised in Figure 8. For each protocol we considered the original encoding, and a slightly changed one which enforces I/O-unambiguity. In the results column we mark an attack by a cross (×) and a successful verification with a check mark (✓). In case of an attack we generally considered the minimal number of sessions needed to find the attack. In case of a successful verification we consider more sessions, which is the reason for the much higher verification times.

Protocol	# sessions	Property	Time			Result
			\approx_t^e	\approx_t^c	\approx_t^p	
Private Authentication	1	Anonymity	1s	1s	1s	✓
	2		53h 53m 20s	47h 46m 40s	46h 56m 40s	
I/O unambiguous	1		1s	1s	1s	
	2		31m 39s	21m 2s	19m 39s	
Passive Authentication	2	Anonymity	4s	3s	3s	✓
I/O unambiguous	2		4s	4s	3s	
	3		6h 38m 34s	6h 29m 24s	6h 36m 40s	
Passive Authentication	2	Unlinkability	4s	4s	3s	✓
I/O unambiguous	2		3s	3s	3s	
	3		7h 43m 2s	6h 39m 14s	4h 27m 47s	
FR BAC protocol	2	Unlinkability	1s	1m 29s	1s	×
I/O unambiguous	2		1s	1s	1s	
UK BAC protocol	2	Unlinkability	1h 2m 35s	?	6h 39m 14s	×
I/O unambiguous	2		4s	53s	2s	

Fig. 8. Performance comparison of the different semantics.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we investigated two families of Dolev-Yao models, depending on how the hypothesis that the *attacker controls the network* is reflected. While the two semantics coincide for reachability properties, they yield incomparable notions of behavioral equivalences, which have recently been extensively used to model privacy properties. The fact that forcing all communication to be routed through the attacker may diminish his distinguishing power may at first seem counter-intuitive. We also propose a third semantics, where internal communication among honest participants is permitted but leaks the message to the attacker. This new communication semantics entails strictly stronger equivalences than the two classical ones. We also identify two subclasses of protocols for which (some) semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented the three semantics in the APTE tool. Our experiments showed that the three semantics provide the same result on the case studies in the APTE example repository. However, the private semantics is slightly more efficient, as less interleavings have to be considered. Our results illustrate that behavioral equivalences are much more subtle than reachability properties and the need to carefully choose the precise attacker model.

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$$\begin{aligned}
A &\triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y)) \\
B &\triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y))
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$P(y) \triangleq \text{if } y = s \text{ then } \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, z).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s)$$

Fig. 9. A and B (without else branches) such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \not\approx_\ell^p B$

A Refining Theorem 3

We here give a more refined version of Theorem 3. In particular we show that the private and classical semantics are incomparable for trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation, even when restricted to processes that do not use else branches.

Theorem 9. *When restricted to processes without else branches, we have that $\approx_r^p \not\subseteq \approx_r^c$ and $\approx_r^c \not\subseteq \approx_r^p$ for $r \in \{\ell, t\}$.*

Proof. The fact that $\approx_r^p \not\subseteq \approx_r^c$ for $r \in \{\ell, t\}$ has already been shown in the proof of Theorem 3 as the processes A, B witnessing the result did not have else branches.

To show that $\approx_\ell^c \not\subseteq \approx_\ell^p$ we show that there exist processes A and B without else branches such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \not\approx_\ell^p B$. Such processes are defined in Figure 9. To see that $A \approx_\ell^c B$ we first observe that the only first possible action from A or B is an input. In particular, given a term t , there is a unique B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} B'$ where $B' = \nu s.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y))$. On the other hand, if $A \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, M)} A'$ then either $A' = B'$ or $A' = A''$ where $A'' \triangleq \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s) \mid P(t))$. Therefore, to complete the proof, we only need to find B'' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} B''$ and $A'' \approx_\ell^c B''$. Such process can be obtain by applying an internal communication on B' , i.e. $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_c B' \xrightarrow{\tau} \nu s.P(s)$. Note that $t \neq s$ since s is bound, meaning that $P(t) \approx_\ell^c 0$. Moreover, $P(s) \approx_\ell^c \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, s)$. This allows us to conclude that $\nu s.P(s) \approx_\ell^c A''$.

To see that $A \not\approx_\ell^p B$ we first observe that when $A \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)}_p A''$, B can only mimic A by performing the transition $B \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, t)} B'$. We conclude as $B' \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c, z)}_p \nu s.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, y).P(y) \mid \{s/z\})$ and $A'' \not\xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c, z)}_p$.

We next show that there also exist A_1 and A_2 such that $A_1 \approx_t^c A_2$, but $A_1 \not\approx_t^p A_2$.

We define such processes in Figure 10. Using the APTE tool we have shown that indeed $A_1 \approx_t^c A_2$ and $A_1 \not\approx_t^p A_2$. The main argument why the result holds is that P_1 is trace included in P_2 in the classical semantics (as the output on channel f can be made silent through an internal communication) while this is not the case in the private semantics. \square

$$A_i \hat{=} \nu s_1. \nu s_2. (\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, h(s_1)) \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, h(s_2)) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(d, x). (\text{if } x = h(s_1) \text{ then } Q_i \mid \text{if } x = h(s_2) \text{ then } P_2))$$

where $Q_1 \hat{=} P_1$, $Q_2 \hat{=} P_2$ and

$$\begin{aligned} P_1 &\hat{=} \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(e, a) \\ P_2 &\hat{=} \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(f, a). \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(e, a) \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(f, x) \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 10. A_1 and A_2 such that $A_1 \approx_i^c A_2$, but $A_1 \not\approx_i^p A_2$.

B Proof of Proposition 2

Definition 10. We say that a plain process P (resp. extended process P) is name-cleaned if P is of the form $P_1 \mid \dots \mid P_m$ and every P_i is not of the form $\nu k. B'$ with k a name or variable of any type.

Lemma 1. Let A be an extended process. There exist a sequence of names and variables \tilde{k} and a name-cleaned extended process A' such that $A \equiv \nu \tilde{k}. A'$.

Proof. Direct from the definition of structural equivalence. \square

Proposition 2. For all closed honest plain processes A , for all $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{e}, \text{p}\}$, $A \Downarrow_c^s$ iff there exists an attacker plain process I^s such that $I^s \mid A \Downarrow_c^{s, \text{ho}}$.

Proof. We will prove that $A \Downarrow_c^s$ implies there exists an attacker plain process I^s such that $C^s[A] \Downarrow_c^s$ for $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{e}, \text{p}\}$ by constructing I^s .

Let us first focus on $s = \text{c}$. Since $A \Downarrow_c^c$, we know that there exist A' , t and $\text{tr} \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$ such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$, $c \notin \text{bn}(\text{tr})$ and $\text{out}(c, t) \in \text{tr}$. Note that we can assume w.l.o.g. that no name in tr is bound twice and bound names in tr are distinct from free names that occurs in A and tr .

Let $\{a_1, \dots, a_k\}$ be all the channel names that occur in tr (bound or free). To each a_1, \dots, a_k , we associate a variable of channel type x_{a_1}, \dots, x_{a_k} . Given a subset $S \subseteq \{a_1, \dots, a_k\}$, we denote by $\sigma(S)$ the substitution $\{x_a \rightarrow a \mid a \in S\}$. We define I^c such that $I^c = Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma(\text{fc}(\text{tr})))$ where $Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma)$ is defined by induction on tr as follows:

- if $\text{tr} = \epsilon$ then $Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma) = 0$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{in}(a, M). \text{tr}'$ then $Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, M). Q_c(\text{tr}', \sigma)$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{out}(a, c). \text{tr}'$ with c of channel-type then

$$Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, y). Q_c(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

where y is fresh variable of channel type;

- if $\text{tr} = \nu x. \text{out}(a, x). \text{tr}'$ and x is of base type then

$$Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, x). Q_c(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

- if $\text{tr} = \nu c. \text{out}(a, c). \text{tr}'$ and c is of channel type then

$$Q_c(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, x_c). Q_c(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

Since $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$, there exist A_0, \dots, A_n and ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_N such that $A' = A_N$, $A = A_0$ and $A_0 \xrightarrow{\ell_1}_c A_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_2}_c \dots \xrightarrow{\ell_N}_c A_N$. We can show by induction that for all $n \leq N$, there exist a plain process Q_n and two sequences of names \tilde{y}_n, \tilde{r}_n such that:

- $I^c A \rightarrow_c^* \nu \tilde{y}_n. \nu \tilde{r}_n. (A_n \mid Q_n)$
- \tilde{r}_n is the sequence of bounded channel names in $\ell_1 \dots \ell_{n-1}$
- $\tilde{y}_n \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(A_n))$
- tr_n is the sequence $\ell_n \dots \ell_N$ where the τ action are removed
- $Q_n = Q_c(\text{tr}_n, \sigma(fc(\text{tr}_n)))$

To conclude this proof, recall that $\text{out}(c, t) \in \text{tr}$ and $c \notin \text{bn}(\text{tr})$ so there exists $n \leq N$ such that $\ell_n = \text{out}(c, t)$ or $\ell_n = \nu t. \text{out}(c, t)$. But since $A_{n-1} \xrightarrow{\ell_n}_c A_n$ and $A_{n-1} \equiv \nu \tilde{k}_{n-1}. B_{n-1}$ with B_{n-1} being name-cleaned, we deduce that there exist P, R such that $B_{n-1} = \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t). P \mid R$ and $c \notin \tilde{k}_{n-1}$. Therefore, $I^c \mid A \rightarrow_c^* \nu \tilde{y}_{n-1}. \nu \tilde{r}_{n-1}. \nu \tilde{k}_{n-1}. (\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t). P \mid R \mid Q_{n-1})$. Note that $\tilde{y}_{n-1} \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(B_{n-1}))$ hence $c \notin \tilde{y}_{n-1}$. Moreover, we assumed that $c \notin \text{bn}(\text{tr})$ hence $c \notin \tilde{r}_{n-1}$ by definition of \tilde{r}_{n-1} . It allows us to conclude $I^c \mid A \Downarrow_c^{c, \text{ho}}$.

The proof for the other two semantics is very similar. First, the construction of the context changes to adapt the changes in the labeled semantics. Second, we prove a slightly different property on the traces to account the presence of opened channels that are generated by the rule C-OPEN. The rest stay the same (up to renaming of c into p and e respectively).

Concerning the semantics private, we define $I^p \doteq I^c$ and we can prove the following property: For all $n \leq N$, there exist two extended processes Q_n, R_n and two sequences of names \tilde{y}_n, \tilde{r}_n such that:

- $C_p[A] \rightarrow_p^* \nu \tilde{y}_n. \nu \tilde{r}_n. (A_n \mid Q_n \mid R_n)$
- \tilde{r}_n is the sequence of bounded channel names in $\ell_1 \dots \ell_{n-1}$
- $R_n \doteq \omega c_1 \mid \dots \mid \omega c_m$ for some c_1, \dots, c_m such that $\tilde{r}_n \subseteq \{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$
- $\tilde{y}_n \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(B_n))$
- tr_n is the sequence $\ell_n \dots \ell_N$ where the τ action are removed
- $Q_n = Q_c(\text{tr}_n, \sigma(fc(\text{tr}_n)))$

Notice that the presence of R_n is the only difference between the property in the classical and private semantics. This is the consequence of the application of the rule C-OPEN that introduces opened channels ωc_1 and that we apply when the trace contains labeled transitions $\text{out}(c, d)$ or $\nu d. \text{out}(c, d)$.

For the eavesdropping semantics, we can prove the same property as for private semantics (up to renaming of p into e) but we need to modify the context as follows. We define $C_e[_]$ such that $I^e[_] \doteq Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma)$ is defined by induction on tr as follows:

- if $\text{tr} = \epsilon$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = 0$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{in}(a, M). \text{tr}'$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, M). Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{out}(a, c). \text{tr}'$ with c of channel-type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, y). Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

where y is fresh variable of channel type;

– if $\text{tr} = \nu x.out(a, x).tr'$ and x is of base type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, x).Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

– if $\text{tr} = \nu c.out(a, c).tr'$ and c is of channel type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a \sigma, x_c).Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

– if $\text{tr} = eav(a, c).tr'$ with c of channel-type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = eav(x_a \sigma, y).Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

where y is fresh variable of channel type;

– if $\text{tr} = \nu x.eav(a, x).tr'$ and x is of base type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = eav(x_a \sigma, x).Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

– if $\text{tr} = \nu c.eav(a, c).tr'$ and c is of channel type then

$$Q_e(\text{tr}, \sigma) = eav(x_a \sigma, x_c).Q_e(\text{tr}', \sigma)$$

Let us now focus on the other implications, that are: if there exists an attacker plain process I^s such that $I^s \mid A \Downarrow_c^{s, \text{ho}}$ then $A \Downarrow_c^s$ for $s \in \{\text{c}, \text{e}, \text{p}\}$. By Lemma 1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that $I^s = \nu \tilde{k}.D$ for some name-cleaned plain process D and some sequence of names and variables of any type \tilde{k} . We now prove that for all $I^s \mid A \rightarrow_s^* B$, there exist an attacker evaluation context $C'[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$ with D' name-cleaned, an honest extended process A' and tr such that $C'[_]$ is s -closing for A , $B \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$. We first focus on $s = \text{c}$. Note that it is not necessary to prove the property name-cleaned since it is implied by Lemma 1.

We prove this result by induction on the number of reduction rules in $I^c \mid A \rightarrow_c^* B$.

Base case: By structural equivalence, there exists \tilde{k}' and D' such that $I \mid A \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.(D' \mid A)$. Moreover, since $fv(A) = \emptyset$, $\tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$ is closing for A and so the base case holds.

Inductive step $C^c[A] \rightarrow_c^* B' \rightarrow_c B$: By our inductive hypothesis, we know that there exist $C'[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$, and honest extended process A' and tr such that $C'[_]$ is c -closing for A' , $B' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Note that due to the structural equivalence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.P$ where P is name-cleaned. Moreover, since $B' \rightarrow_c B$ and $B' \equiv C'[A']$, we deduce that $C'[A'] \rightarrow_c B$. Let us do a case analysis on the rule applied.

Case 1, internal reduction on A' , i.e. there exists A'' such that $A' \xrightarrow{\tau}_c A''$ and $B \equiv C'[A'']$. In such a case, we have that $C'[A'] \xrightarrow{\tau}_c C'[A'']$. Moreover, since $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$ then we directly obtain that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A''$ and so the result holds.

Case 2, internal reduction on C' , i.e. there exists D'' such that $D' \xrightarrow{\tau}_c D''$ and $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.(D'' \mid A')$. By the structural equivalence, we know that there exist \tilde{k}'' and D''' such that D'' is name-cleaned and $\nu \tilde{k}'.(D'' \mid A') \equiv \nu \tilde{k}''.(D''' \mid A')$. Therefore, we can

define $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}''.(D''' \mid _)$ and obtain that $C'[A'] \xrightarrow{\tau}_c C''[A']$. Since $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$, the result holds.

Case 3, rule COMM between C' (input) and A' (output), i.e. $D' = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid P_2$ and $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2)$ (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'). Note that in such a case, $c \notin \tilde{r}$. We do a case analysis on u .

- Case 3.a, $u \in \text{Ch} \cap \tilde{r}$: Let us redenote $\nu\tilde{r}$ as $\nu\tilde{r}'.\nu u$. Thus $A' \xrightarrow{\nu u.\text{out}(c, u)}_c \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$. Hence, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' , we obtain that $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu u.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2))$. Hence, by denoting $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu u.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$, the result hold.
- Case 3.b, $u \in \text{Ch}$ but $u \notin \tilde{r}$. In such a case, $A' \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c, u)}_c \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$. Hence, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' , we obtain that $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2))$. By denoting $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$, the result holds.
- Case 3.c, $u \notin \text{Ch}$: In such a case, $A' \xrightarrow{\nu y.\text{out}(c, y)}_c \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \{u/y\})$ with $y \notin fv(A') \cup fv(u)$. Note we can take y such that $y \notin fv(C'[A']) \cup bn(C'[A'])$. Note that $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2)$. By definition of the structural equivalence and since we took $y \notin fv(C'[A']) \cup bn(C'[A'])$, we deduce that $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu y.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1\{y/x\} \mid D_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \{u/y\})$. Lastly, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' , we deduce that $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu y.(D_1\{y/x\} \mid D_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \{u/y\}))$. By denoting $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu y.(D_1\{y/x\} \mid D_2 \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \{u/y\})$, the result holds.

Case 4, rule COMM between A' (input) and C' (output), i.e. $D' = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2$ and $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2)$ (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'). Note that in such a case, $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Moreover, we know that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' , meaning that the names and variables in \tilde{r} does not occur in u . Hence, $A' \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, u)}_c \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2)$. Once again due to the fact the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' , we obtain that $B'' \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2))$. By denoting $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2)$, the result holds.

We have concluded the proof of the property: for all $C^c[A] \xrightarrow{*}_c B$, there exist an evaluation attacker context $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$ with D' name-cleaned, an honest extended process A' and tr such that $C'[_]$ is c -closing for A' , $B \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. It remains to prove this result for $s = e$ and $s = p$. Let us focus first on the case $s = p$. The proof is in fact similar to the case $s = c$. Notice that the case of the rule C-ENV correspond to either Case 2, 3.c or 4 when u is of base type. Hence it remains the case of the rules C-PRIV and C-OPEN.

Case 5, rule C-OPEN between C' (input) and A' (output), i.e. $D' = \text{in}^\theta(c, x).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).P_1 \mid P_2$ and $B \equiv \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1\{d/x\} \mid D_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \omega d)$. Lets us do a case analysis on whether (5.a) $d \in \tilde{r}$ or (5.b) $d \notin \tilde{r}$. Note that Case (5.a) is in fact almost identical to Case (3.a) and that the result holds with $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu d.(D_1\{u/x\} \mid$

$D_2 \mid \omega d \mid _$) and $A'' = \nu \tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$ with $\nu \tilde{r} = \nu \tilde{r}'.\nu d$. Furthermore, note that Case (5.b) is also very similar to Case (3.b) and that the result holds with $C''[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.(D_1\{d/x\} \mid D_2 \mid \omega d _)$ and $A'' = \nu \tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2)$. Notice that in both case $C''[_]$ is indeed p-closing for A'' .

Case 6, rule C-OPEN between A' (input) and C' (output), i.e. $D' = \text{out}^\theta(c, d).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2)$ and $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu \tilde{r}.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid P_1\{d/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \omega d)$. This case is very similar to Case 4 when u is of channel type and the result holds with $C''[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu \tilde{r}.(P_1\{d/x\} \mid P_2)$.

Case 7, rule C-PRIV with a communication on a channel c . Notice that this rule is in fact partially covered by the beginning of the proof. Indeed, Case 1 and 2 cover the cases where c is not in \tilde{k}' . Therefore, we only need to focus on the case where the private channel is in \tilde{k}' , i.e. $\nu \tilde{k}' = \nu \tilde{k}''.\nu c$ for some \tilde{k}'' . We know that $C'[_]$ is p-closing for A' . Hence since c is a channel bound in $C'[_]$ whose scope includes $_$, we deduce that if $c \in \text{fn}(A)$ then ωc is also in the scope of c . But according to the definition of the rule, we know that ωc is not in the scope of νc . Moreover, if the output or input is done by A' then it would imply that $c \in \text{fn}(A)$. Thus, this allows us to deduce that this both output and input are tagged with at , meaning that there exists D'' such that $\nu c.(D' \mid A') \xrightarrow{\tau}_{\text{p}} \nu c.(D'' \mid A')$ and $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}''.\nu c.(D'' \mid A')$. In such a case, by denoting $C''[_] = \nu \tilde{k}''.\nu c.(D'' \mid _)$ and $A'' = A'$, the result directly holds.

We have concluded the proof of the property for $s = \text{p}$ hence it remains the case $s = \text{e}$. Once, again several cases are already covered since $\xrightarrow{\ell}_{\text{p}} \subset \xrightarrow{\ell}_{\text{e}}$. Hence we only need to focus on the cases of the rules C-EAV and C-OEAV:

Case 8, rule C-EAV, i.e. $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3)$, $D'' = \text{eav}(c, y).Q_1 \mid Q_2$, $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu \tilde{r}.(Q_1\{u/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3)$ and u is of base type (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'). Note that in such a case $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Moreover, note this is the only possible combination of input and output since C' is an attacker evaluation context and A' is an honest extended process. Let us consider a variable z such that $z \notin \text{fv}(C'[A']) \cup \text{bn}(C'[A'])$. Hence $A' \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)} \nu \tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid \{u/z\})$. But since $z \notin \text{fv}(C'[A']) \cup \text{bn}(C'[A'])$, we deduce that $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu z.\nu \tilde{r}.(Q_1\{u/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid \{u/z\})$. Hence, by denoting $C''[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu z.(Q_1\{z/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu \tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid \{u/z\})$, the result holds.

Case 9, rule C-OEAV, i.e. $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3)$, $D'' = \text{eav}(c, y).Q_1 \mid Q_2$, $B \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu \tilde{r}.(Q_1\{d/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2\{d/x\} \mid P_3 \mid \omega d)$ and d is of channel type (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'). We have to do a case analysis on d :

- Case $d \in \tilde{r}$: Let us denote $\nu \tilde{r} = \nu \tilde{r}'.\nu d$. In such a case $A' \xrightarrow{\nu d.\text{eav}(c, d)} \nu \tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3)$. But we know that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D' hence $B'' \equiv \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu d.(Q_1\{d/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid \nu \tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2\{d/x\} \mid P_3))$. Therefore, by denoting $C''[_] = \nu \tilde{k}'.\nu d.(Q_1\{u/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu \tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2\{d/x\} \mid P_3)$, the result holds.

- Case $d \notin \tilde{r}$: In such a case $A' \xrightarrow{eav(c,u)} \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3)$ and so the result holds by denoting $C''[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(Q_1\{u/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$ and $A'' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3)$.

Note that in both case, $C''[_]$ is indeed e-closing for A'' .

We have proved that for all $s \in \{c, p, e\}$, for all $C^s[A] \rightarrow_s^* B$, there exist an attacker evaluation context $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$ with D' name-cleaned, an honest extended process A' and tr such that $C'[_]$ is s -closing for A' , $B \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$. This property allows us to conclude the main proof. Indeed, consider $s \in \{c, e, p\}$ and $C^s[_]$ an attacker evaluation context such that $C^s[A] \Downarrow_c^{s,\text{ho}}$. By definition, we deduce that $C^s[A] \rightarrow_s^* C[\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t).P]$ for some evaluation context C that does not bind c , some t and some plain process P . By our property, we deduce that there exists an attacker evaluation context $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.(D' \mid _)$ with D' name-cleaned, an honest extended process A' and tr such that $C[\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t).P] \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$. More specifically, since $C'[_]$ is an attacker evaluation context, $C[\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t).P] \equiv C'[A']$ and C does not bind c , we deduce that $A' \equiv \nu\tilde{r}.\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, t').P' \mid Q'$ for some t', P', Q', \tilde{r} such that $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Therefore, if $t' \in Ch$ but $t' \notin \tilde{r}$ then $A' \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c,t')}_s A''$ for some A'' meaning that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr.out}(c,t')}_s A''$; else $A' \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c,z)}_s A''$ for some A'' and some z fresh (z being either a base type variable or a channel), meaning that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}.\nu z.\text{out}(c,z)}_s A''$. In both cases, we obtain that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_s A''$, $\text{out}(c, t) \in \text{tr}'$ and $c \notin \text{bn}(\text{tr}')$ for some tr', A'' and t . It allows us to conclude that $A \Downarrow_c^s$. \square

C Proof of Theorem 1

We start by restating the a proposition from [11] that was used to prove that trace equivalence implies may equivalence in the classical semantics. In order to prove the proposition for the semantics private and eavesdrop, we will first write exactly the proof of from [11] for the classical semantics and then highlight what changes are required to obtain the proofs for the private and eavesdropping semantics.

Proposition 4. *Let $s \in \{c, p, e\}$. Let A and B be two honest closed extended process with $\text{dom}(A) = \text{dom}(B)$, and $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.(D \mid _)$ be an attacker evaluation context s -closing for A . If $C[A] \rightarrow_s^* A''$ for some process A'' , then there exist a closed extended process A' , an attacker evaluation context $C' = \nu\tilde{n}'.(D' \mid _)$ s -closing for A' , and a trace $\text{tr} \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$ such that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$, $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'$, and for all closed extended process B' , we have:*

$$\begin{aligned} &C[_] \text{ is } s\text{-closing for } B \text{ and } B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B' \text{ and } \phi(B') \sim \phi(A') \\ &\quad \text{implies that} \\ &C' \text{ is } s\text{-closing for } B' \text{ and } C[B] \rightarrow_s^* C'[B']. \end{aligned}$$

Proof. We first focus on the case $s = c$. Let A and B be two extended processes with $\text{dom}(A) = \text{dom}(B)$ and $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.(D \mid _)$ be an evaluation context c-closing for A .

Let A'' be such that $C[A] \rightarrow_s^* A''$. We prove the result by induction on the length ℓ of the derivation.

Base case $\ell = 0$: In such a case, we have that $A'' \equiv C[A]$. Let $A' = A$, $C' = C$ and $\text{tr} = \epsilon$, we have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$, and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\epsilon}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$ for some B' . Clearly, we have that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$ and $C'[_]$ is c-closing for B' since $C' = C$ and $B \rightarrow_c^* B'$.

Inductive case $\ell > 0$: In such a case, we have that there exists a closed extended process A_1 such that $C[A] \rightarrow_c^* A_1$ with a derivation whose length is smaller than ℓ , and $A_1 \rightarrow_c A''$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis allowing us to deduce that there exist an extended process A'_1 , an evaluation context $C'_1[_] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(D'_1 \mid _)$ c-closing for A'_1 , and a trace $\text{tr}_1 \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$ such that $A_1 \equiv C'_1[A'_1]$, $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_c A'_1$, and for all closed extended processes B'_1 , we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} C[_] \text{ is c-closing for } B \text{ and } B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B'_1 \text{ and } \phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1) \\ \text{implies that} \\ C'_1[_] \text{ is c-closing for } B'_1 \text{ and } C[B] \rightarrow_s^* C'_1[B'_1]. \end{aligned}$$

Since $A_1 \equiv C'_1[A'_1]$ and $A_1 \rightarrow_c A''$, we have that $C'_1[A'_1] \rightarrow_c A''$. (internal reduction is closed under structural equivalence). W.l.o.g., we can assume that D'_1 is name-cleaned, the bound names and variables in $C'_1[A'_1]$ are bound once and distinct from the free names. We do a case analysis on the rule involved in this reduction.

Case 1: internal reduction in A'_1 , i.e. there exists A' such that $A'_1 \rightarrow_c A'$ and $A'' \equiv C'_1[A']$. In such a case, we have that $C'_1[A'_1] \rightarrow_c C'_1[A']$. Let $C'[_] = C'_1[_]$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'_1[A'] = C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_c A'_1 \rightarrow_c A'$, i.e. $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Lastly, let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A'_1) \equiv \phi(A')$, and thus relying on our induction hypothesis, we obtain that $C'_1[_] is c-closing for B' and $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B']$. Since $C'_1[_] = C'[_]$, we conclude.$

Case 2.a: rule THEN in D'_1 , i.e. $D'_1 = \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2 \mid P_3$ and $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_3 \mid A'_1)$. In such a case, we have $C'_1[A'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_3 \mid A'_1)$. Let $A' = A'_1$, $C'[_] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_3 \mid _)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_c A'$. Lastly, let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B' are distinct from the free names of C'_1 . Moreover, we know that C'_1 is c-closing for A'_1 meaning that $fv(u, v) \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(A'_1))$. Furthermore, since the free names are distinct from bound names, we obtain that $fn(u, v) \cap bn(A'_1) = \emptyset$. But $\phi(A'_1) = \phi(A') \sim \phi(B')$ and $(u =_E v)\phi(A')$ hence we obtain $(u =_E v)\phi(B')$ meaning that $C'_1[B'] \rightarrow \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_3 \mid B') = C'[B']$. By our inductive hypothesis, we also have that C'_1 is c-closing for B' and $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B']$. Hence, we conclude that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$ and $C'[_] is c-closing for B' .$

Case 2.b: rule ELSE in D'_1 , i.e. $D'_1 = \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2 \mid P_3$ and $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_2 \mid P_3 \mid A'_1)$. Similar to case 2.a.

Case 3: rule COMM in D'_1 , i.e. $D'_1 = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3$ and $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid A'_1)$. In such a case, we have $C'_1[A'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid A'_1)$. Let $A' = A'_1$, $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid _)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Lastly, let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. Since $\phi(A') = \phi(A'_1)$ then by our inductive hypothesis, we obtain C'_1 is c-closing for B' and $C[B] \rightarrow_c^ C'_1[B']$. But $C'_1[B'] \rightarrow_c \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid B') = C'[B']$ and so the result holds.*

Case 4: rule COMM between D'_1 (output) and A'_1 (input), i.e. $D'_1 = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, M).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'_1 = \nu\tilde{r}.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ (recall that we assume that bound names and variables are distinct from free names and variables and are only bound once). Note that in such a case, $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Hence $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, M)} \nu\tilde{r}.(Q_1\{M/x\} \mid Q_2)$. Moreover, since \tilde{r} are not in P_1, P_2 , we have $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(Q_1\{M/x\} \mid Q_2))$. Let $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(Q_1\{M/x\} \mid Q_2)$, $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid _)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1.\text{in}(c, M)$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Lastly let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_c B'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, M)}_c B'_2 \rightarrow_c^ B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once. Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we have also that $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and C'_1 is c-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c C'[B'_2]$ and $C'[-]$ is c-closing for B'_2 (since $C'[-]$ is c-closing for B'_2 and $B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$ and C' is c-closing for B').*

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c, M)} B'$. Hence, we know that $B'_1 = \nu\tilde{r}'.(\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$ for some \tilde{r}' , Q'_1, Q'_2 and $B'_2 \equiv \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q'_1\{M/x\} \mid Q'_2)$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}'.(\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, M).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}'.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1\{M/x\} \mid Q'_2) \equiv C'[\nu\tilde{r}'.(Q'_1\{M/x\} \mid Q'_2)] \equiv C'[B'_2]$. Notice that $C'[-]$ is c-closing for B'_2 since $f_v(C'_1[B'_1]) = \emptyset$.

Case 5: rule COMM between C'_1 (input) and A'_1 (output), i.e. $D'_1 = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'_1 = \nu\tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, M).Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ (recall that we assume that bound names and variables are distinct from free names and variables and are only bound once). Note that in such a case, $c \notin \tilde{r}$. We do a case analysis on M .

- Case 5.a, $M \in \text{Ch} \cap \tilde{r}$: Let us denote $\nu\tilde{r} = \nu\tilde{r}'.\nu M$. Thus $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu M.\text{out}(c, M)}_c \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2)$. Hence, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1 , we obtain that $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu M.(P_1\{M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2))$. Let $A' = \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2)$, $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu M.(P_1\{M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid _)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1.\nu M.\text{out}(c, M)$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$. Lastly let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_c B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu M.\text{out}(c, M)}_c B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once.

Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we have also that $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[-]$ is c-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c C'[B'_2]$ (since $fv(C'_1[B'_1])$ and since $B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$).

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu M.out(c,M)} B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu \tilde{m}. \nu M. (out^{ho}(c, M). Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$ for some \tilde{m}, Q'_1, Q'_2 and $B'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. \nu M. (in^{at}(c, x). P_1 \mid P_2 \mid out^{ho}(c, M). Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. \nu M. (P_1 \{^M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2) \equiv C'[\nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)] \equiv C'[B'_2]$.

- Case 5.b, $M \in \mathcal{Ch}$ but $M \notin \tilde{r}$: Thus $A'_1 \xrightarrow{out(c,M)} \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2)$. Hence, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1 , we obtain that $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. (P_1 \{^M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2))$. Let $A' = \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2)$, $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1. (P_1 \{^M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid -)$ and $tr = tr_1.out(c, M)$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{tr}_c A'$. Lastly let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_c B'_1 \xrightarrow{out(c,M)} B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once. Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we have also that $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[-]$ is c-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c C'[B']$ (since $fv(C'_1[B'_1])$ and since $B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$).

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{out(c,M)} B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu \tilde{m}. (out^{ho}(c, M). Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$ for some \tilde{m}, Q'_1, Q'_2 such that $M \notin \tilde{m}$ and $B'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. (in^{at}(c, x). P_1 \mid P_2 \mid out^{ho}(c, M). Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. (P_1 \{^M/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2) \equiv C'[\nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)] \equiv C'[B'_2]$.

- Case 5.c, $M \notin \mathcal{Ch}$: Consider y a fresh variable. Thus $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu y.out(c,y)} \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2 \mid \{^M/y\})$. Hence, since the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1 and since y is fresh, we obtain that $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu y. \nu \tilde{r}. (P_1 \{^y/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2 \mid \{^M/y\}) \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu y. (P_1 \{^y/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2 \mid \{^M/y\}))$. Let $A' = \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2 \mid \{^M/y\})$, $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu y. (P_1 \{^y/x\} \mid P_2 \mid -)$ and $tr = tr_1. \nu y.out(c, y)$. We have that $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{tr}_c A'$. Lastly let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_c B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{tr}_c B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu y.out(c,y)} B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once. Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we deduce that $dom(B'_1) = dom(A'_1)$ and $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_c^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[-]$ is c-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c C'[B']$ (since $fv(C'_1[B'_1])$ and since $B'_2 \rightarrow_c^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_c^* C'[B']$).

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu y.out(c,y)} B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu \tilde{m}.(out^{ho}(c, N).Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$ for some \tilde{m} , $N \notin Ch$, Q'_1, Q'_2 and $B'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{m}.(Q'_1 \mid Q'_2 \mid \{^N/y\})$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu \tilde{m}.(in^{at}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid out^{ho}(c, N).Q'_1 \mid Q'_2)$. Moreover, since y is fresh, we obtain that $\nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu y.\nu \tilde{m}.(in^{at}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid out^{ho}(c, y).Q'_1 \mid Q'_2 \mid \{^N/y\})$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_c \nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu y.\nu \tilde{m}.(P_1\{^y/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2 \mid \{^N/y\}) \equiv C'[\nu \tilde{m}.(Q'_1 \mid Q'_2 \mid \{^N/y\})] \equiv C'[B'_2]$.

This concludes the proof of the proposition for $s = c$. Therefore, it remains to take care of the cases $s = p$ and $s = e$. Let us focus first on the case $s = p$. The proof is in fact very similar to the classical semantics. Considering that the differences between the classical semantics and the private semantics are on the internal communication, we only need the rules that are not already covered in the classical proof. Notice that the rule C-ENV correspond to either Case 3 or Case 4 when M is of base type or Case 5.c. Moreover, the rules THEN and ELSE are already covered either Case 1 or 2.a or 2.b. Hence it remains the case of the rules C-PRIV and C-OPEN.

Case 6, rule C-OPEN between C'_1 (input) and A'_1 (output), i.e. $D'_1 = in^\theta(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'_1 = \nu \tilde{r}.(out^{ho}(c, d).Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu \tilde{r}.(P_1\{^d/x\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d)$. Let us do a case analysis on whether (6.a) $d \in \tilde{r}$ or (6.b) $d \notin \tilde{r}$. Note that Case (6.a) is in fact almost identical to Case (5.a) and that the result holds with $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu d.(P_1\{^d/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$, $A' = \nu \tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $tr = tr.\nu d$ with $\nu \tilde{r} = \nu \tilde{r}'.\nu d$. Furthermore, note that Case (6.b) is also very similar to Case (5.b) and that the result holds with $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1\{^d/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$ and $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.(Q_1 \mid Q_2)$. Notice that in both cases $C'[-]$ is p-closing for A' and B' since ωd was added to $C'[-]$.

Case 7, rule C-OPEN between A'_1 (input) and C'_1 (output), i.e. $D'_1 = out^\theta(c, d).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'_1 = \nu \tilde{r}.(in^{ho}(c, x).Q_1 \mid Q_2)$ and $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1.\nu \tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid Q_1\{^d/x\} \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d)$. This case is very similar to Case 4 when M is of channel type and the result holds with $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}'_1.(P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$ and $A' = \nu \tilde{r}.(Q_1\{^d/x\} \mid Q_2)$. Notice that in both cases $C'[-]$ is p-closing for A' and B' since ωd was added to $C'[-]$.

Case 8, rule C-PRIV with a communication on a channel c . Notice that this rule is in fact partially covered by the beginning of the proof. Indeed, Case 1 and 3 cover the cases where c is not in \tilde{n}'_1 . Therefore, we only need to focus on the case where the private channel is in \tilde{n}'_1 , i.e. $\nu \tilde{n}'_1 = \nu \tilde{n}''_1.\nu c$ for some \tilde{n}''_1 . We know that $C'_1[-]$ is p-closing for A'_1 . Hence since c is a channel bound in $C'_1[-]$ whose scope includes $_$, we deduce that if $c \in fn(A_1)$ then ωc is also in the scope of c . But according to the definition of the rule, we know that ωc is not in the scope of νc . Moreover, if the output or input is done by A'_1 then it would imply that $c \in fn(A_1)$. Thus, this allows us to deduce that this both output and input are tagged with at , meaning that there exists D''_1 such that $\nu c.(D'_1 \mid A'_1) \xrightarrow{\tau}_p \nu c.(D''_1 \mid A'_1)$ and $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}''_1.\nu c.(D''_1 \mid A'_1)$. In such a case, by denoting $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{n}''_1.\nu c.(D''_1 \mid _)$, $A' = A'_1$ and $tr = tr_1$, we obtain $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\tau}_p A'$. Lastly let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_p B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. By our inductive hypothesis, we know that $C[B] \rightarrow_p^* C'_1[B']$. But $C'_1[B'] = \nu \tilde{n}''_1.\nu c.(D''_1 \mid B') \rightarrow_p \nu c.(D''_1 \mid B') \equiv C'[B']$. Hence the result holds.

We have concluded the proof of the property for $s = \mathfrak{p}$ hence it remains the case $s = \mathfrak{e}$. Once, again several cases are already covered since $\xrightarrow{\ell}_{\mathfrak{p}} \subset \xrightarrow{\ell}_{\mathfrak{e}}$. Hence we only need to focus on the cases of the rules C-EAV and C-OEAV:

Case 8, rule C-EAV, i.e. $A'_1 = \nu\tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).Q_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q_2 \mid Q_3)$, $D'_1 = \text{eav}(c, y).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2\{u/x\} \mid Q_3)$ and u is of base type (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1). Note that in such a case $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Moreover, note this is the only possible combination of input and output since C'_1 is an attacker evaluation context and A'_1 is an honest extended process. Let us consider a fresh variable z . Hence $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)} \nu\tilde{r}.(Q_1 \mid Q_2\{u/x\} \mid Q_3 \mid \{u/z\})$. But since z is fresh, we deduce that $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu z.\nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2\{u/x\} \mid Q_3 \mid \{u/z\})$. Let $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu z.(P_1\{z/y\} \mid P_2 \mid _)$, $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(Q_1 \mid Q_2\{u/x\} \mid Q_3 \mid \{u/z\})$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1.\nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)$. We have $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_{\mathfrak{p}} A'$. Let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}} B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$.

We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'_2 \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}}^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once. Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we deduce that $\text{dom}(B'_1) = \text{dom}(A'_1)$ and $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}}^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[_]$ is e-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}} C'[B'_2]$ and $C'[_]$ is p-closing for B'_2 (since $C'[_]$ is e-closing for B'_2 and $B'_2 \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}}^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}}^* C'[B']$ and $C'[_]$ is p-closing for B').

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu\tilde{m}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, N).Q'_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$ for some \tilde{m} , N is of base type, Q'_1, Q'_2, Q'_3 and $B'_2 \equiv \nu\tilde{m}.(Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{N/x\} \mid Q'_3 \mid \{N/y\})$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{m}.(\text{eav}(c, y).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, N).Q'_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$. Moreover, since z is fresh, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu z.\nu\tilde{m}.(\text{eav}(c, y).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, z).Q'_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q'_2 \mid Q'_3 \mid \{N/z\})$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}} \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu y.\nu\tilde{m}.(P_1\{z/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{N/x\} \mid Q'_3 \mid \{N/z\}) \equiv C'[\nu\tilde{m}.(Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{N/x\} \mid Q'_3 \mid \{N/z\})] \equiv C'[B'_2]$. Note that since the rule is focused on base type terms, we directly have that $C'[_]$ is e-closing for B'_2 .

Case 9, rule C-OEAV, i.e. $A'_1 = \nu\tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d).Q_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q_2 \mid Q_3)$, $D'_1 = \text{eav}(c, y).P_1 \mid P_2$, $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{d/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q_1 \mid Q_2\{d/x\} \mid Q_3 \mid \omega d)$ and d is of channel type (We assume w.l.o.g. that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1). We have to do a case analysis on d :

- Case $d \in \tilde{r}$: Let us denote $\nu\tilde{r} = \nu\tilde{r}'.\nu d$. In such a case $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu d.\text{eav}(c, d)} \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2\{d/x\} \mid Q_3)$. But we know that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1 hence $A'' \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'_1.\nu d.(P_1\{d/y\} \mid P_2 \mid \omega d \mid \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2\{d/x\} \mid Q_3))$. Let $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{k}'.\nu d.(Q_1\{d/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d \mid _)$, $A' = \nu\tilde{r}'.(Q_1 \mid Q_2\{d/x\} \mid Q_3)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1.\nu d.\text{eav}(c, d)$. We have $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_{\mathfrak{e}} A'$. Let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu d.\text{eav}(c, d)}_{\mathfrak{e}} B'_2 \rightarrow_{\mathfrak{e}}^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once.

Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we deduce that $\text{dom}(B'_1) = \text{dom}(A'_1)$ and $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_e^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[-]$ is e-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_e C'[B'_2]$ and $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B'_2 (since $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B'_2 and $B'_2 \rightarrow_e^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_e^* C'[B']$ and $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B').

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\nu d. \text{eav}(c,d)}_e B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu \tilde{m}. \nu d. (\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d). Q'_1 \mid \text{in}(c, x) Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$ for some $\tilde{m}, Q'_1, Q'_2, Q'_3$ and $B'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3)$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. \nu d. (\text{eav}(c, y). P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d). Q'_1 \mid \text{in}(c, x) Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_e \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. \nu d. (P_1\{^d/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3 \mid \omega d) \equiv C'[\nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3)] \equiv C'[B'_2]$. Note that d is possible a new free channel of B'_2 . However, since we have ωd in C' , we ensure that C' is e-closing for B'_2 .

- Case $d \notin \tilde{r}$: In such a case $A'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{eav}(c,d)} \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q_3)$. But we know that the names and variables in \tilde{r} are not in D'_1 hence $A'' \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. (P_1\{^d/y\} \mid P_2 \mid \omega d \mid \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q_3))$. Let $C'[-] = \nu \tilde{k}'. (Q_1\{^d/y\} \mid Q_2 \mid \omega d \mid -)$, $A' = \nu \tilde{r}. (Q_1 \mid Q_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q_3)$ and $\text{tr} = \text{tr}_1. \text{eav}(c, d)$. We have $A'' \equiv C'[A']$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_e A'$. Let B' be a closed extended process such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_e B'$ and $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$. We have that there exists B'_1 such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_1}_e B'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{eav}(c,d)}_e B'_2 \rightarrow_e^* B'$. By renaming, we can assume that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once. Since $\phi(B') \sim \phi(A')$, we deduce that $\text{dom}(B'_1) = \text{dom}(A'_1)$ and $\phi(B'_1) \sim \phi(A'_1)$. Thus, we can apply our induction hypothesis on B'_1 . This allows us to deduce that $C[B] \rightarrow_e^* C'_1[B'_1]$ and $C'_1[-]$ is e-closing for B'_1 . In order to conclude, it remains to show that $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_e C'[B'_2]$ and $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B'_2 (since $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B'_2 and $B'_2 \rightarrow_e^* B'$ implies $C'[B'_2] \rightarrow_e^* C'[B']$ and $C'[-]$ is e-closing for B').

We have seen that $B'_1 \xrightarrow{\text{eav}(c,d)}_e B'_2$. Hence, $B'_1 = \nu \tilde{m}. (\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d). Q'_1 \mid \text{in}(c, x) Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$ with $d \notin \tilde{m}$ for some $\tilde{m}, Q'_1, Q'_2, Q'_3$ and $B'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3)$. But since we assumed that the bound names of B'_1 are distinct from the names of C'_1 and are bound only once, we obtain that $C'_1[B'_1] \equiv \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. (\text{eav}(c, y). P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, d). Q'_1 \mid \text{in}(c, x) Q'_2 \mid Q'_3)$. Hence $C'_1[B'_1] \rightarrow_e \nu \tilde{n}'_1. \nu \tilde{m}. (P_1\{^d/y\} \mid P_2 \mid Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3 \mid \omega d) \equiv C'[\nu \tilde{m}. (Q'_1 \mid Q'_2\{^d/x\} \mid Q'_3)] \equiv C'[B'_2]$. Note that d is possible a new free channel of B'_2 and b could be bound in \tilde{n}'_1 . However, since we have ωd in C' , we ensure that C' is e-closing for B'_2 . \square

Lemma 2. *Let A and B be two closed extended processes such that $A \approx_t^s B$. Let u be a name that occurs in $\text{fn}(A) \cup \text{fn}(B)$ and not in $\text{bn}(A) \cup \text{bn}(B)$, and u' be a fresh name. For all $s \in \{c, p, e\}$, we have $A\{u'/u\} \approx_t^s B\{u'/u\}$.*

Proof. By induction on the derivation. \square

The previous lemma indicates that the trace equivalence are preserved by replacement of free names.

As for the previous proposition, the proof of Theorem 1 is taken from [11] for the classical semantics and we adapt it for the private and eavesdropping semantics.

Theorem 1. $\approx_t^s \subsetneq \approx_m^s$ and $\approx_t^s = \approx_m^s$ on image-finite processes for $s \in \{c, e, p\}$.

Proof. We first prove that for all $s \in \{c, p, e\}$, $\approx_t^s \subseteq \approx_m^s$. Since we already proved in the body of the paper that there exists two closed honest extended processes such that $A \approx_m^s B$ but $A \not\approx_t^s B$, we would thus obtain that $\approx_t^s \subsetneq \approx_m^s$.

Let A, B be two closed extended processes such that $A \approx_t^s B$. Let $C[_]$ be an evaluation context s -closing for A and B , and c be a channel name. We assume w.l.o.g. that $C[_] = \nu \tilde{n}.(D_1 \mid \nu \tilde{m}.(_ \mid D_2))$ for some extended processes D, D' and for some sequences of names and variables \tilde{n} , and \tilde{m} . We assume w.l.o.g. that $\tilde{m} \cap (bn(A) \cup bv(A)) = \emptyset$ and $\tilde{m} \cap (bn(B) \cup bv(B)) = \emptyset$.

Let $A_2 = A\{\tilde{m}'/\tilde{m}\}$ and $B_2 = B\{\tilde{m}'/\tilde{m}\}$ where \tilde{m}' is a sequence of fresh names and variables. Thanks to Lemma 2, we have that $A_2 \approx_t^s B_2$. Hence, by structural equivalence, there exists $C_2[_] = \nu \tilde{k}.(D \mid _)$ such that $C[A] \equiv C_2[A_2]$ and $C[B] \equiv C_2[B_2]$.

Assume now that $C[A] \Downarrow_c^s$. This means that there exist an evaluation context C_1 that does not bind c , a term M , and a plain process P , $\theta \in \{\text{at}, \text{ho}\}$ such that $C[A] \equiv C_2[A_2] \rightarrow_s^* C_1[\text{out}^\theta(c, M).P]$. Applying Proposition 4 on A_2, B_2 and $C_2[_]$, we know that there exist a closed extended process A'_2 , an evaluation context $C'_2[_] = \nu \tilde{r}.(E \mid _)$ s -closing for A'_2 and $\text{tr} \in (\mathcal{A} \setminus \{\tau\})^*$ such that $C_1[\text{out}^\theta(c, M).P] \equiv C_2[A'_2]$, and $A_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s A'_2$, and for all closed extended process B'_2 such that $B_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B'_2$ and $\phi(B'_2) \sim \phi(A'_2)$, we have that $C_2[B_2] \rightarrow_s^* C'_2[B'_2]$. Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that $bn((\text{tr}) \cap fn((B_2))) = \emptyset$.

Since $C'_2[_] = \nu \tilde{r}.(E \mid _)$, we can deduce from $C_1[\text{out}^\theta(c, M).P] \equiv C'_2[A'_2]$ that the output $\text{out}^\theta(c, M)$ comes from the process E when $\theta = \text{at}$ or from A'_2 when $\theta = \text{ho}$. We distinguish these two cases:

- *Case $\theta = \text{at}$:* Since, we have that $A_2 \approx_t^s B_2$, we know that there exists B'_2 such that $B_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B'_2$ and $\phi(A'_2) \sim \phi(B'_2)$. Therefore, we have that $C_2[B_2] \rightarrow_s^* C'_2[B'_2] \equiv \nu \tilde{r}.(E \mid B'_2)$. But by hypothesis, we know that the output $\text{out}^\theta(c, M)$ comes from E and $c \notin \tilde{r}$. Hence we have that $C_2[B_2] \Downarrow_c^s$, and since $C[B] \equiv C_2[B_2]$, we conclude that $C[B] \Downarrow_c^s$.
- *Case $\theta = \text{ho}$:* Thus, we have that $A'_2 \equiv \nu \tilde{v}.(\text{out}^\theta(c, M).P \mid A_3)$ with $c \notin \tilde{v}, \tilde{r}$.

Thus, we have that $A'_2 \xrightarrow{\nu z.out(c, z)}_s \nu \tilde{v}.(P \mid A_3 \mid \{M/z\})$ where z is fresh (if M is a term of channel type, the transition is different but the proof can be done in a similar way.) Let $A'' = \nu \tilde{v}.(P \mid A_3 \mid \{M/z\})$ and $\text{tr}' = \text{tr} \cdot \nu z.out(c, z)$, we have that $A_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_s A''$. Since we have that $A_2 \approx_t^s B_2$, we have that there exists B'_2 such that $B_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_s B'_2$ and $\phi(A'') \sim \phi(B'_2)$. Since internal reduction rules do not modify the frame (modulo structural equivalence), we can deduce w.l.o.g. that there exists B' such that $B_2 \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_s B' \xrightarrow{\nu z.out(c, z)}_s B'_2$. Therefore, we have that there exists a term N , an evaluation context C_3 and a process Q such that $B' \equiv C_3[\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, N).Q]$ and c is not bind by C_3 . Furthermore, we have that $\phi(A'_2) \sim \phi(B')$ which means that $C_2[B_2] \rightarrow_s^* C'_2[B']$, and thus $C_2[B_2] \rightarrow_s^* C'_2[C_3[\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, N).Q]]$. Hence, we have that $C_2[B_2] \Downarrow_c^s$, and since $C[B] \equiv C_2[B_2]$, we conclude that $C[B] \Downarrow_c^s$. \square

This concludes the proof of $\approx_t^s \subseteq \approx_m^s$. It remains to prove that on image-finite processes, $\approx_t^s = \approx_m^s$ for all $s \in \{c, e, p\}$. We first focus on $s = c$.

Assume that $A \not\approx_t^c B$. We assume w.l.o.g. that $A \not\sqsubseteq_t^s B$. In such a case, there exists a witness for the non equivalence. This means that there exists A', tr such that $\text{bn}(\text{tr}) \cap \text{fn}(B) = \emptyset$, and for all $B', B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$ implies $\phi(A') \not\approx \phi(B')$. Moreover, we assume that no name in tr is bound twice (*i.e.* $\nu a.$ can not occur twice in tr) and bound names in tr are distinct from free names that occur in A, B , and tr .

We build an evaluation context $C_c[_]$ according to the trace tr and also the tests that witness the fact that static equivalence does not hold. Let $S_{\text{tr}} = \{\phi(B') \mid B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'\}$. Since B is image-finite, we know that S_{tr} / \sim is finite. Let $\{\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m\} = S_{\text{tr}} / \sim$. Note that m can be equal to 0 if there is no B' such that $B \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c B'$.

We know that $\{1, \dots, m\} = T^+ \uplus T^-$ with:

- for each $i \in T^+$, there exist two terms M_i and N_i such that $\text{fv}(M_i) \cup \text{fv}(N_i) \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(A'))$, $(M_i =_{\text{E}} N_i)\phi(A')$, and $(M_i \neq_{\text{E}} N_i)\phi_i$; and
- for each $i \in T^-$, there exist two terms M_i and N_i such that $\text{fv}(M_i) \cup \text{fv}(N_i) \subseteq \text{dom}(\phi(A'))$, $(M_i \neq_{\text{E}} N_i)\phi(A')$, and $(M_i =_{\text{E}} N_i)\phi_i$.

Let bad be a fresh channel name that does not occur in A and B . Let P_1, \dots, P_m, P_{m+1} be the plain processes defined as follows:

- $P_{m+1} \hat{=} \text{out}^{\text{at}}(\text{bad}, \text{bad}).0$
- for $1 \leq i \leq m$, we define P_i as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P_i &\hat{=} \text{if } M_i = N_i \text{ then } P_{i+1} \text{ else } 0 \quad \text{when } i \in T^+ \\ P_i &\hat{=} \text{if } M_i = N_i \text{ then } 0 \text{ else } P_{i+1} \quad \text{when } i \in T^- \end{aligned}$$

Let $\{a_1, \dots, a_k\}$ be channel names that occur free in A, B , and tr . Let $\mathcal{X}_{ch}^0 = \{x_{a_1}, \dots, x_{a_k}\}$ be a set of variables of channel type, and $\sigma = \{x_{a_1} \mapsto a_1, \dots, x_{a_k} \mapsto a_k\}$. Moreover, for all channel names $\{d_1, \dots, d_m\}$ that are bound in tr , we also associate fresh variables x_{d_1}, \dots, x_{d_m} .

We define $C_c[_]$ such that $C_c[_] = \nu \tilde{z}.(\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}^0) \mid _)$ where $\tilde{z} = \text{dom}(\phi(A))$ and $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch})$ is defined by recurrence on tr as follows:

- if $\text{tr} = \epsilon$ then $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = P_1$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{in}(a, M).\text{tr}'$ then $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, M).\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$;
- if $\text{tr} = \nu z.\text{out}(a, z).\text{tr}'$ and z is of base type then $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, x).\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$
- if $\text{tr} = \text{out}(a, c).\text{tr}'$ then $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, y).\text{if } y = x_c\sigma \text{ then } \mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch}) \text{ else } 0$ where y is fresh variable of channel type; and
- if $\text{tr} = \nu c.\text{out}(a, c)$ and c is of channel type then $\mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, x_c).\text{if } x_c \in \mathcal{X}_{ch}\sigma \text{ then } 0 \text{ else } \mathbb{Q}_c(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}'_{ch})$ where $\mathcal{X}'_{ch} = \mathcal{X}_{ch} \uplus \{x_c\}$.

We use the conditional $\text{if } u \in \{u_1, \dots, u_k\} \text{ then } 0 \text{ else } P$ as a shortcut for

$$\text{if } u = u_1 \text{ then } 0 \text{ else (if } u = u_2 \text{ then } 0 \text{ else } (\dots (\text{if } u = u_k \text{ then } 0 \text{ else } P) \dots)).$$

We can see that $C_c[A] \Downarrow_{\text{bad}}^c$ since $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}} A'$ and $\phi(A')$ satisfies by definition all the tests that are tested in P_1, \dots, P_m . However, by construction of $C_c[_]$, we have that $C_c[B] \not\Downarrow_{\text{bad}}^c$.

This concludes the proof for the case $s = c$. The proof for $s = p$ and e are very similar. We only need to slightly modify the context $C_c[-]$. In fact since the possible labels in the private semantics are the same as in the original semantics, we have $C_p[-] = C_c[-]$. However, for the eavesdropping semantics, we define $C_e[-]$ such that $C_e[-] = \nu \tilde{z}.(Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}^0) \mid -)$ where $\tilde{z} = \text{dom}(\phi(A))$ and $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch})$ is defined by recurrence on tr as follows:

- if $\text{tr} = \epsilon$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = P_1$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{in}(a, M).\text{tr}'$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, M).Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$;
- if $\text{tr} = \nu z.\text{out}(a, z).\text{tr}'$ and z is of base type then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, z).Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$;
- if $\text{tr} = \text{out}(a, c).\text{tr}'$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, y)$. if $y = x_c\sigma$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$ else 0 where y is fresh variable of channel type; and
- if $\text{tr} = \nu c.\text{out}(a, c)$ and c is of channel type then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(x_a\sigma, x_c)$. if $x_c \in \mathcal{X}_{ch}\sigma$ then 0 else $Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}'_{ch})$ where $\mathcal{X}'_{ch} = \mathcal{X}_{ch} \uplus \{x_c\}$.
- if $\text{tr} = \text{eav}(a, c).\text{tr}'$ with c of channel-type then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{eav}(x_a\sigma, y)$. if $y = x_c\sigma$ then $Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$ else 0 where y is fresh variable of channel type;
- if $\text{tr} = \nu z.\text{eav}(a, z).\text{tr}'$ and z is of base type then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{eav}(x_a\sigma, z).Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}_{ch})$;
- if $\text{tr} = \nu c.\text{eav}(a, c).\text{tr}'$ and c is of channel type then $Q_e(\text{tr}, \mathcal{X}_{ch}) = \text{eav}(x_a\sigma, x_c)$. if $x_c \in \mathcal{X}_{ch}\sigma$ then 0 else $Q_e(\text{tr}', \mathcal{X}'_{ch})$ where $\mathcal{X}'_{ch} = \mathcal{X}_{ch} \uplus \{x_c\}$.

□

D Proof of Theorem 6

In this section, we want to prove that $\approx_m^e \subseteq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$. In order to show that $\approx_m^e \subseteq \approx_m^c$, we need to build a transformation of context that would allow us to go from the classic semantics to eavesdropping semantics, and vice versa.

Notice that in the definition of structural equivalence $!A \mid !A$ is not equivalent to $!A$ even though they have the same behavior. In fact, for reachability, may equivalence, trace equivalence, observational equivalence and labeled bisimilar, using the structural equivalence coincides with using the structural equivalence augmented with the equality $!A \mid !A \equiv !A$. As such in this section, we will consider the structural equivalence augmented with the equality $!A \mid !A \equiv !A$.

Definition 11. Let P be an extended attacker process. We define \overline{P} inductively as follows:

- 0 when $P = 0$
- $\overline{P_1} \mid \overline{P_2}$ when $P = P_1 \mid P_2$
- P when $P = \{u/x\}$
- ωc when $P = \omega c$
- $\nu n.(\overline{P'} \mid \text{!eav}(n, y) \mid \text{!eav}(n, z))$ when $P = \nu n.P'$, n is of channel type and y, z are variables of base and channel type respectively.
- $\nu k.P'$ when $P = \nu n.P'$, n is of base type
- if $u = v$ then $\overline{P_1}$ else P_2 when $P = \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2$

- $\text{eav}(c, x).\overline{P'}$ when $P = \text{eav}(c, x).P'$
- $\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{P'}$ when $P = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).P$
- $\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\overline{P'}$ when $P = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).P'$ and x is of base type
- $\text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\overline{P'}$ ($!\text{eav}(x, y) \text{ } !\text{eav}(x, z)$) when $P = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).P', y, z$ are variables of base and channel type respectively.

Let \mathcal{T}_{ch} be the terms of channel type, i.e. names and variables of channel type. Let $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.(D \mid _)$ be an attacker evaluation context and S a set of channel names. We define $\overline{C}_S[_]$ as follows:

$$\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(D \mid _)} \mid \prod_{a \in \tilde{n} \cap \mathcal{T}_{ch}} !\text{eav}(a, y) \text{ } !\text{eav}(a, z) \mid \omega a \mid \prod_{a \in S} !\text{eav}(a, y) \text{ } !\text{eav}(a, z) \mid \omega a$$

where y and z are variables of base and channel type respectively.

In order to facilitate the readability of the proof, for a set S of names and variables, we will denote $\mathbb{P}(S) = \prod_{a \in S \cap \mathcal{T}_{ch}} !\text{eav}(a, y) \text{ } !\text{eav}(a, z)$ and $\mathbb{P}_o(S) = \prod_{a \in S \cap \mathcal{T}_{ch}} !\text{eav}(a, y) \text{ } !\text{eav}(a, z) \mid \omega a$. Moreover, we will consider that $\mathbb{P}(S) \mid \mathbb{P}(S) \equiv \mathbb{P}(S)$.

Hence, $\overline{C}_S[_]$ can now be written as $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(D \mid _)} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$.

Note that from the definition, we have that for all A closed honest extended process, if $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.(D \mid _)$ is c-closing for A then $\overline{C}_S[_]$ is e-closing for A for all S .

Lemma 3. *Let A be an extended process and $\nu\tilde{n}$ a sequence of names and variables. We have $\overline{\nu\tilde{n}.A} \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(A \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{n}))}$.*

Proof. Direct from the definition. \square

Lemma 4. *Let A be a closed honest extended process. Let $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D \mid _)}$ be an attacker evaluation context c-closing for A such that D is named-cleaned and eavesdrop-free. Let S be a set set of channel names such that $fc(C[A]) \subseteq S$.*

1. *For all $C[A] \rightarrow_c A_0$, there exist A' closed honest extended process, $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D' \mid _)}$ an attacker evaluation context c-closing for A' such that D' is name-cleaned and eavesdrop-free, $C'[A'] \equiv A_0$ and $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}'_S[A']$*
2. *For all $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e A_0$, there exist A' closed honest extended process, $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D' \mid _)}$ an attacker evaluation context c-closing for A' such that D' is name-cleaned and eavesdrop-free, $\overline{C}'_S[A'] \equiv A_0$ and $C[A] \rightarrow_c C'[A']$*

Proof. We first start by proving the first property. Notice that by structural equivalence, we can always assume that the bound names and variables in $C[A]$ are only bound once and are distinct from the free names in S . Indeed, for all $C''[_], A''$, if $C[A] \equiv C''[A'']$ only by renaming of bound names and variables then we obtain that $\overline{C}_S[A] \equiv \overline{C}''_S[A'']$.

We do a case analysis on the internal rule applied.

Case 1.a, rule THEN on D , i.e. $D = \text{if } u = v \text{ then } D_1 \text{ else } D_2 \mid D_3$ and $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(D_2 \mid D_3 \mid A)}$: In such a case we have $\overline{D} \rightarrow_e \overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_3}$ and so $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\overline{D} \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{n}))} \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_3} \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{n}))}$. By Lemma 3, we obtain that $\overline{\nu\tilde{n}.D} \rightarrow \overline{\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1 \mid D_3)}$. Let us denote $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1 \mid D_3) \mid _)}$ and $A' = A$. Since $\overline{C}'_S[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1 \mid D_3) \mid _)} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$, we obtain that $A_0 \equiv C'[A']$ and $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}'_S[A']$.

Case 1.b, rule ELSE on D: Similar to Case 1.a.

Case 2.a, rule THEN on A, i.e. $A \equiv \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(if } u = v \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2 \mid P_3)$ and $A_0 \equiv C[\nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_3 \text{)}]$: In such a case, let us denote $C'[_] = C[_]$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_3 \text{)}$. Therefore, $C'[A'] = C[A'] \equiv A_0$. Note that $A \rightarrow_e A'$. Hence $C[A] \rightarrow_e C[A']$ and $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}_S[A']$. Thus the result holds.

Case 2.b, rule ELSE on A: Similar to Case 2.a.

Case 3, rule COMM on A, i.e. $A \equiv \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3)$ and $A_0 \equiv C[\nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}]$: Note that even though $A \rightarrow_c \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$, we don't necessarily have that $A \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$. We have to do a case analysis on u and c :

- Case 3.a, $c \in \tilde{r}$: In such a case, we know from A being an honest processes that $c \notin \text{oc}(P_3)$. Thus we can apply rule C-PRIV to obtain that $A \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$. Hence, by denoting $C'[_] = C[_]$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$, we obtain that $C'[A'] = C[A'] \equiv A_0$, $A \rightarrow_e A'$ and so $C[A] \rightarrow_e C[A']$ and $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}_S[A']$. Therefore, the result holds.
- Case 3.b, $c \notin \tilde{r}$ and u of base type: In such a case, $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3 \mid \text{eav}(c, y) \rightarrow_e P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3$ by the rule C-EAV. Let us denote $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$. Since $c \notin \tilde{r}$, we obtain that $A \mid \text{eav}(c, y) \rightarrow_e A'$ and so $A \mid \text{!eav}(c, y) \rightarrow_e A' \mid \text{!eav}(c, y)$. By noticing that c is either in \tilde{n} or in $\text{fc}(C[A])$ and so in S , the structural equivalence gives us that $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}_S[A']$. Hence the result holds with $C'[_] = C[_]$.
- Case 3.c, $c \notin \tilde{r}$ and u of channel type: This case is very similar to Case 3.b. Indeed, $\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_2 \mid P_3 \mid \text{eav}(c, z) \rightarrow_e P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \mid \omega c$ by the rule C-OEAV. Let us denote $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\text{(} P_1 \mid P_2\{u/x\} \mid P_3 \text{)}$. Since $c \notin \tilde{r}$, we obtain that $A \mid \text{eav}(c, z) \rightarrow_e A' \mid \omega c$ and so $A \mid \text{!eav}(c, z) \mid \omega c \rightarrow_e A' \mid \text{!eav}(c, z) \mid \omega c$. By noticing that c is either in \tilde{n} or in $\text{fc}(C[A])$ and so in S , the structural equivalence gives us that $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}_S[A']$. Hence the result holds with $C'[_] = C[_]$.

Case 4, rule COMM on D, i.e. $D = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).D_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).D_2 \mid D_3$ and $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\text{(}\nu\tilde{m}.\text{(} D_1 \mid D_2\{u/x\} \mid D_3 \text{)} \mid A \text{)}$: Let us do a case analysis on u :

- Case 4.a, u is of base type: In such a case, we have $\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D}_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\overline{D}_2 \mid \overline{D}_3 \rightarrow_e \overline{D}_1 \mid \overline{D}_2\{u/x\} \mid \overline{D}_3$ by the rule C-ENV. Hence, $\nu\tilde{m}.\text{(out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D}_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\overline{D}_2 \mid \overline{D}_3 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m})) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{m}.\text{(}\overline{D}_1 \mid \overline{D}_2\{u/x\} \mid \overline{D}_3 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}))$. Let us denote $D' = (D_1 \mid D_2\{u/x\} \mid D_3)$. By Lemma 3, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D} \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D}'$. Hence, we deduce that $\nu\tilde{n}.\text{(}\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n})) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}.\text{(}\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D}' \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n})) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$. Let us denote $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\text{(}\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D}' \mid _ \text{)}$ and $A' = A$. We have $A_0 \equiv C'[A']$ and $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}'_S[A']$. Hence the result holds.
- Case 4.b, u is of channel type and $u \notin \tilde{m} \cup \tilde{n}$: In such a case, $u \in \text{fv}(C[A]) \subseteq S$ and we have $\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D}_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\text{(}\overline{D}_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(x) \text{)} \mid \overline{D}_3 \rightarrow_e \overline{D}_1 \mid \overline{D}_2\{u/x\} \mid \overline{D}_3 \mid \mathbb{P}(u) \mid \omega u$ by the rule C-OPEN. Since $u \notin \tilde{m}$, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{m}.\text{(out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D}_1 \mid \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).\text{(}\overline{D}_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(x) \text{)} \mid \overline{D}_3 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m})) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{m}.\text{(}\overline{D}_1 \mid \overline{D}_2\{u/x\} \mid \overline{D}_3 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m})) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$. Let us denote $D' = (D_1 \mid D_2\{u/x\} \mid D_3)$. By Lemma 3, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D} \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D}' \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$. Moreover, since $u \notin \tilde{n}$ then $\nu\tilde{n}.\text{(}\nu\tilde{m}.\overline{D} \mid A \mid$

$\mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \rightarrow_e \tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$. Lastly, since $u \in S$ and $\mathbb{P}_o(u) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u) \equiv \mathbb{P}_o(u)$, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S) \rightarrow_e \tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$. Therefore, the result holds with $A' = A$ and $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid _$.

- Case 4.c, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{n}$: This case is similar to Case 4.b. Since $u \notin \tilde{m}$, we can apply the same reasoning and obtain $\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \rightarrow_e \overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$ where $D' = (D_1 \mid D_2\{^u/x\} \mid D_3)$. Since $u \in \tilde{n}$ and $\mathbb{P}_o(u) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u) \equiv \mathbb{P}_o(u)$, we deduce that $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n})$. Therefore, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$ and so the result holds with $A' = A$ and $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid _$.
- Case 4.d, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{m}$: First of all, note that since $u \in \tilde{m}$, $\nu\tilde{m}.D \equiv \nu u.\nu\tilde{m}'.D$ for some \tilde{m}' such that $u \notin \tilde{m}'$. Note that since u is bound, $u \notin fv(A) \cup fn(A)$. Hence, by applying the same reasoning as in Case 4.b, we obtain that $\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \rightarrow_e \overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$ where $D' = (D_1 \mid D_2\{^u/x\} \mid D_3)$. Since $\mathbb{P}(u) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u) \equiv \mathbb{P}(u) \mid \omega u \mid \mathbb{P}(u) \equiv \mathbb{P}_o(u)$, we deduce that $\nu u.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D)} \mid \mathbb{P}(u) \rightarrow_e \nu u.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u)$. First, notice that $\nu u.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D)} \mid \mathbb{P}(u) = \nu u.\nu\tilde{m}'.\overline{D} \mid \overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)}$ by Lemma 3. Second, since u does not appear in A , we deduce that $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu u.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid \mathbb{P}_o(u))} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu u.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n} \cup \{u\})$. Hence, if we denote $\tilde{n}' = \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{u}$ then $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}')$. Therefore, by denoting $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}'.D')} \mid _$ and $A' = A$, we deduce $\overline{C}_S[A] \rightarrow_e \overline{C}'_S[A']$. Thus the result holds.

Case 5, rule COMM between A (input) and D (output), i.e. $D = \text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A \equiv \nu\tilde{r}.\text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2$ and $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1 \mid D_2 \mid P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)$: Note that $c \notin \tilde{m} \cup \tilde{r}$. Let us do a case analysis on u :

- Case 5.a, u is of base type: In such a case, let us split \tilde{r} and \tilde{m} in $\tilde{r}_b.\tilde{r}_c$ and $\tilde{m}_b.\tilde{m}_c$ respectively, such that \tilde{r}_c and \tilde{m}_c are of channel type, and \tilde{r}_b and \tilde{m}_b are of base type. Since u is of base type, we deduce that $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{m}_b.\nu\tilde{r}_b.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}_c.(D_1 \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}_c.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))}$. Note that $\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \rightarrow_e \overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2$ by the rule C-ENV. Hence $\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}) \rightarrow_e \overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m})$. Therefore, $\nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}))} \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}))}$. But $\nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(\text{out}^{\text{at}}(c, u).\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}))} \equiv \overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A$ thanks to Lemma 3 and since we assume that bound names and variables are bound once and distinct from free names and variables. Moreover, $\nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}))} \equiv \nu\tilde{m}_b.\nu\tilde{r}_b.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}_c.\overline{(\overline{D_1} \mid \overline{D_2} \mid \mathbb{P}(\tilde{m}_c))} \mid \nu\tilde{r}_c.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))}$. Therefore, let us denote $\tilde{n}' = \tilde{n}.\tilde{m}_b.\tilde{r}_b$, $D' = D_1 \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}_c.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)$. Notice that \tilde{m}_b and \tilde{r}_b being of base type implies that $\mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) = \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}')$. Hence $\nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid A \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}) \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S) \rightarrow_e \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}_c.D')} \mid A' \mid \mathbb{P}_o(\tilde{n}') \mid \mathbb{P}_o(S)$. Hence, the result holds with $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}_c.D')} \mid _$.
- Case 5.b, u is of channel type and $u \notin \tilde{m} \cup \tilde{n}$: Notice that in such a case $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D)} \mid \nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)}$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.b and the result will hold with $C'[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\overline{(\nu\tilde{m}.D')} \mid _$, $D' = D_1 \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.\overline{(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)}$.

- Case 5.c, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{n}$: Notice that in such a case $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1 \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.c and the result will hold with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.D' \mid -)$, $D' = D_1 \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)$.
- Case 5.d, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{m}$: Note that since $u \in \tilde{m}$, $\nu\tilde{m}.D \equiv \nu u.\nu\tilde{m}'.D$ for some \tilde{m}' such that $u \notin \tilde{m}'$. Hence, $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu u.(\nu\tilde{m}'.(D_1 \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.d and the result will hold with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'.(\nu\tilde{m}'.D' \mid -)$, $D' = D_1 \mid D_2$, $\tilde{n}' = \tilde{n}.u$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2)$.

Case 6, rule COMM between A (output) and D (input), i.e. $D = \text{in}^{\text{at}}(c, x).D_1 \mid D_2$, $A \equiv \nu\tilde{r}.(\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_1 \mid P_2)$ and $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{m}.\nu\tilde{r}.(D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2 \mid P_1 \mid P_2)$: Note that $c \notin \tilde{m} \cup \tilde{r}$. Let us do a case analysis on u :

- Case 6.a, u is of base type: In such a case, let us split \tilde{r} and \tilde{m} in $\tilde{r}_b.\tilde{r}_c$ and $\tilde{m}_b.\tilde{m}_c$ respectively, such that \tilde{r}_c and \tilde{m}_c are of channel type, and \tilde{r}_b and \tilde{m}_b are of base type. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 5.a and the result holds with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'.(\nu\tilde{m}_c.D' \mid -)$, $\tilde{n}' = \tilde{n}.\tilde{m}_b.\tilde{r}_b$, $D' = D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}_c.(P_1 \mid P_2)$.
- Case 6.b, u is of channel type and $u \notin \tilde{m} \cup \tilde{n}$: Notice that in such a case $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2))$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.b and the result will hold with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.D' \mid -)$, $D' = D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2)$.
- Case 6.c, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{n}$: Notice that in such a case $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.(D_1 \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.c and the result will hold with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}.(\nu\tilde{m}.D' \mid -)$, $D' = D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2)$.
- Case 6.d, u is of channel type and $u \in \tilde{m}$: Note that since $u \in \tilde{m}$, $\nu\tilde{m}.D \equiv \nu u.\nu\tilde{m}'.D$ for some \tilde{m}' such that $u \notin \tilde{m}'$. Hence, $A_0 \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.\nu u.(\nu\tilde{m}'.(D_1 \mid D_2) \mid \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{^u/x\} \mid P_2))$. The rest of the proof follows a similar reasoning as in Case 4.d and the result will hold with $C'[-] = \nu\tilde{n}'.(\nu\tilde{m}'.D' \mid -)$, $D' = D_1\{^u/x\} \mid D_2$, $\tilde{n}' = \tilde{n}.u$ and $A' = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1 \mid P_2)$.

This concludes the proof of the first property. The second property is in fact easy to prove: All rules in the eavesdropping semantics other than THEN and ELSE will be mapped by the rule COMM in the classical semantics. One can notice that since we know that A and C do not contain eavesdrop processes and since the transformation from A to \bar{A} and $C[-]$ to $\bar{C}_S[-]$ only adds processes of the form $\text{eav}(c, y).0$, the communication rules all become instances of the rule COMM. For instance, an application of rule C-EAV would result into the following

$$\text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid \text{eav}(c, y).0 \xrightarrow{\tau_e} P \mid Q\{^u/x\}$$

which is typically the rule COMM when we remove the transformation and so the process $\text{eav}(c, y).0$. Lastly, since any instance of ωd has no impact on the classical semantics, every rule thus corresponds to the rule COMM once the transformation is removed. \square

Corollary 1. *Let A be an closed honest extended process. Let $C[_] = \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{m}.D \mid _$ be an attacker evaluation context c-closing for A such that D is named-cleaned and eavesdrop-free. Let S be a set set of channel names such that $fc(C[A]) \subseteq S$. For all channel c , $C[A] \Downarrow_c^c$ iff $\overline{C}_S[A] \Downarrow_c^e$.*

Theorem 6. $\approx_m^e \subsetneq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$.

Proof. Consider two closed honest extended process A and B . We assume $A \approx_m^e B$. We first show that $A \approx_m^c B$.

Let $C[_]$ be an attacker evaluation context c-closing for A and B . Notice that in the classical semantics, a process $\text{eav}(c, x).P$ as the same behaviour as the process 0 . Hence, there exists $C^1[_]$ an attacker evaluation context eavesdrop-free and c-closing for A and B such that for all c , $C[A] \Downarrow_c^c \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^c$ and $C[B] \Downarrow_c^c \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^c$ (1). Moreover, relying on the structural equivalence, we deduce that there exists $C^2 = \nu\tilde{n}.\nu\tilde{m}.D \mid \nu\tilde{r}._ \mid E$ attacker evaluation context eavesdrop-free and c-closing for A and B such that D is named-cleaned, $C^1[A] \equiv C^2[A]$ and $C^1[B] \equiv C^2[B]$. Lastly, by renaming \tilde{r} through the structural equivalence, we deduce that there exist A', B' two closed honest extended process and $C^3[_] = \nu\tilde{n}'.\nu\tilde{m}'.(D' \mid _)$ attacker evaluation context eavesdrop-free and c-closing for A and B such that D is named-cleaned, $C^2[A] \equiv C^3[A']$ and $C^2[B] \equiv C^3[B']$. Therefore, we have $C^1[A] \equiv C^3[A']$ and $C^1[B] \equiv C^3[B']$. Lastly, let us denote $S = fc(C^3[A']) \cup fc(C^3[B'])$, relying on Lemma 3 and Definition 11, one can note that there exists C^4 attacker evaluation context e-closing for A and B such that $\overline{C^3}_S[A'] \equiv C^4[A]$ and $\overline{C^3}_S[B'] \equiv C^4[B]$.

We can conclude the proof as follows: Let $S = fc(C[A]) \cup fc(C[B])$. For all channel c ,

$$\begin{array}{lll}
& C[A] \Downarrow_c^c & \\
\text{iff} & C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^c & \text{by (1)} \\
\text{iff} & C^3[A'] \Downarrow_c^c & \text{since } C^1[A] \equiv C^3[A'] \\
\text{iff} & \overline{C^3}_S[A'] \Downarrow_c^e & \text{by Corollary 1} \\
\text{iff} & C^4[A] \Downarrow_c^e & \text{since } \overline{C^3}_S[A'] \equiv C^4[A] \\
\text{iff} & C^4[B] \Downarrow_c^e & \text{since } A \approx_m^e B \\
\text{iff} & \overline{C^3}_S[B'] \Downarrow_c^e & \text{since } \overline{C^3}_S[B'] \equiv C^4[B] \\
\text{iff} & C^3[B'] \Downarrow_c^c & \text{by Corollary 1} \\
\text{iff} & C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^c & \text{since } C^1[B] \equiv C^3[B'] \\
\text{iff} & C[B] \Downarrow_c^c & \text{by (1)}
\end{array}$$

Let us now prove that $A \approx_m^p B$. Let $C[_]$ be an attacker evaluation context p-closing for A and B . As for the classical semantics, notice that in the private semantics, a process $\text{eav}(c, x).P$ as the same behaviour as the process 0 . Hence, there exists $C^1[_]$ an attacker evaluation context eavesdrop-free and p-closing for A and B such that for all c , $C[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p$ and $C[B] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p$. Moreover, notice that $\rightarrow_p \subseteq \rightarrow_e$. Hence, for all c , $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p$ implies $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e$ and $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p$ implies $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. Furthermore, since $C^1[_]$ is eavesdrop-free and A, B are both honest, we deduce that rules C-EAV and C-OEAV can never be applied in a derivation of $C^1[A]$ or $C^1[B]$. Hence, we obtain that for all c , $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e$ and $C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. Lastly, $A \approx_m^e B$ implies that for all channel c , $C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e$. We can conclude

the proof by combining all these statements as follows: for all channel c ,

$$C[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C^1[A] \Downarrow_c^e \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^e \Leftrightarrow C^1[B] \Downarrow_c^p \Leftrightarrow C[B] \Downarrow_c^p$$

We have concluded the proof of $\approx_m^e \subseteq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$. Therefore, it remains to show that this inclusion is not strict. In Figure 6, we have provided two processes A and B such that $A \approx_\ell^c B$, $A \approx_\ell^p B$ but $A \not\approx_t^e B$. Notice that these processes do not contain replication and so are imagine-finite. Thus, by Theorem 1, $A \not\approx_t^e B$ implies $A \not\approx_m^e B$. Moreover, by Proposition 3, $A \approx_\ell^c B$ and $A \approx_\ell^p B$ implies $A \approx_t^c B$, $A \approx_t^p B$. Once again by Theorem 1, we deduce that $A \approx_m^c B$, $A \approx_m^p B$. Hence, we conclude that $\approx_m^e \subsetneq \approx_m^p \cap \approx_m^c$. \square

E Proof of Theorem 8

Theorem 8. *When restricted to I/O-unambiguous processes, we have that $\approx_r^p = \approx_r^e$ but $\approx_r^e \subsetneq \approx_r^c$ for $r \in \{\ell, t\}$.*

Proof. From Theorems 4, 6 and 5, we already know that $\approx_r^e \subseteq \approx_r^p \cap \approx_r^c$ for $r \in \{lbl, m, t\}$. Hence, for $r \in \{lbl, m, t\}$, we only need to prove that $\approx_r^p \subseteq \approx_r^e$ and $\approx_r^e \subseteq \approx_r^c$ to obtain the result.

Proof of $\approx_t^p \subseteq \approx_t^e$: Let A and B to honest I/O-unambiguous processes such that $A \approx_t^p B$. Let $A \xrightarrow{tr}_e A'$. By definition, we know that there exist ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n and extended processes A_0, \dots, A_n such that:

- tr is $\ell_1 \dots \ell_n$ where the τ are removed
- $A_0 = A$, $A_n = A'$
- $A_0 \xrightarrow{\ell_1}_e A_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_2}_e \dots \xrightarrow{\ell_n}_e A_n$.

Note that since A is honest, the rules C-ENV, C-OPEN, C-EAV, C-OEAV are never applied in the derivation. The idea is to

$$\approx_r^{s_1} = \approx_r^{s_2} \text{ for } r \in \{\ell, o, m, t\} \text{ and } s_1, s_2 \in \{c, p, e\}$$

We first focus on the proof of $\approx_r^{s_1} = \approx_r^{s_2}$ for $r \in \{\ell, o, m, t\}$ and $s_1, s_2 \in \{c, p, e\}$

F Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2. *For all ground, closed honest extended processes A , for all channels d , we have that $A \Downarrow_d^p$ iff $A \Downarrow_d^c$ iff $A \Downarrow_d^e$.*

Proof. We will prove that the following three implications: (1) $A \Downarrow_d^c \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^p$, (2) $A \Downarrow_d^p \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^e$ and (3) $A \Downarrow_d^e \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^c$.

Given a trace tr , let us denote $S(tr) = \{c \mid tr_1 out(c, t) tr_2 = tr \text{ and } tr_1 \text{ does not bind } c\}$.

Implication 1, $A \Downarrow_d^c \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^p$: Since A is honest, the only rules that differs are the rules COMM and C-PRIV. Furthermore, since A is honest we also know that $c \notin oc(A)$.

We show that for all $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_c A'$, there exist $\nu\tilde{n}.A'' \equiv A'$, tr' and a frame ϕ such that $S(\text{tr}) \subseteq S(\text{tr}')$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_p \nu\tilde{n}.(A'' \mid \phi)$ such that . We prove this result by induction on the length of the derivation $A \xrightarrow{\ell_1 \dots \ell_m}_c A'$ with tr being $\ell_1 \dots \ell_m$ without the τ actions.

Base case $m = 0$: Hence $\text{tr} = \varepsilon$ and so the result directly holds with $\phi = 0$.

Inductive step $m > 0$: In such a case, by our inductive hypothesis, there exists $\nu\tilde{r}.B \equiv A_{m-1}$ and a frame ϕ such that $S(\text{tr}) \subseteq S(\text{tr}')$ and $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_p \nu\tilde{r}.(B \mid \phi)$. W.l.o.g. we can assume that bound names and variables in $\tilde{r}.(B \mid \phi)$ are bound once and distinct from free names and variables. We can also assume that B is name-cleaned. We do a case analysis on the rule applied in $A_{m-1} \xrightarrow{\ell_m} A_m$.

- Case 1, any rule but the rule COMM: In such a case, by definition of the semantics, the result directly holds
- Case 2, rule COMM: In such a case, $B = \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).P_1 \mid \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P_2 \mid P_3$ and $A_m = \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid P_3)$. We do a case analysis on c and u :
 - $c \in \tilde{r}$: then since $c \notin \text{oc}(A)$ (A_{m-1} is honest) and by applying rule C-PRIV we obtain that $\tilde{r}.(B \mid \phi) \xrightarrow{\varepsilon}_p \tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid P_3 \mid \phi)$. Hence the result holds.
 - $c \notin \tilde{r}$ and u is of base type: By applying OUT-T followed by IN, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{r}.(B \mid \phi) \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c,z).\text{in}(c,z)}_p \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid P_3 \mid \phi \mid \{u/z\})$ with z fresh. Hence the result holds.
 - $c \notin \tilde{r}$ and u is of channel type: By applying OUT-CH followed by IN, we obtain that $\nu\tilde{r}.(B \mid \phi) \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c,u).\text{in}(c,u)}_p \nu\tilde{r}.(P_1\{u/x\} \mid P_2 \mid P_3 \mid \phi \mid \{u/x\})$. Hence the result holds.

We conclude by noticing that if $A \Downarrow_d^c$ then there exist A_c, tr_c such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_c}_c A_c$ and $d \in S(\text{tr}_c)$. Thus by our property, we obtain that there exist A_p, tr_p such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_p}_p A_p$ and $S(\text{tr}_c) \subseteq S(\text{tr}_p)$ and so $d \in S(\text{tr}_p)$ which implies $A \Downarrow_d^p$.

Implication 2, $A \Downarrow_d^p \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^e$: As $A \Downarrow_d^p$, there exists tr, A' such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_p A'$ and $d \in S(\text{tr})$. Since $\xrightarrow{\ell}_p \subset \xrightarrow{\ell}_e$, $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_e A'$ and so $A \Downarrow_d^e$.

Implication 3, $A \Downarrow_d^e \Rightarrow A \Downarrow_d^c$: Since A is honest, the only rules that differ are the rules COMM, C-PRIV, EAV-OCH, EAV-CH, EAV-T.

We show that for all $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}}_e A'$, there exist tr' such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}'}_c A'$ and $S(\text{tr}) \subseteq S(\text{tr}')$. We prove this result by induction on the length of the derivation $A \xrightarrow{\ell_1 \dots \ell_m}_c A'$ with tr being $\ell_1 \dots \ell_m$ without the τ actions.

Base case $m = 0$: Hence $\text{tr} = \varepsilon$ and so the result directly holds with $\text{tr}' = \varepsilon$.

Inductive step $m > 0$: In such a case, by our inductive hypothesis, there exists tr'' such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}''}_e A_{m-1}$. W.l.o.g. we can assume that bound names and variables in A_{m-1} are bound once and distinct from free names and variables. Moreover we can assume that $A_{m-1} = \nu\tilde{n}.B$ with B name-cleaned. We do a case analysis on the rule applied in $A_{m-1} \xrightarrow{\ell_m} A_m$.

- Case 1, rule C-PRIV: In such a case, $B = \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid R$, $c \in \tilde{n}$ and $A_m \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R)$. Notice that $B \xrightarrow{\tau}_c \nu\tilde{n}.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R)$ by rule COMM hence the result holds with $\text{tr}' = \text{tr}''$.
- Case 2, rule EAV-OCH: In such a case, $B = \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid R$, $\ell = \nu u.\text{eav}(c, u)$, u is of channel type, $u \in \tilde{n}$ and $A_m \equiv \nu\tilde{n}'.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R)$ with $\tilde{n} = \tilde{n}'.u$. By applying rule OPEN-CH followed by rule IN, we obtain that $A_{m-1} \xrightarrow{\nu u.\text{out}(c, u).\text{in}(c, u)}_c A_m$. Hence the result holds with $\text{tr}' = \text{tr}''.\nu u.\text{out}(c, u).\text{in}(c, u)$.
- Case 3, rule EAV-CH: In such a case, $B = \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid R$, $\ell = \text{eav}(c, u)$, u is of channel type, $u \notin \tilde{n}$ and $A_m \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R)$. By applying rule OUT-CH followed by rule IN, we obtain that $A_{m-1} \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c, u).\text{in}(c, u)}_c A_m$. Hence the result holds with $\text{tr}' = \text{tr}''.\text{out}(c, u).\text{in}(c, u)$.
- Case 4, rule EAV-T: In such a case, $B = \text{out}^{\text{ho}}(c, u).P \mid \text{in}^{\text{ho}}(c, x).Q \mid R$, $\ell = \nu z.\text{eav}(c, z)$, u is of base type and $A_m \equiv \nu\tilde{n}.(P \mid Q\{u/x\} \mid R \mid \{u/z\})$. By applying rule OUT-T followed by rule IN, we obtain that $A_{m-1} \xrightarrow{\nu z.\text{out}(c, z).\text{in}(c, z)}_c A_m$. Hence the result holds with $\text{tr}' = \text{tr}''.\nu z.\text{out}(c, z).\text{in}(c, z)$.
- Case 5, any other rule : In such a case, by definition of the semantics, the result directly holds.

We conclude by noticing that if $A \Downarrow_d^e$ then there exist A' , tr_e such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_e}_e A'$ and $d \in S(\text{tr}_e)$. Thus by our property, we obtain that there exist tr_c such that $A \xrightarrow{\text{tr}_c}_c A'$ and $S(\text{tr}_e) \subseteq S(\text{tr}_c)$ and so $d \in S(\text{tr}_c)$ which implies $A \Downarrow_d^c$. \square