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Conference papers

Removing the Strong RSA Assumption from Arguments over the Integers

Abstract : Committing integers and proving relations between them is an essential ingredient in many cryptographic protocols. Among them, range proofs have shown to be fundamental. They consist in proving that a committed integer lies in a public interval, which can be seen as a particular case of the more general Diophantine relations: for the committed vector of integers x, there exists a vector of integers w such that P (x,w) = 0, where P is a polynomial. In this paper, we revisit the security strength of the statistically hiding commitment scheme over the integers due to Damgard-Fujisaki, and the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of openings. Our first main contribution shows how to remove the Strong RSA assumption and replace it by the standard RSA assumption in the security proofs. This improvement naturally extends to generalized commitments and more complex proofs without modifying the original protocols. As a second contribution, we design an interactive technique turning commitment scheme over the integers into commitment scheme modulo a prime p. Still under the RSA assumption, this results in more efficient proofs of relations between committed values. Our methods thus improve upon existing proof systems for Diophantine relations both in terms of performance and security. We illustrate that with more efficient range proofs under the sole RSA assumption.
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Contributor : David Pointcheval Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, February 20, 2017 - 1:08:27 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 17, 2022 - 10:08:38 AM




Geoffroy Couteau, Thomas Peters, David Pointcheval. Removing the Strong RSA Assumption from Arguments over the Integers. EUROCRYPT 2017 - 36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Apr 2017, Paris, France. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_11⟩. ⟨hal-01471901⟩



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